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PREFACE
This book was written as a doctoral thesis. It was submitted to and
accepted b^ the University of Poona in 1979.
Several people contributed to the creation of this book, in various ways.
Prof. S. D. Joshi, my supervisor, introduced me to the study of the Sanskrit
grammatical tradition. His unfailing skepticism towards and disagreement
with the ideas worked out in this book contributed more to their
development than he may have been aware. Prof. Paul Kiparsky gave
encouragement when this was badly needed. In the years following 1979
Dr. Dominik Wujastyk was kind enough to read the manuscript and
suggest improvements in language and style. To all of these I owe a debt of
gratitude, but most of all I owe such a debt to Pandit Shivarama Krishna
Shastri. In the course of several years he read with me many portions of
Nagesa's grammatical and other works, and much besides. His ability to
understand difficult grammatical and philosophical texts in Sanskrit was
unequalled, and without his help it would have taken far longer to write this
book and indeed might very well have proved impossible. Shivarama
Krishna Shastri never saw the result of our reading; he died before this
book could appear in print. I dedicate it to his memory.
J. BRONKHORST
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INTRODUCTION
In the following pages an attempt will be made to establish that the part of
Nagesa's Paribhasendusekhara (P$) which deals with Par. L (asiddham
bahirangam antarange) has not been correctly understood from
Vaidyanatha Payagunda - Nagesa's own pupil - onward. In other
words, it is here claimed that an important portion (I'apogee du
Paribhasendusekhara, as Renou calls it) of the most widely studied book
written by the most recent grammarian of importance has been
misinterpreted.
I shall propose for consideration an interpretation of the P$ on Par. L
which at certain points is closer to the exact wording of the text than any
other interpretation of it that I am aware of; which does not contain
internal contradictions where other interpretations do; which makes good
sense where others stumble. On the other hand, the demand that the text be
without contradictions will force me to consider it as slightly deviating
from its original form at two places. The difficulties which are thus avoided
also existed in the other interpretations of the text, but were not heeded
there.1
The methodological consideration on which this study is based is of such
simplicity that one wonders if it deserves to be explicitly stated. It has been
expressed as follows by Thieme (Kleine Schriften II, pp. 602-603).2
In interpreting a given text, our basic assumption is that the author
means to make sensible statements and to be consistent with himself.
Our endeavour is to construct and understand his sentences so as to
yield sense and consistency.
Let me make it clear that acceptance of this principle does not mean that I
consider it impossible that, to stick to our text, Nagesa made slips in, or
somehow failed to remove inconsistencies from, the P$. On the contrary,
the possibilities range from a text that is meaningful and consistent down to
its minutest details on the one hand, to a text that was (to use a well-known
metaphor) "produced by a monkey on a typewriter" on the other. That is to
say, there is no certain way to decide whether the P$ is "the product of
Nagesa's mature intellect and scholarship,"3 or the more or less accidental
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outcome of the efforts of someone who understood what he was writing
about only imperfectly, or not at all.
My claim4 is that one must hold on to the assumption that the text is
meaningful and consistent for as long as possible. Even if one cannot find a
meaningful and consistent interpretation, he cannot with certainty say that
such an interpretation does not exist. Someone else may find one someday.
But if the possibility is admitted that a certain text has no consistent
meaning, why should we cling to the assumption that it has? Why should
we not be more ready to admit that certain texts are inconsistent, or even
meaningless?
I think the answer is as follows: because such interpretations are
extremely uninteresting and can be defended always and everywhere. The
most interesting and sensible statements can be accounted for as due to
chance. In short, such interpretations are irrefutable.
Interesting interpretations are those interpretations that "stick out their
necks" - which are ready, as it were, to be superseded by better
interpretations. If one accepts too soon that the author was careless while
writing his book, that he overlooked something, or if one finds another
excuse for not taking the text seriously, one has bartered away the
possibility of finding a meaningful, consistent interpretation even if it
exists. (And finding such an interpretation is the reason we take the trouble
to read the text at all.) Such tactics make the interpretation at which one
has arrived unassailable. If, on the other hand, one refrains from using such
devices, then every clash between the text and the interpretation demands a
solution. In such cases the fault is either with the interpretation or with the
text as it has reached us. Only when we see no other way out can we
tentatively consider our failure to reach a satisfactory interpretation as due
to carelessness on the part of the author. And even if we have found a
satisfactory interpretation, nothing guarantees that one day someone else
will not arrive at an interpretation that fits the text even better.
But the possibility remains that we are wasting our energies on a text
which really is inconsistent or even meaningless. I think this is the price we
have to pay for an otherwise sound methodological principle. And as
consolation we may remember that the number of cases where we shall find
a consistent interpretation that fits a text which is "really" inconsistent will
be small indeed.
The methodological principle described above has the advantage that it
accords well with common sense. This is perhaps the reason why so few
people have taken the trouble of giving it an explicit formulation. The
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major part of this book, I believe, will be convincing to every careful reader,
even without his being aware that a methodological principle is involved.
However, in the description of this principle given above no information
was provided as to the extent to which the principle is to be followed,
information which would answer the question: consistency at what price?
There are procedures which, though in agreement with our principle, bring
us dangerously close to the limit of what our common sense is willing to
accept. Two restrictions must therefore be imposed.
First, the interpretation which we lend to the text should not be extended
in an ad hoc manner in order to accommodate a recalcitrant passage.
Secondly, the interpretation should not deviate from the wording of the
text. Obviously, no general rules can be given as to when an interpretation
is extended in an ad hoc fashion, and when it no longer fits the wording of
the text. It will, however, in general be possible to say of two competing
interpretations which one is closer to the text and which one requires fewer
ad hoc measures.5
The present work consists of four parts. In parts I - III I shall propound
the interpretation of the P$ on Par. L which I think is the correct one. That
is to say, in Part I this interpretation is shown to be in agreement with the
text of the P$\ indeed, it is arrived at on the basis of that text. In Part II other
passages of the P$ on Par. L are studied in the light of the interpretation
arrived at in Part I. In Part III the same is done with regard to passages of
the P§ outside Par. L. Not much attention is paid here to the opinions of
the commentators. Only Kielhorn's translation is criticized in certain
places.
That Kielhorn had difficulties in translating the P$ on Par. L, and that
here more than elsewhere he relied not only on the commentaries, but on
the oral instruction of Bhaskara Shastri (for which Kielhorn went to
Satara), has been recorded by K. V. Abhyankar in the preface to the second
edition of Kielhorn's translation of the P$ (p. 6). Kielhorn was a very
meticulous translator, who in his translation brought together the best
which the commentaries known to him had to offer with a sharp eye for the
exact wording of the text. Criticizing his translation where it went wrong
therefore seemed to me a good starting-point for criticizing the commentarial
tradition.
But the fountainhead of this commentarial tradition is Vaidyanatha
Payagunda's commentary on the P$9 named Gada. The ideas regarding the
BP found therein are expounded and criticized in Part IV. What is more, an
attempt is made to reconstruct how Vaidyanatha arrived at his ideas.
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As I said above, Kielhorn's translation is close to the text and is based on
the best the commentaries had to offer. Indeed, in general it is hard to
improve upon, and I have not tried to do so. In most instances, I have made
use of his translation with only minor changes; and where I thought his
translation was incorrect, I have all the same employed as much of it as
possible.
In a number of places it was found that the P$ did not contain enough
information to settle some of the nicer points of Nagesa's interpretation of
the BP. In such cases I turned to Nagesa's other grammatical works. In
doing so, however, it soon became clear that Nagesa's ideas regarding the
BP had gone through a process of evolution. Considerations which the
reader can find reproduced in Appendices III - V led me in the end to trust
only the L&£ as a reliable supplement to the P§. Indeed, a study of all the
passages of the L$$ which in one way or another make use of the BP
convinced me that Nagesa's ideas regarding this Paribhasa remained
unchanged during the time that elapsed between writing the P§ and the
LSSfi
During the development of the thesis which is the main subject of this
book, certain data presented themselves which throw light on the relative
chronology of Nagesa's grammatical works. On this account it was possible
to arrive at a fuller picture of these works and their mutual relations than
was hitherto available. In Appendix III the several threads of the
investigations by myself and others come together.
PARTI
NAGESA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BP

1. THE STRUCTURE OF NAGESA'S DISCUSSION
P§ 76.7-8, App. I 11. 1-2
nityad apy antarangam baliyo 'ntarahge bahirangasydsiddhatvat / tad
aha I ASIDDHAM BAHIRANGAM ANTARANGE /
"An antarahga (rule) possesses greater force even than a nitya (rule),
because that which is bahiranga is (regarded as) not having taken
effect (or as not existing) when that which is antdrariga (is to take
effect). This (the author of the Paribhasas) expresses (thus):
Par. L: That which is bahiranga is (regarded as) not having taken
effect (or as not existing) when that which is antaranga (is to take
effect)." (K. p. 221.)
This passage merely introduces the BP. We quickly pass on to the next.
PS16. 9-11, App. I 11. 3-5
antarmadhye bahirangasastriyanimittasamuddyamadhye'ntarbhutany
arigani nimittani yasya tad antarangam / evam tadiyanimittasamuddydd
bahirbhutdngakam bahirangam /
"Antarahga is (a rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie
within the sum of the causes of a bahiranga rule; in like manner (that
rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie without the sum of
the causes of that {antaranga rule) is bahiranga" (Cf. K. pp.221-222.)
As Kielhorn points out in a footnote (p. 222, fn. 1), not only can a rule be
antaranga or bahiranga, but so can "an operation, or that which is taught in
a rule". Since confusion in this respect does not seem possible, I shall,
following in the footsteps of Kielhorn, use "rule" and "operation"
arbitrarily, when a noun is required with which the term antaranga or
bahiranga is to be in apposition.
The translation given here of the passage last cited differs from
Kielhorn's translation of the same in two places. Kielhorn translates the
first sentence as follows:
4 CHAPTER 1
Antaranga is (a rule) the causes (of the application) of which lie within
(or before) the sum of the causes of a bahiranga rule;
That is to say, Kielhorn adds in parentheses the words "or before".
Similarly in the next sentence he adds "(or beyond)" after "without", so
that his translation of this second sentence is:
in like manner (that rule) the causes (of the application) of which
lie without (or beyond) the sum of the causes of that (antaranga rule)
is bahiranga.
It is to be noted that both times Kielhorn gives these words - in the first
sentence "or before", in the second "or beyond" - in parentheses, which
indicates that nothing in the Sanskrit original corresponds to these words.
Since moreover the translation makes perfect sense without them, one
wonders if their inclusion was really necessary.
In spite of this, the two examples discussed in a footnote to Kielhorn's
translation (K. pp. 222-223, fn. 2) both present situations wherein the rules
which are supposed to be antaranga are such that their causes lie before, not
within, the causes of the rules assumed to be bahiranga. In the first
example, si-u-na, two rules apply simultaneously: P. 6.1.77 (iko yan aci)
teaches the substitution of y for I; P. 7.3.86 (pugantalaghupadhasya ca)
prescribes substitution of Guna for the penultimate I before the affix na.
The cause of P. 6.1.77 is u, the cause of P. 7.3.86 is na; u is before na, and
from this the conclusion isdrawn that P. 6.1.77 is antaranga, and P. 7.3.86
bahiranga. The case is similar in the second example, the derivation of
narpatya.
Let me, at this point, assure the reader that I am well aware that at a later
stage Nagesa does introduce operations which are antaranga because their
causes lie before the causes of the corresponding bahiranga operations. So
it might be argued that Kielhorn here merely anticipates the sequel to help
the reader. Be that as it may, what I wish to emphasize is that both the
examples given by Kielhorn to illustrate the passage under discussion do
not illustrate this passage, because Kielhorn does not given an example
where the causes of the application of one rule lie within the causes of the
application of another rule. But this is what Nagesa is talking about. Antar
means "within", and if this word is not clear enough, it is immediately
followed by madhye, which carries the same meaning. Later I shall try to
show that Kielhorn's "anticipating the sequel" made him lose sight of a vital
distinction between the earlier and the later passages, as a result of which
STRUCTURE OF NAGESA'S DISCUSSION 5
the overall scheme of Nagesa 's discussion became blurred. At this time I
merely want to draw attention, not to a mistaken translation on the part of
Kielhorn, for this would be saying too much, but to what may very well be
the germ from which later mistakes spring.
We do not yet fully know what exact meaning the word ahga - which is
equated with nimitta - is considered to have. The following passage throws
some light on this.
P$16. 12-13, App. I 11.6-8
atrahgasabdena sabdariipam nimittam eva grhyate sabdasastre tasya
pradhanatvat / tenarthanimittakasya na bahirahgatvam /
"The word ahga in this (Paribhasa) denotes only a formal cause (such
as a sound or a combination of sounds), because in a work which
teaches the formation of words main importance attaches to the
wordform. (When) therefore (an operation is) caused by the meaning,
it is not (on that account) bahirahga, (and the present Paribhasa
cannot affect it)." (Cf. K. pp. 223-224.)
The next passage provides further information.
P$S\. 1-2, App. 111.34-35
paribhdsayam ahgasabdena saptamyadyantopattam sabdarupam
nimittam eva grhyate
". . .the word ahga in the Paribhasa only denotes a formal cause (such
as a sound or a combination of sounds) exhibited (in a rule)l in a
locative or other case." (Cf. K. p. 229.)
This is what Nagesa tells us with respect to the significance of the word
ahga. Some more information to elucidate the phrase "in a locative or other
case" would have been welcome. It will, however, become apparent in the
course of our study that if we read this phrase as ttin a locative case",
satisfactory results are obtained in the majority of cases we shall encounter.
Later (in Chapter 2) the question of what constitutes the other case or
cases will be discussed in detail.
The next passage is polemical in nature. It contests the view that the BP
interferes with the proper formation of the words gaudherah and pacet.
The reason for including it here is that it introduces a new criterion of
Antarahgatva.
6 CHAPTER 1
P$7S. 1-3, App. I 11. 12-14
etena gaudherah paced itydddv eyddindm an'gasamjndpeksatvena
bahirangataydsiddhatvdd vali lopo na sydd iti paras tarn / eyddesdder
aparanimittakatvendntararigatvdc ca / /
"This (circumstance that the word ahga in the present Paribhasa
denotes only a formal cause) proves the incorrectness of the assertion
that in (the formation of) gaudhera, pacet etc. the elision, (by P.
6.1.66, of the semivowel y of gaudhey-ra, pacey-t etc.) ought (by the
present Paribhasa) not to take place because (the substitution, by P.
7.1.2 etc., of) eY etc. (for the initial consonant of the affix dhrak etc.)
would be bahiranga, because of its dependence on (dhrak etc. as
preceded by something) termed 'Ariga', and would therefore be
regarded as not having taken effect (when P. 6.1.66 would be
applicable; for the 'dependence on dhrak as preceded by something
termed 'Ariga', cannot be called a formal cause). Moreover (that
assertion is proved to be incorrect) by the fact that (on the contrary)
the substitutes ey etc. are antaranga because they are not caused by
something following." (K. pp. 225-226.)
In the derivation of gaudherah from godhd-dhrak the following two
rules apply in this order: P. 7.1.2 (dyaneyinlyiyah phadhakhacchaghdm
pratyayddfndm) prescribes substitution of ey for dh of dhrak; P. 6.1.66
(lopo vyor vali) subsequently causes dropping of y before ra. P. 7.1.2 has no
following cause; P. 6.1.66, on the other hand, does have a following cause:
dropping of y is caused by the r that follows. Such being the case, the above
passage states that P. 7.1.2 is antaranga and P. 6.1.66 bahiranga.
The situation is similar in the derivation of pacet from paca-yd-t2. First P.
7.2.80 (ato yeyah) substitutes iy for yd\ it has no following cause. Then P.
6.1.66 causes elision of y; the following cause is T. Again, the operation
without following cause is antaranga', the one with following cause,
bahiranga.
Here then Nagesa for the first time illustrates how, in his opinion, the
terms antaranga and bahiranga are to be assigned to rules, or operations.
But this first pair of illustrations is also an exception to the general rule,
formulated earlier, that the causes of the antaranga rule must be within the
causes of the bahiranga rule. For here the antaranga rule has no following
cause, whereas the bahiranga rule does, so that inclusion is out of the
question.
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This means that thus far we have met with two conditions which, when
fulfilled, make one rule antarahga with respect to another rule, which is
bahiranga. Since, at least for the time being, only the sounds or
combinations of sounds indicated in a rule in a locative case (see above) are
accepted as causes we write here throughout "cause", not "followingcause".
The conditions are:
(1) The causes of the application of the antarahga rule lie within the
causes of the application of the bahiranga rule.
(2) The antarahga rule has no cause, whereas the bahiranga rule does.
It is, incidentally, interesting to note that the disparity between these two
conditions is not as great as might be supposed. In point of fact, they can be
reformulated in such a way that one single condition remains, as follows:
"The class of causes of the application of the antarahga rule is properly
included in the class of causes of the application of the bahiranga rule. "That
this single condition covers both the conditions enumerated above can be
shown as follows: When the causes of the antarahga rule lie within the
causes of the bahiranga rule,obviously the class of causes of the antarahga
rule is properly included in the class of causes of the bahiranga rule. When
the antarahga rule has no causes, the class of causes of the antarahga rule is
the null class. This null class again is properly included in every class which
is not itself the null class, i.e., which contains at least one element; it is
therefore also properly included in the class of causes of the bahiranga rule,
provided this latter class contains at least one element.
It is, obviously, not contended here that Nagesa had this new formulation in
mind when he wrote on the BP.3 He could not have, for the new condition
makes use of concepts of modern set theory, with which Nagesa could not
have been acquainted. All that the above exposition is intended to show is
that the two conditions for Antarahgatva introduced thus far by Nagesa are
less discontinuous than they may seem to be.
After this little disgression we return to Nagesa's text. The next passage
that deserves * our attention explains the meaning, not of the terms
antarahga and bahiranga as the previous passages did, but of the Paribhasa
in which these terms figure.
/ t f84. 1, App. I 11.51-52
antarahge kartavye jatam tatkalapraptikam ca bahirahgam asiddham ity
arthah /
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"The meaning (of the Paribhasa) is this, that when an antaranga (rule
or operation) is about to take effect, a bahiranga (rule or operation)
which (already) has taken effect, and likewise (a bahiranga rule or
operation) which applies simultaneously (with the antaranga rule or
operation), is (regarded as) not having taken effect or (as) not
existing." (Cf. K. p. 234.)
In the passages to be studied next, Nagesa will introduce a second
interpretation of the BP which, together with the first interpretation, is
expected to cover all cases where this Paribhasa is applicable. In order to
keep the two interpretations clearly apart, it does not seem out of place here
to summarize what has been found so far with respect to the first
interpretation.
(1) Concerning the meaning of the words antaranga and bahiranga, it
has been found that a rule or operation is antaranga with respect to another
rule or operation - which is bahiranga - when its causes lie within the causes
of that other one. This condition is also to be considered satisfied when the
former rule has no c^use, whereas the latter has. "Cause" (anga or nimitta)
in this context must be understood to mean formal (sabdarupd) cause,
exhibited in a rule (for the time being: merely) in a locative case.
(2) The BP, on this interpretation of the terms antaranga and bahiranga,
comes to mean: When an antaranga and a bahiranga rule apply
simultaneously, the antaranga rule takes effect first; when a bahiranga rule
has taken effect, and subsequently an antaranga rule applies, the former is
to be regarded as not having taken effect with respect to the latter.
No more will be said now regarding the first interpretation of the BP. For
a proper understanding of what Nagesa has to say further, it will be
advantageous to become acquainted, even at this early stage, with his
second, supplementary, interpretation of this Paribhasa.
/tf 96. 1-3, App. 111. 129-132
- nanv evam asusruvad ity atra laghupadhagunad uvario'lpa-
nimittatvdbhdvdd uvah na sydd iti cet / na / tatrdntahkdrya-
tvariipdntarangatvasattvdt antahkdryatvam ca purvopasthitanimittaka-
tvam angasabdasya nimittaparatvdt I
"Now one might maintain that (if then the term antaranga were) thus
(employed strictly in what has above been considered to be its proper
sense, it ought) in (the formation of) the aorist par. (asusruvat) of sru,
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(where the question arises whether for the radical u uv should by P.
6.4.77 be substituted before a, or Guna by P. 7.3.86 before T, not to be
applied to the substitution of uv), because here (the substitution of)
uv has not (even) fewer causes than (that of) Guna for the
prosodially short penultimate, (and not being antaranga) uv ought
not to be substituted (for u). But this would be untenable; for (the
substitution of uv) is antaranga, viz. antaranga in the sense which is
expressed by the word antahkarya\ and by antahkarya we mean that
the cause (a of the substitution of uv, in the order of the
pronunciation of the sounds,) precedes (the cause t of the substitution
of Guna); for the word ahga is equivalent to nimitta i.e. 'cause'." (Cf.
K. pp. 259-260.)
It is in trying to understand the present passage that our insistence on
interpreting the word antar literally (see above) starts bearing fruit. For this
is one of the passages that causes Kielhorn - even though this translation of
it is impeccable - considerable trouble. For us it is not the least bit
problematic, as I shall show first.
In the derivation of asusruvat, the following stage is reached: a-su-sru-a-
t. Here two rules present themselves. P. 6.4.77 (aci snudhatubhruvam yvor
iyanuvanau) prescribes substitution of uv for the u of sru; its cause is the
following a. P. 7.3.86 (pugantalaghupadhasya cd) prescribes substitution
of Guna for the u of srw, its cause is T. The only condition that we have met
so far for calling a rule antaranga with respect to another rule is that its
causes lie within the causes of the other rule. This, of course, is possible only
when the causes of the antaranga rule are fewer than the causes of the
bahiranga rule. But clearly, the cause of P. 6.4.77, which is a, does not lie
within the causes of P. 7.3.86, for a does not lie within T. And since both
these rules each have one single cause, the causes of P. 6.4.77 are not even
fewer in number than the causes of P. 7.3.86; and a fortiori inclusion is
absolutely out of the question. It follows that the terms antaranga and
bahiranga as defined thus far cannot be applied to these two rules in the
derivation of asusruvat.
It is for this reason that Nagesa, in the present passage, gives the term
antaranga an additional meaning, wherein it becomes synonymous with
antahkarya. A rule is called antaranga, in the sense antahkarya, when its
cause lies before the cause of the corresponding bahiranga rule. Here a
completely new meaning is added to the word antaranga. It is clear that this
new meaning makes, in the derivation of asusruvat, P. 6.4.77 antaranga,
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and as a result, P. 7.3.86 bahiranga.
For Kielhorn the matter is less simple. Since he had translated antar
madhye as "within {or before)", the word antaranga had, for him, from the
very beginning carried the meaning which in the present passage is ascribed
to it. He could not therefore consider the derivation of asusruvat irregular,
and the passage under consideration must, from his point of view, look
obscure at best. The following phrase is especially embarrassing for him:
laghupadhagundduvano'lpanimittatvdbhdvdd. He translates this correctly:
"because here (the substitution of) uv has not (even) fewer causes than (that
of) Guna for the prosodially short penultimate." But to make sense of this
he has to resort to the following devious argument. He writes in a footnote
(p. 259, fn. 2):
Some grammarians have maintained that that which has fewer causes
is antaranga in regard to that which has more causes; but not even, if
their opinion is adopted, can the substitution of uv be regarded as
antaranga compared with that of Guna, for the latter has only one
cause, viz. T, just as the former has only one cause, viz. a.
It will be agreed that Kielhorn here interprets the passage in a very
strange way. According to him, the derivation of asusruvat is not irregular
in any way; the BP has been legitimately employed in it. This employment
of the Paribhasadoes not even contrast with what was said earlier about its
use. The reason asusruvat is nevertheless presented as being problematic is,
according to Kielhorn, that its derivation cannot be justified by an
interpretation of the BP which is, in any case, unacceptable. That that which
has fewer causes is antaranga in regard to that which has more causes had
already been rejected by Nagesa much earlier in the PS. Vide the following
passage:
PS 80. 6-8, App. I 11. 26-28
bahirangdntarangasabddbhydm bahvapeksatvdlpdpeksatvayoh sabda-
maryddaydldbhdc ca / tathd saty asiddham bahvapekqam alpapeksa ity
eva vadet I
"Moreover, one cannot by any rule of language derive the meanings
'dependent on a greater number (of causes)' and 'dependent on a
smaller number (of causes)' from the words bahiranga and antaranga.
Had these (words) really been (intended to^convey those meanings,
the author of the Paribhasas) would certainly have said asiddharn
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bahvapeksam alpapekse (instead of saying asiddham bahirahgam
antararige)." (K. p. 228.)
It is not necessary now to study in what context these last remarks were
made. It is clear that early in his discussion of the BP Nagesa rejects the
notion that few causes make a rule antaranga, while many make it bahiranga.
That Kielhorn, without any indication to that effect from the context,
suddenly revives this rejected opinion, because otherwise the passage
quoted above makes no sense to him, merely strengthens us in the idea that
he is on the wrong track.
Let us further note that if Kielhorn, while translating antar madhye as
"within (or before)", merely anticipated the sequel to aid the reader, there
would have been no need for him to present this bizarre argument. Or, if he
really anticipated the sequel when translating antar madhye, he soon forgot
that, and came to think that "(or before)" was part of the translation.
Let me, for clarity's sake, repeat in a few words what is, in my opinion,
the correct interpretation of Nagesa's discussion concerning asusruvat. If
only the first meaning of the terms antaranga and bahiranga is taken into
consideration, then the substitution of uv for u cannot be antaranga with
respect to the substitution of Guna for u, because the causes of the first
operation are not included in the causes of the latter operation; what is
more, the number of causes of the first operation is not even less than the
number of causes of the second one. That is why a new meaning of these
two terms is called for, and it is actually provided by Nagesa.
Having thus assigned new, additional, meanings to the terms antaranga
and bahiranga, Nagesa next teaches us what interpretation of the Paribhasa
is to be accepted where the new meanings are used.
P$ 96.9-10, App. I 11. 138-141
tad api yugapatprdptau purvapravrttiniyamakam eva yatha patvyety
atra padasya vibhajydnvdkhyane na tu jdtasya bahirangasya
tddrse'ntararige'siddhatdniyamakam ...
"The (being antaranga in this sense) only determines that, when (two
operations) apply simultaneously, (the antaranga operation) shall
take effect first, as is the case in patvyd when this word is dissolved
(into its constituent parts) and (its formation out of those parts)
accounted for (by the rules of grammar), but it does not cause a
bahiranga (operation) which has (already) taken effect (to be
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considered as) not having taken effect in regard to such an antaranga
(operation),"...(K. p. 261.)
The content of this passage is clear enough: When we are dealing with a rule
which is antaranga in the second sense of this word, which is therefore
antahkarya, i.e., the cause of which precedes the cause of the corresponding
bahirariga rule, then we also have to interpret the BP in a different way. In
such a case the Paribhasa merely gives preference to an antaranga rule when
this antaranga rule applies simultaneously with the corresponding
bahirariga rule. When, on the other hand, a bahirariga rule already has
taken effect at the time that the antaranga rule applies, then the BP does
nothing. In other words, when this latter situation prevails, the bahiranga
rule is not to be considered as not having taken effect or not existing.
If what precedes has not been able to convince the reader, the following
sentence may change his mind.
/tf 97.1, App. 111. 142-143
ata eva vdyvor ityddau vali lopo yanah sthdnivattvena vdrito bhdsyakrtd /
"It is for this reason (viz. because a rule or operation which is
bahiranga in the new sense of that word, is not to be considered as not
having taken effect in regard to its corresponding antaranga rule or
operation), that in the case of vdyvoh etc. (where y should have been
elided before v by P. 6.1.66), the elision (of y) has by the author of the
Bhasya been prevented by (the assumption that) the semivowel (v,
which has been substituted for u,) is like the original (u; to assume this
would have been unnecessary if the bahirariga substitution of v had by
the BP been asiddha in regard to the antaranga elision of y).n (Cf. K.
pp. 261-262.)
It is hard to add anything to the text in order to clarify it. It informs us in
no uncertain terms that the BP would not have prevented the elision of y
before v in vdyvoh. Certainly P. 6.1.77 (iko yari aci), which in vdyu-os
substitutes v for u, is bahiranga; its cause is o. And P. 6.1.66 (lopo vyor
vali), which prescribes elision of y before v, is antaranga; its cause is v. But
these rules are bahiranga and antaranga in the second sense of those terms.
And we know now that when those terms are used in this second sense the
BP does not cause a bahiranga rule which has taken effect to be considered
as not having taken effect with regard to the corresponding antaranga rule
which then applies.
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The passages discussed so far form the framework of what Nagesa has to
say regarding the BP. They are also the backbone of our argument. A
thorough acquaintance with their contents is essential for an
understanding of what follows. For this reason a summary of those
contents will now be given. In this way some simplifying conventions can
also be introduced:
Out of a pair of rules or operations, one is antaranga with regard to the
other, if and only if the other is bahirahga with regard to the former.
The term antaranga has two different meanings, to which correspond
two different meanings of the term bahirahga, and two different
interpretations of the BP. Therefore I shall speak of antarahgax (short: ai),
and antaran'gai (short: ai)\ bahirahga\ (short: b\) and bahirarigai (short: bi)\
and of BPi and BP2. These terms will now be explained.
A rule is a\ with respect to another rule when the causes of the former rule
lie within the causes of the latter one; this includes the case where the
former rule has no causes, whereas the latter has. The latter rule is b\ with
respect to the former.
A rule is ai with respect to another rule when the cause of the former rule
precedes the cause of the latter one. The latter rule is bi with respect to the
former.
Now we turn to the two interpretations of the Paribhasa:
BPi: If in a derivation two rules, one of which is a\ with respect to the
other, apply simultaneously, the one that is a\ will take effect first. If in a
derivation a rule which is b\ with respect to another rule has taken effect, it
is to be regarded as not having taken effect, when that other rule
subsequently becomes applicable.
BP2: If in a derivation two rules, one of which is ai with respect to the
other, apply simultaneously, the one that is ai will take effect first.
This, I submit, is the basic structure of Nagesa's ideas regarding the BP. It
is not complete yet; additions will be made as we proceed. But I would like
to urge such readers as disagree with me here or at a later stage to try to find
fault with what has been said so far. If some of the things still to come sound
dubious to them, let them then attempt to give an alternative interpretation
which accounts as well as the present one for the passages dealt with in this
first chapter.
Unfortunately, the discussion up to this point contains one flaw, which
anyone wishing to show the unsound nature of my contentions will be
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ready to use against me. It is the fact that "cause" - a crucial concept in a
study of the BP - has here been said to be "what is indicated in a rule in a
locative case", where our text clearly states "in a locative or other case". To
justify this statement of mine, and to further elucidate this obscure concept,
we turn to the next chapter.
2. THE MEANINGS OF ANGA
As we have seen (above, p. 5) the amount of explicit information Nagesa
gives us regarding the meaning of ahga ("cause") leaves much to be desired.
If we had to depend exclusively on his explicit statements, there would be
no way of getting away from this unsatisfactory state of affairs.
Fortunately, another way is open to us. We can study exactly how Nagesa
puts the BP to use in specific cases. This, we may hope, will yield the information
which was withheld from us in a more straightforward manner. The
passage to be studied for this purpose will be largely drawn from elsewhere
in the P§ (that is to say, not from Nagesa's discussion of the BP) and from
the L$$. The first one is on Par. XCV.
P$ 180. 1
mimarjisati tyartham1 ca / TaTRa vrddheh purvam antarahgatvdd dvitve ...
"Moreover (Par. XCV must be adopted) for (the correct formation
of) mimarjisati (the desid. of mrj); when namely (mrj) has been
reduplicated - and this must be done before Vrddhi is substituted (for
r by P. 7.2.114), because (the reduplication is) antarahga (in regard to
the substitution of Vrddhi) - , . . . " . (K. p. 461.)
The passage is taken out of context, and may therefore remain somewhat
obscure to the reader. But what becomes clear from it is that in the
derivation of mimarjisati reduplication is antaranga with respect to the
substitution of Vrddhi.
The rules which prescribe these two operations are P. 6.1.9 (sanyanoh)
and P. 7.2.114 (mrjer vrddhih), respectively. Let us look at these more
closely, beginning with the latter.
P. 7.2.114 (mrjer vrddhih) does not, either by itself or by means of
anuvrtti, contain any term indicative of the cause of the substitution of
Vrddhi. In spite of that, the SK explains the sutra (no. 2473) as follows:
mrjer iko vrddhih syad dhatupratyaye pare, "Vrddhi is substituted for the
root-vowel of the stem mrj before any affix that is ordained after a root."
Nagesa, in the L&S(Varanasi ed., part II, p. 571) - which was written after
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the PS, see Appendix III - expresses his consent in the following words:
dhatoh kdryam ucyamdnam Hi paribhdsdlabdham art ham aha
dhdtupratyaye iti, "He explains the meaning (of the sutra), arrived at by
means of the Paribhasa dhatoh kdryam ucyamdnam . . . , by saying 'before
any affix that is ordained after a root'." Nagesa here refers to Par.
LXXXVIII of his own P$ (171.4), which reads in full: dhatoh kdryam
ucyamqnam tatpratyaye bhavati, "When an operation is taught concerning
a root, it takes place (only when the root) is followed by such an affix (as
can be added to roots)"2 (cf. K. p. 429). With the help of this Paribhasa, P.
7.2.114 obtains a term indicative of the cause of the operation prescribed by
this rule. Thus, once this meaning of P. 7.2.114 is accepted (and it clearly is
by Nagesa), the cause of the substitution of Vrddhi for r, in the derivation of
mimdrjisati from mrj-sa(n)-ti, becomes san\ for san is a following "affix
that is ordained after a root".
P. 6.1.9 (sanyahoh) is considered to consist of a compound with a
genitive case ending. This can be learnt from the P$ itself, which says
(14.5-6):... sanyahoh ity asya sasthyantatvdt3..., "The term sanyahoh in
P. 6.1.9 being a genitive..." (K. p. 52). This rule prescribes reduplication of
that which ends in san. However, this reduplication is subject to some
conditions, one of which is important for us at present. It is laid down in P. 6.1.1.
{ekaco dve prathamasya), and holds that only the first part of mrj-san may
be reduplicated, i.e., only mrj. A result of this is that san, though part of
that which undergoes the reduplication, is itself not reduplicated. And such
being the case, the restriction embodied in Par. X - according to which
"that which undergoes an operation can, so far as it undergoes that
operation, not be made the cause of the application of a grammatical rule"
(K. p. 51) - does not affect the affix san. In other words, it is quite possible
that the cause of the reduplication of mrj is san.
However, as soon as we assume that san is indeed the cause of
reduplication in the derivation of mimdrjisati, we are confronted with
difficulties. For we have seen above that san is also the cause of the
substitution of Vrddhi in this same derivation. That is to say, both
reduplication and substitution of Vrddhi would have one and the same
cause, viz. san. But then it would become unclear why reduplication should
be antaranga with respect to the substitution of Vrddhi: As both operations
have one and the same cause, it cannot be said that the cause of one
operation lies within the causes of the other, nor that the cause of one
precedes the cause of the other. In spite of that, according to the present
passage, reduplication is antaranga.
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A solution to this problem can easily be found. We have but to accept
that san is not the cause of reduplication because sanyan'oh (in P. 6.1.9) has
a genitive case ending. In other words, terms with a genitive case ending
occurring in a rule are not to be regarded as causes of an operation, at least
not where the Antarangatva or Bahirangatva of that operation is to be
determined.
Once this much is accepted, the above passage becomes clear. In the
derivation of mimarjisati, reduplication of mrj has no cause, whereas
substitution of Vrddhi does have a cause, viz. san. Therefore the former
operation is antarahga, or, more exactly, au with respect to the latter, and
takes place first. This disposes of the genitive case.
We turn to the ablative case. Two passages, one in the LSS, the other in
the PS, allow us to infer that a word in the ablative "case cannot in the
context of the BP be considered a cause. The first passage reads:
LS$ on SK 2202 (Varanasi edition, II, p. 447)
bhavatad iti / lugapeksayd paratvdddhes tatan j
"In (the derivation of) bhavatat (out of bhava-hi, the substitution of)
tat (an) for hi (by P. 7.1.35 supersedes the substitution of luk for hi by
P. 6.4.105), because (P. 7.1.35) occurs later (in the Astadhyayi) than
(P. 6.4.105 which prescribes substitution of) luk (for hi)."
At the stage bhava-hi two rules apply, P. 7.1.35 (tuhyos tatanriasisy
anyatarasydm) prescribes substitution of tat for hi; P. 6.4.105 (ato heh)
prescribes substitution of luk for hi. P. 7.1.35 supersedes P. 6.4.105 because
it occurs later in the Astadhyayi. This is what the above passage says. It
seems safe to conclude that P. 7.1.35 is not at the same time antarahga with
respect to P. 6.4.105. Had it been so, our passage would not have failed to
mention this, for Antarangatva is a stronger criterion for deciding which
rule supersedes which than later occurrence in the Astadhyayi. What is
more, the very next sentence explains why Par. LII (antarangdn api vidhin
bahirango lug badhate) does not apply here: that Paribhasadoes not apply
because it is anitya.4 This excludes the possibility that the Antarangatva of
P. 7.1.35 was not mentioned because of an oversight on the part of Nagesa.
So P. 7.1.35 is not antarahga, and P. 6.4.105 not bahirahga. But if a word
with an ablative case ending were indicative of a cause of the kind required
by Par. L, then P. 7.1.35 would be antarahga, and P. 6.4.105 would be
bahirahga. To see why, we may note that neither of these two rules has a
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following cause. But whereas P. 7.1.35 has no preceding cause either, P.
6.4.105 would have a preceding cause (a) indicated by a word with an
ablative case ending (ato). And just as a rule without following cause is
antaranga with respect to a rule with a following cause, there would seem to
be no way of escaping the conclusion that a rule without preceding cause is
antaranga with respect to a rule with a preceding cause. To get out of the
difficulties we can but assume that preceding causes do not count in the
context of Par. L.
The passage from the PS which confirms our opinion that words with an
ablative case ending do not indicate causes in the context of the BP is the
one we have studied above (p. 6) and which mentions the derivation of
pacet.5 For clarity's sake I shall repeat the relevant facts.
At the stage paca-yd-t P. 7.2.80 (ato yeyah) prescribes substitution of eY
for yd: This operation has no following cause, since the rule prescribing it
contains no word with a locative case ending. That rule does, however,
contain a word with an ablative case ending: atah, "after short a". The next
operation, elision of y before T, is prescribed by P. 6.1.66 (lopo vyor vali).
Its following cause is T, referred to in the rule by the word vali, which has a
locative case ending.
We know that out of these two operations the first one is antaranga
because it has no following cause. But this means quite simply that the
preceding cause of that operation is completely ignored. The conclusion is
obvious: Preceding causes do not count in the context of Par. L.
Other than the ablative, genitive and locative, none of the cases qualifies
as an indicator of the cause of an operation. Since in the realm of the BP the
genitive and ablative are disqualified, only the locative remains. But here
also a restriction must be added. A visayasaptami, "locative which conveys
the sense that the affix etc. which in the rule has this locative case ending
may be added at some time or other", does not indicate the cause of an
operation. This we learn from the passage to be studied presently.
On p. 193 Nagesa introduces Par. CXIX samprasdranam taddsrayam ca
kdryam6 balavat, "A (substitution of) Samprasarana and the operation
dependent on it possess greater force (than other operations which are
simultaneously applicable)" (K. p. 512). In the ensuing discussion Nagesa
rejects this Paribhasaand then comes to our passage.
PS 193.13-194.2
nau ca samscanoh ityddau1 samscanor ityddi visayasaptamlti tatrdpi na
dosa ity anyatra vistarah
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"Nor (does the rejection of this Paribhasa entail) any fault in the case
of (rules) like P. 6.1.31, for the locatives samscanoh etc. (of those
rules do not convey the sense 'when san and can follow', but they
convey the meaning) 'where {san etc) may be added (at some time or
other)'. More hereof elsewhere." (K. p. 514.)
This passage is in itself not very clear, and it is worthwhile to see what the
SJ^has to say concerning P. 6.1.31, and how Nagesa comments on this.
First the SK (no. 2579):
t?au ca samscanoh / sanpare canpare ca nau svayateh samprasarariam va
syat I samprasaranam tadasrayam ca karyam balavat iti vacanat
samprasarariam / purvariipam / asusavat /
"There is optionally (substitution of) Samprasarana (for the
semivowel) of svi, when (the affix) ni follows, when this (affix itself) is
followed by the (Desiderative affix) san and when it is followed by the
(aorist affix) can (In the derivation of the 3. sg. aor. par. asusavat
from svi-(n) I (c)-(c) a(n)-t) Samprasarana takes place by Par. CXIX
(before substitution of Vrddhi for the vowel I of svi by P. 7.2.115.
Subsequently, by P. 6.1.108, the single substitute for the
Samprasarana vowel u and the following vowel I is) the preceding
(vowel u. This way) asusavat (is formed)."
When in the derivation of asusavat the following stage has been reached
svi-(n)i(c)-(c)a(n)-t,
two rules present themselves. P. 7.2.115 (aco nniti) prescribes substitution
of Vrddhi for the final vowel I of svi. P. 6.1.31 prescribes substitution of
Samprasarana for v in svi.
It is argued that if P. 7.2.115 would take effect first, the form asusavat
would not result. The derivation would, in that case, take this shape8:
svi-(n)i(c}-(c)a(ri)-t -~svai-i-a-t(1.2.115)-* svay-i-a-t (6.1.78) etc.
The outcome would not be the desired form asusavat.
It must be concluded that at the stage svi-(n)i(c)-(c)a(n)-t it is not P. 7.2.115
but P. 6.1.31 that is to take effect first. However, the cause of the
application of P. 7.2.115 is nic, and of P. 6.1.31 nic and can together.
Clearly nic lies within the combination nic + san. P. 7.2.115 must,
therefore, be considered antarahga with respect to P. 6.1.31 and should take
effect first.
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To avoid this undesired consequence, Bhattoji Diksita has recourse to Par.
CXIX {samprasaranam tadasrayam ca karyam balavai). The result is that
P. 6.1.31, though bahiranga, takes effect before P. 7.2.115.
Nagesa dispproves of this procedure. He is of the opinion that even
without Par. CXIX the correct form asusavat can be arrived at. The reason
is, he says, that the locative samscanoh in P. 6.1.31 is a visayasaptaml. He
explains this clearly in his LSS (Varanasi ed., II, p. 618):
ca sam j atra nau ca samscanor hi visayasaptaml / evam ca tayor
vivaksitayor antarangatvad vrddhyddeh purvam samprasaranam
 i anyathd-
ntarangatvdd vrddhydyoh krtayoh pascat samprasdranepi asusavat
ityddyasiddhis tad aha: samprasaranam taddsrayan ceti / na tv iyam
paribhaseti bhramitavyam / tasyd bhdsye pratydkhydndt /
"On P. 6.1.31. Here in nau ca samscanoh (the locative) is a locative
which conveys that the affixes concerned may be added at some time
or other. Therefore, when it is intended to utter those two (i.e., nic
and san, or nic and cari), Samprasarana is substituted before Vrddhi
etc., because it is antaranga. Otherwise (when the locative of nau and
of samscanoh does not convey that these affixes will be added at some
time or other, the form) asusavat etc. would not be obtained, even
though Samprasarana would be there, (because Samprasarana
would be there) afterwards, when (substitution of) Vrddhi (for the
final I of svi by P. 7.2.115), and (substitution of) ay (for the resulting
Vrddhi-vowel ai, by P. 6.1.78) would have taken place, for (these two
substitutions are, on this assumption,) antaranga. This (Bhattoji)
expresses in the words: samprasaranam tadasrayam ca But it
should not erroneously be thought that this is a Paribhasa. For it has
been rejected in the Bhasya."
There may be a difference between what Nagesa says here and what he
says in the P$. Here both nau and samscanoh seem to be considered as
ending in a visayasaptaml, whereas in the p£ only samscanoh may be
intended to be such. Be this as it may, the conclusion to be drawn remains
unaffected: A word in a locative case, if this locative case is a visaya-
saptaml, does not indicate such a cause as is required for the application
of the BP.
So the word ahga in our Paribhasa denotes a formal cause - such as sound
or a combination of sounds - exhibited in a rule in a locative case, and not
in any other case. But why then does Nagesa say: "exhibited in a rule in a
locative or other case" (see above, p. 5)? As we have seen, none of the
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other eligible cases has been accepted. What then are those other cases?
It is easier to raise this question than to answer it. The only answer I can
think of is that Nagesa here has the "two-word principle" in mind.
According to this principle, which will be discussed in Chapter 5, an
operation which depends on two words is bahirahga (b\) with respect to an
operation which does not depend on two words. As we shall see in Chapter
5, the two words (or sounds that are part of two words) which act as causes
in the context of the two-word principle are not always referred to by words
with a locative case ending. If this solution does not appeal to the reader, he
may prefer to believe that Nagesa added the word adi, which gave rise to
our translation "or other case", without having anything specific in mind,
merely to account for as yet unthought-of eventualities, as indeed is a
regular practice in sastric Sanskrit.9
With this much, the two statements of Nagesa concerning the meaning of
anga, which he made in his discussion of the BP and which were studied
by us earlier (above, p. 5), have been sufficiently clarified. One final
observation, however, must be made. These two statements regarding the
meaning of anga, were both made in that portion of the discussion of
Par. L which deals with the first interpretation of the BP, i.e.,
with BPi. This has as a consequence that it is conceivable that the
restrictions here imposed on the meaning of anga do not apply with the
same force where the second interpretation of the BP, i.e., BP2, is
concerned. With respect to this, nothing can be said with certainty until a
study has been made of what Nagesa has to say about it. Such a study will
now be undertaken.
From the example asusruvat, which Nagesa uses to introduce his second
interpretation of the BP, it becomes clear that here also, in the realm of
BP2, the word anga can denote a formal cause, exhibited in a rule in a
locative case. For at the stage a-su-sru-a-t both the causes of the competing
operations (see p. 9 above) are so exhibited. The cause a is indicated by
aci in P. 6.4.77; the cause t by sarvadhatukardhadhatukayoh, which is
drawn into P. 7.3.86 from rule 84.
Nowhere in the P$ and the L$$ have formal causes that were exhibited
in a rule by a word in the genitive or ablative case been used in the context
of BP2. We may therefore safely conclude that also where BP2 is concerned
only such formal causes as are exhibited in a rule in a locative case can be
used, just as we found was the case with BPi.
However, Nagesa's discussion of BP2 contains a passage which adds a
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completely new dimension to the meaning of the term anga in BP2. It reads
as follows:
P$ 96.5-8, App. I 11. 134^138
arthandm api jdtivyaktilingasamkhydkdrakdnam bodhakramah sastra-
krtkalpitas tatkramenaiva ca tadbodhakasabdapradurbhavah kalpita iti
tatkramenaiva tatkdryaniti patvyetydddv antarangatvdt purvam purvaya-
nddesah parayanddesasya bahirangataydsiddhatvdd ity anendcah
parasmin iti siitre bhdsye spas tarn / /
"It appears from the Bhasya on P. 1.1.57 that similarly meanings (as,
e.g., those expressed by a Pratipadika), viz. a genus, a (particular)
individual, gender, number and a (particular) case-relation, are
imagined to be apprehended in a certain order (one after the other) by
Panini, that the several portions of a word which express those
(meanings) are imagined to arise (one after the other) in the same
order, and that the operations which concern each (of those portions)
take effect therefore in the very same order; in (the formation of)
patvyd etc. therefore (from patu-i-a etc.), the substitution of a
semivowel for the first vowel (u), being antaranga, takes place first,
because the substitution of a semivowel for the second vowel (7) is
bahiranga and therefore (regarded as) not existing." (Cf. K. p.
260-261.)
Reading this passage, I see no way of avoiding the conclusion that here
Antarangatva is assigned to operations on the basis of meaning. This is, in
itself, not alarming. We simply conclude from it that, whereas BPi does not
permit meanings as causes, BP2 does. That meanings are not allowed to be
causes in the realm of BPi we had learned long ago (above, p. 5); that BP2
has no such scruples, we learn now.
In the uniform interpretation of the BP that Kielhorn presents, on the
other hand, the presence of two passages, one of which excludes meanings
from the range of causes, and another which expressly admits them, must
be viewed as nothing less than a contradiction.
At this point, let me admit that it is not impossible that the P$ contains
mutually contradictory passages. All I claim is that it is reasonable to
accept as correct that interpretation which reduces the number of such
contradictory passages to a minimum, other things being equal. And in the
present case, the contradiction which there is for those who refuse to keep
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the two interpretations of the BP strictly apart does not exist for those who
accept the division.
What then does Kielhorn do to solve his problem? The answer is
disappointing. He does nothing. Or perhaps I should say, almost nothing.
For he translates the crucial word arthdndm of the above passage in such an
inconspicuous manner - he renders it "whatever is expressed (by a word)" -
that the contradiction escapes the notice of the superficial reader.
Criticizing Kielhorn in cases like this is easy. But it should not make us
forget that we are not wholly without difficulties either. For one thing, the
fact that some extra meaning has been assigned to the terms antaranga and
bahiranga has repercussions on how BP2 is to be interpreted. What we
knew was that in the derivation oi patvya the stagepatu-i-d occurred. Here
two operations presented themselves: substitution of the semivowel v for
the vowel u by P. 6.1.77 (its cause is i) and substitution of the semivowel y
for the vowel F, again by P. 6.1.77 (its cause is A). Here the former operation
was antaranga, because its cause T preceded, in the order of the
pronunciation of the sounds, the cause A of the corresponding bahiranga
operation, i.e., of the second operation described above. Both these
operations apply simultaneously, but the former takes effect first, due to
BP2.
What we learn from the passage last studied, however, is that an
operation can be antaranga because the sounds on which it depends present
themselves earlier in order of time, this again because the meanings which
are responsible for those sounds, or combinations of sounds, appear in a
certain, chronological, order. This has as a consequence that an operation
may be entitled to the name antaranga before the corresponding bahiranga
operation is in sight. In the derivation of patvya this means that
substitution of v for u in paTu-F, by P. 6.1.77, will be antaranga before A -
which is to become an integral part of patvya - has made its appearance.
What can the role of BP2 in such a case possibly be? For haven't we seen
already that BP2 is only to be put into use where the antaranga and
bahiranga rules apply simultaneously (pp. 1 If, above)?
It is clear that some adjustments in BP2 are to be made. This Nagesadoes
in the following passage.
PS 97.2-3, App. I 11. 144-146
kramendnvdkhydne titktoddharane piirvapravrttikatvam antarangatvam
bahirangasydsiddhatvani api nimittdbhdvdd aprdptirupam bodhyam
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"If, on the other hand, in accounting for the formation of a word, (one
makes each expressive portion of it arise) one after the other, (i.e., if
one, e.g., first adds z to patu, and afterwards a to patvi), then the
Antarangatva (of the substitution of a semivowel for the first vowel u)
in the above example {patvya) must be taken to mean 'its taking place
first', and the Asiddhatva of the bahirahga (substitution of a
semivowel for the second vowel T) can only mean 'that it does not (yet)
apply, because its cause (a) is (as yet) absent'." (K. p. 262.)
The role assigned to BP2 in cases like this is minor indeed. Here BP2
comes to mean hardly more than "first come, first served".
So the formation of patvya can be accounted for in two ways. One is by
dissolving the word into its constituent parts and then building it up out of
those constituent parts (vibhajyanvakhydna); the other is by making
each expressive portion of the word arise one after the other
{kramendnvdkhydna). BP2 assumes a different form (henceforth to be
called BP21 and BP22 respectively) depending on which of the two
alternatives we choose. But the outcome is the same, either way.
More will be said about BP22 later, in Part II. We shall find that this
aspect of the Paribhasa is employed far more often than BPi and BP21
together. (This is, incidentally, also the case in the L$S.) Here we are
concerned with the meaning of ahga, and consequently we have to address
ourselves to a problem which remains in connection with the formal causes
which figure in BPi and BP21.
In order to understand the problem which will now engage our attention,
the reader is requested to turn away from Par. L for a short while and look
at Par. X. That Paribhasa reads: kdryam anubhavan10 hi karyi nimittatayd
ndsnyate, which means: "Surely, that which undergoes an operation can so
far as it undergoes that operation not be made the cause (of the application
of a grammatical rule)" (K. p. 51). The question which we have to study is:
Does Par. X also apply to causes that are employed in the context of Par.
L? In other words, does a following cause (which is exhibited in a rule in a
locative case) still count as cause for the BP when it itself undergoes the
operation concerned?
The answer to the above question is that Par. X does not apply in the
context of Par. L. This will now be shown with the help of two passages
from the L$S and one from the PS.
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LSS on SK 76 (Kumbakonam ed., I, p. 381)
na ca kartari carsityadau gunasya padadvayasambandhivarnadvayasritatvena
bahirangatvad rephabhdvena na visarga Hi vdcyam j gunasyeva
padadvayasambandhirephakhardtmakavarnadvayasritatvena visargasydpi
tattvdt I paranimittakatvam apy ubhayoh samam /
"And it should not be said that (in such forms as carsi-, which are
composed of ca-Rsi etc., and which occur) in P. 3.2.186 etc., there is no
(substitution of) visarga (for r by P. 8.3.15) because (as far as P. 8.3.15
is concerned) the r (in carsi-) does not exist, (and that this is so)
because (the substitution of) Guna (a for a-r of ca-rsi by P. 6.1.87) is
bahiranga (with respect to the subsequently applying substitution of
visarga for R) on account of the fact that (the substitution of Guna a
for a-r) depends on two sounds of two words. (This should not be
said) because, like (the substitution of) Guna (a for a-r in ca-rsi-), also
(the substitution of) visarga (for r in carsi-) is (bahiranga) since it
(also) depends on two sounds, viz. r and (s which is included in the
pratydhdra) khar, of two words. Further, both (the substitution of
Guna a for a-r and the substitution of visarga for r) are equal in this
respect that (both) have a following cause."
Part of this passage will not be intelligible to the reader until he has read
Chapter 5. For our present purpose it is the last sentence which is of
importance, and this sentence can be understood without difficulty.
P. 3.2.186 contains the expression carsidevatayoh. The first part of this
expression, carsi, one can arrive at as follows: ca-rsi —• c-a-si (6.1.87) — ca-
r-si (1.1.51). At the stage carsi P. 8.3.15 applies, but does not take effect, for
reasons that do not concern us here. The last sentence of the above passage
informs us that both P. 8.3.15 and P. 6.1.87 have a following cause.
That P. 8.3.15 has a following cause the reader can easily verify for
himself. Difficulties arise in connection with P. 6.1.87. This rule reads: ad
gunah [aci 77], and clearly contains a word with a locative case ending, viz.
aci. One could therefore say that in ca-rsi- the vowel r is a cause, because it
is exhibited in the rule concerned (P. 6.1.87) in a locative case. But r itself
undergoes the operation! Consequently, if Par. X is valid in the context of
Par. L, r cannot be considered a cause of the substitution of a for a-r.
The conclusion to be drawn from the fact that the above passage says
that P. 6.1.87 has SL following cause is clear: Par. X cannot be used in the
context of Par. L.
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We shall study a second passage from the LSS which will lead us to this
same conclusion: that Par. X does not apply in the realm of the BP. This
second passage comments on the SK on P. 8.2.80. This sutra reads:
adasoser dad u do mah. The sound u in this rule stands for both u and u. It
does so, according to Bhattoji Dlksita, because it is a Samaharadvandva of these
two sounds. Nagesa disagrees, and gives his reason in the following lines:
LSS on SK 419 (Kumbakonam ed. II, p. 1043)
u s u s Hi dvandve sulope ghyantatvaddhrasvasya purvanipate
napumsakahrasvasavarnadlrghayoh prdptayor dirghasya
sabdantarapraptyanityatvena nityatvadaparanimittakatvenantarahgatvac
ca hrasvatve tatah savarnadlrghe u iti rupasiddheh
"Because the form u would not result. In the Dvandva (compound) u-
s-u-s (first) elision of (the nominative singular case-endings) s(u) (by P.
2.4.71 would take place; then) the short (vowel u) would be placed
first (by P. 2.2.32) because it ends in (what is called) ghi (by P. 1.4.7);
when (subsequently the following two rules) apply, (P. 1.2.47 which
prescribes) shortening (of u on account of the fact that the Dvandva
compound u-u is) neuter, (and P. 6.1.101 which prescribes
substitution of the single) long (vowel u for the two) homogeneous
(vowels u-u, substitution of) long (u for u-u) would be anitya by Par.
XLIII; as a result (the substitution of) short (u for uby P. 1.2.47 would
take precedence) because it is nitya, and also antarahga on account of
the fact that it has no following cause; after this, (substitution of) long
(ufor the two) homogeneous (vowels u-u would take place, so that we
would end up with u, instead of the desired u)."
At the stage u-u two rules apply. P. 1.2.47 prescribes shortening of u; it
has no following cause. P. 6.1.101 prescribes substitution of u for u-ii.
Our passage tells us that P. 1.2.47 is antarahga because it has no following
cause. This indicates that P. 6.1.101 does have a following cause. The
following cause of P. 6.1.101 can only be u, in spite of the fact that u
undergoes the operation. We must again conclude that Par. X does not
apply.
After these two passages from the LS$ we can study one from the PS.
This passage from the PS comes last because the evidence it contains is less
strong than the evidence provided by the two passages from the L&$. The
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reason is that the crucial part of the passage from the PS can be interpreted
in two ways, as will be explained below.
PS 148.6-11
nanv ayaje indram itydddv antarangasydpi gunasydpavddena
savarnadlrghena bad hah sydd ata aha /
APAVADO YADY ANYATRA CARITARTHAS TARHY
ANTARANGENA BADHYATE (Par. LXV) / /
niravakdsatvarupasya bddhakatvabijasydbhdvdtu/ evam ca prakrte'nt-
arangena gunena savarnadirghah samdndsraye caritdrtho yangunayor
apavddo'pi12 bddhyate / piirvopasthitanimittakatvarupdntarangatva-
visayan idam / /
"Now one might say that, e.g., in (the formation of) ayaje indram
(from ayaja-i-indram) the (substitution by P. 6.1.87 of) Guna (for a-
I), even though it is antaranga, ought to be superseded by the
(substitution of the) homogeneous long vowel (i for i-i which is taught
in P. 6.1.101), an Apavdda (of the rule which teaches the substitu-
tion of Guna. The author of the Paribhasas) says therefore.
Par. LXV: When an Apavdda serves a purpose elsewhere, then it is
superseded by a (general) antaranga (rule);
because the reason why it would supersede (the general antaranga
rule), viz. the circumstance that there would be no opportunity (for
the taking effect of it if it did not supersede the antaranga rule), does
(in this case) not exist. And so the (substitution of) a homogeneous
long vowel (for i-i) is in the present instance (of ayaja-i-indram)
superseded by the antaranga (substitution of the) Guna (e for a-i),
notwithstanding that the former is an Apavdda of (both the
substitution of) yan (taught in P. 6.1.77) and (that of) Guna, viz.
because it serves a purpose when it depends on the same (sounds on
which the substitutions of yan or Guna depends). This concerns such
antaranga (rules) as are antaranga for the reason that their causes (in
the order of the pronunciation of the sounds) precede (the causes of
the bahiranga Apavddas)". (Cf. K. pp. 347-348.)
To ayaja-i-indram two rules apply. P. 6.1.101 (akah savarne dirghah)
prescribes substitution of i for i-i. P. 6.1.87 (dd gunah) prescribes
substitution of e for a-i. We learn from the above passage that P.-6.1.87 is
antaranga with respect to P. 6.1.101, and further that this is so because the
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cause of P. 6.1.87 precedes, in the order of the pronunciation of the sounds,
the cause of P. 6.1.101. This leaves us no choice. The cause of P. 6.1.87 must
be the first I in ayaja-i-indram, and the cause of P. 6.1.101 can only be the
second I in that same form. But both these sounds undergo the operation of
which they are the cause. This can be the case only if Par. X is not
applicable here.
As was said above, this passage from the P$ can be interpreted
differently, in such a way that the nonapplicability of Par. X cannot be
deduced from it. We have assumed that the last sentence of this passage
means that Par. LXV operates only in the realm of BP21. For there the
cause of the antaranga rule precedes IN the order of the pronunciation of the
sounds the cause of the bahirahga rule. Unfortunately, the words "in the
order of the pronunciation of the sounds" occur in the translation in
parentheses. This means that nothing in the Sanskrit original corresponds
to these words. In other words, the last sentence of this passage can also be
understood as meaning that Par. LXV operates only in the realm of BP22,
or generally in the realm of BP2, i.e., BP21 and BP22 combined. Indeed, we
shall see that BP22 provides that operations which take place inside a single
word supersede operations which reach over the boundary of single words
(Chapter 7, below), so that there is nothing unusual about invoking BP22
where the derivation of ayaje indram is the subject of discussion.14.
Even if, in view of the above, the reader discards the passage from the P$
as evidence regarding the behaviour of Par. X in the context of Par. L, he
cannot so easily explain away the two earlier passages from the L$$. Our
earlier conclusion therefore stands: Par. X cannot be used in the context of
Par. L.
3. THE JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE PARIBHASA
By now we have become accustomed to the fact that the BP behaves as if it
really is a combination of two Paribhasas. To its two main interpretations
correspond two meanings assigned to the word anga (even though neither
of these departs from the fundamental sense "cause"). It will therefore
cause no surprise to find that the BP has been justified by Nagesa in a
double way: BPi by a Jnapaka, BP2 by a maxim of common life. We are now
ready to come to grips with the passages introducing both.
PS 85.2-6, App. I 11. 56-61
iyam ca tripadyam na pravartate tripadya asiddhatvat / asyam ca vaha
uthsutrastham udgrahanam jhdpakam ity esa sapddasaptadhyayisthd /
anyatha samprasaranamatravidhanena laghupadhagune vrddhir eci iti
vrddhau visvauha ity'adisiddhes tadvaiyarthyam spastam eva / satyam hy
etasyam bahirahgasamprasaranasyasiddhatval laghupadhaguno na syat / /
"This (Paribhasa) has no concern (with the rules) in the last three
chapters (of Panini's grammar) because those rules are asiddha (in
regard to that which precedes them in Panini's grammar); and that
this (Paribhasa) has its place among (the rules contained in) the first
seven lectures and the first chapter (of the eighth lecture, or in other
words, .that it precedes the rules contained in the three last chapters of
Panini's work) results from the circumstance that its (existence) is
indicated by the word uth in the rule P. 6.4.132. If the Paribhasadid
not exist, that (term uth in P. 6.4.132) would clearly be superfluous;
(to account) for the formation of visvauhah (from visva-vah-as) etc.,
it would suffice to enjoin (the substitution of) Samprasarana (for the
v of vah), for after the substitution by P. 6.1.108 of the Samprasarana
u for u-a, i.e. after the change of vah to uh) the Guna (vowel o would be
substituted) for the prosodially short penultimate (u by P. 7.3.86),
and afterwards the Vrddhi (vowel au for a-o) by P. 6.1.88; whereas, as
soon as the present (Paribhasa) is (adopted), Guna cannot be
(substituted) for the prosodially short penultimate (u), because (the
substitution of) the Samprasarana (u for va), being hahiranga (in
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regard to the substitution of Guna), is (by this Paribhasa regarded as)
not having taken place." (K. pp. 235-237.)
If the BP did not exist, and P. 6.4.132 were to read vahah, instead ofvdha
iah as it actually does, the form visvauhah could be derived in the following
manner:
visva-vdh -nvi-sas
visva-u-dh-nvi-sas, by P. 6.4.132 (vahah)
visva-u-h-nvi-sas, by P. 6.1.108
visva-oh-nvi-sas, by P. 7.3.86
visvauh-nvi-sas, by P. 6.1.88
This at least is the part of the derivation we are here interested in.
However, once the BP is accepted, the above derivation, or, rather,
partial derivation, becomes impossible. The reason is that the substitution
of Samprasarana u for v - in view of Par. CXIX we may say substitution of
u for va1 - is bahiranga, substitution of Guna o for u antarahga. The former
operation is consequently to be considered asiddha with respect to the
latter. This, at any rate, is what Nagesa says about the matter.
For details concerning this derivation let us listen to what Kielhorn says
in a footnote (K. p. 236, fn. 1). He describes the situation as follows:
visva-vah-nvi-ah becomes visva-uh-nvi-ah by P. 6.4.132 (now: vahah) and
P. 6.1.108. The cause of this operation is ah. Substitution, following this, of
Guna for u by P. 7.3.86 would have as cause nvi. Since, however,
substitution of u for va is bahiranga, substitution of Guna for u antaranga,
this latter operation cannot take place after the former.
Kielhorn's explanation is rather unsatisfactory, for it leaves us with some
problems. First, the meaning of P. 6.4.132 (vdha iah) is, according to the
SK {no. 329), bhasya vahah samprasdranam iah sydt. When we deprive this
rule of the word iah, the remainder, i.e., vahah, comes to mean bhasya
vahah samprasdranam sydt, "Let there be Samprasarana of vah when it
is Bha." From this it follows that the immediate cause of the application of
P. 6.4.132 (in its new shape: vahah) is the fact that vah carries the name
"Bha". Further, vdh is called "Bha" because it is followed by the affix ah -
the intervening affix nvi disappears by P. 1.3.9 and P. 6.1.67 - so that ah is
the indirect cause of the application of P. 6.4.132 (modified). But once it is
admitted that ah is not directly, but indirectly, the cause of the application
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of P. 6.4.132 (modified), we are in for trouble. Because elsewhere in his
comment on this same ParibhasaNagesa has stated that neither dependence
on technical terms nor an indirect cause can make an operation bahirahga.
So we are confronted with a contradiction in the PS.
A detailed exposition of the contradiction, and of what to do about it,
must be deferred to Appendix II. Here it may merely be stated that, more
often than not, Nagesa does allow indirect causes to make an operation
bahirahga, so it is perfectly legitimate, in the case under discussion, to say
that ah is the cause of P. 6.4.132 (modified).
The cause of P. 7.3.86 is nvi. It is this simple fact that constitutes our
second problem, much more threatening than the first one. For nvi, the
cause of P. 7.3.86, lies before - not within - ah, the cause of P. 6.4.132
(modified). And the result of this is that here BP2i applies, not BPi. And
where BP21 applies, a bahirahga operation may very well be followed by an
antarahga operation.
Let us recall exactly what we are doing. It is claimed, by Nagesa, that, if
P. 6.4.132 (yaha uth) were not to contain the word iith and therefore simply
read vdhah, the form visvauhah could not then be correctly derived. For at
the stage.
visva-vdh-rivi-ah
first this rule vahah, followed by P. 6.1.108, would bring about
visva-uh-nvi-ah.
Subsequently!, P. 7.3.86, aspiring to put o for u in uh, would be prevented
from taking effect by the BP.
But what we have just discovered is in direct conflict with this. True, the
first operation is bahirahga and the second, antarahga, but they are bi and
ai, respectively. And that means that the second interpretation of the BP
applies here, BP2, which does not prevent an antarahga operation from
taking place after a bahirahga one.
The difficulty we are here confronted with is extremely serious. As the
Jnapaka is always one of the main topics to be discussed in connection with
a Pa ribhasa, it is impossible to assume that Nagesa made a mistake here.
Before we attempt to tackle this problem, we note that Sesadrisudhl,
who - as can be gathered from K. V. Abhyankar's introduction to the PS-
in his Pafibhasabhdskara attacked Nagesa wherever he could, "in a bitter
language which almost shows the bad taste of the author" (p. 32) was
puzzled by the same question as we are. He says:
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PS 418.22-25
visvauhah ity atra samprasdranam bahirahgam gunas tv antarahga ity
dsritya iyam paribhdsd jndpitd / tatra gunasya nimittam nvih /
samprasdranasya nimittam sas / na cdsya gunanimittaghatitatdsti,
yena bahirahgatd sydt /
"This Paribhasa (i.e., the BP) is indicated (by uth in P. 6.4.132),
provided that, in (the derivation of) visvauhah, (substitution of)
Samprasarana (u for v of vdh in visva-vdh-nvi-sas) is bahirariga, but
(substitution of) Guna (o for u in the following stage visva-uh-nvi-
sas) antarahga. In that (derivation) the cause of (substituting) Guna
(o for u) is nvi. The cause of (substituting) Samprasarana (u for v) is
sas. But this (suffix sas) does not contain as a constituent part (the
suffix nvi which is) the cause of (substituting) Guna, as a result of
which substitution of Samprasarana u for v) would be bahirahga."
So according to Sesadrisudhl as well, substitution of Samprasarana
would be bahirahga for Nagesa, if only its cause, sas were to contain the
cause of substituting Guna, nvi: in other words, if nvi were within sas. But
this means that, at least in one important respect, Sesadrisudhl understood
the text of the PS exactly the way we understand it.
This is not the only passage in Sesadrisudhi's work from which it is clear
that its author understood the part of the P$ now under consideration to be
based on inclusion as the criterion of Antarahgatva.2 It is not surprising, in
the light of what we know about this choleric grammarian, to hear that
Sesadrisudhl- rejected that criterion.3
All this is of no relevance to our present task. For us it suffices to know
that we are not alone in our perplexity about how to understand Nagesa's
explanation of the Jnapaka of Par. L. This again gives us confidence that so
far we have been on the right path. And it encourages us to renew our
efforts to overcome the present obstacle.
What is required of a cause in the context of the BP - and more
particularly so in the context of BPi - is that it be formal (sabdarupa) and
indicated in a rule by a word in the locative case. The suffix nvi is, no doubt,
indicated in the rule concerned (P. 7.3.86) by a word in the locative case; for
P. 7.3.86 draws in the compound sdrvadhdtukdrdhadhdtukayoh from the
preceding sutra but one. But can this same suffix*be considered formal, i.e.,
sabdarupa "in the form of sound"?
Let us, at this point, recall that the whole of nvi is dropped, viz. by P.
1.3.9 and P. 6.1.67. In other words, this suffix does not survive to the end of
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a derivation, and never materializes as sound. What else can this mean but
that NVI.cannot be considered sabdarupa and, as a consequence, is not a
cause in the sense required by the BP?
This conclusion relieves us, at a stroke, of all our problems. For now, all
of a sudden, the substitution of Guna o for u in visva-uh-nvi-sas is an
operation without following cause. And we know that an operation
without following cause is antaranga with regard to an operation that has a
following cause. What is more, it is antaranga in the first sense of that term,
so that it falls under the jurisdiction of BPj.
Having agreed on this much, we see that the derivation of visvauhah
behaves in the expected manner. The new rule vahah (P. 6.4.132 without
wTH)is responsible for the change oivisva-vah-nvi-sas into visva-uh-nvi-sas;
the cause of this operation is sas. P. 7.3.86, seeing the conditions for its
application fulfilled, would substitute Guna o for u, but, having no
following cause, it is prevented by BPi. Thus the derivation would take a
wrong turn here and not lead to visvauhah. And this is exactly what was
expected of it.
Let us recapitulate what has, up to now, been said regarding the meaning
of anga in the context of BPi. We have already seen that afiga is a cause,
exhibited in a rule in the locative case. We also know that the cause has to
be formal. As to what exactly is meant by the word "formal" {sabdarupa),
we have now learnt that it must be a sound which is not elided before the
derivation has reached its natural conclusion.4
The study of the justification of BP2 offers far fewer difficulties. But then
it offers no novelties either. This time the justification does not take the
shape of a Jnapaka; here it is a maxim from ordinary life.
PS 96.3-8, App. I 11. 132-138
idam antarahgatvam lokanyayasiddham iti manusyo'yam pratar utthaya
sarlrakaryani karoti tatah suhrddm tatah sambandhindm . . . ity anendcah
parasmin iti sutre bhasye spastam
"That this (kind of) Antarangatva is established by a maxim of
common life appears from the Bhasya on P. 1.1.57 where we read the
following: 'when a man has risen in the morning, he does (first)
vvhatever concerns his own person, afterwards (what concerns) his
frienas, afterwards (what concerns) his relatives—'" (K. pp.
260-261.)
What is meant by "this kind of Antarangatva" is, as appears from the
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context, the kind of Antarangatva which sets BP2 working; we could say,
further extending a convention introduced earlier, Antarangatvai.
It is worth noting that both the formulations of BP2 are covered by the
above maxim of common life. Both where the cause of one operation lies
before the cause of another one, in the order of the pronunciation of the
sounds, and also where the meaning of the Paribhasacan be paraphrased as
"first come, first served" (see p. 24, above), it is clear that a comparison with
the orderly activities of a man in the early morning can happily be drawn.
We have studied the justifications of both the interpretations of the BP.
But this does not yet solve all problems. The justification of BPi - the
presence of uth in P. 6.4.132 - hinges, as we have seen, on the fact that in the
derivation of visvauhah the antaranga operation, which would be
substitution of Guna, has no following cause, whereas the corresponding
bahiranga operation has a following cause. The cause of the antaranga
operation is therefore not included in the causes of the bahiranga operation
in the ordinary sense of the word "inclusion". Moreover, in none of the
examples studied was the cause of the antaranga operation included in the
causes of the bahiranga operation. Whenever use was made of BPi, the
antaranga operation had no following cause. We shall see that instances
where the causes of the antaranga operations are included in the causes of
the bahiranga operations are few indeed.5 Why then, if neither the Jiiapaka
nor actual derivations compel him to do so, does Nagesa formulate BPi in
such a queer way?
The answer to this question consists of two parts. First Nagesa wanted to
remain true to the letter of the Paribhasa. Secondly, there is a passage in the
Mahabhasya where one operation is said to be antaranga with respect to
another one because the cause of the former is included in the causes of the
latter.
The passage relating to the first part of the answer has been studied
already (above, p. 3). In it the word antaranga is explained as a Bahuvrihi
compound, meaning "of which the cause lies within the causes of the
bahiranga operation". It is this literal interpretation of the term antaranga
(and bahiranga) that forces Nagesa to formulate BPi the way he does. And
the fact that the Mahabhasya, at least in one place, appears to interpret the
terms in the same way, could not but strengthen Nagesa in his opinion that
he was right, even if instances illustrating this interpretation were not easily
forthcoming.
The Bhasya passage where, at least according to Nagesa, BPi has been
put to use, serves at the sametime as evidence to show that the word anga in
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the Paribhasa means "cause". This is pointed out in the first passage from
the P$ to be studied now.
P$ 80.12-81.2, App. I 11. 33-35
unasabdam asrityetyadibhasyena ca paribhasayam angasabdena
saptamyadyantopattam sabdarupam nimittam evagrhyata itispastam evoktam
"And the statement of the Bhasya (quoted above) that 'the
substitution of y (for I) would depend on the combination of letters
Una etc.' expresses clearly the view that the word ahga in the Paribhasa
only denotes a formal cause (such as a sound or a combination of
sounds) exhibited (in a rule) in a locative or other case." (Cf. K. p.
229.)
The second part of this passage has been studied earlier. At this moment
it is to be noted that here Nagesa invokes a Bhasya passage to substantiate
his views ragarding the meaning of ahga. That Bhasya passage is here
merely referred to, but its contents are more fully described elsewhere in the
discussion of the BP. There that description is, to be sure, part of a larger
whole, in which Kaiyata's comments on that Bhasya passage are
reproduced and subsequently rejected. Of course, the fact that Kaiyata's
comments are rejected does not mean that the Bhasya passage itself is not
accepted. This, if it were in need of proof at all, is shown by the fact that this
Bhasya passage is invoked as authority in Nagesa's remarks quoted above.
But let us see how Nagesa describes the contents of the Bhasya passage.
PS 78.3-79.3, App. I 11. 14-18
vidhis tadantasya iti sutre bhasya iko yan aci ityadav api
tadantavidhau syona ity atrantarahgatvad yano gunabadhakatvam isyate
tan na sidhyed unasabdam asritya yanadeso nasabdam asritya guna ity
antarangatvad guna eva syad ity uktam /
"In the Bhasya on P. 1.1.72 it has been stated that whereas it is
desirable that in (the formation of) syona (from si-it-na the
substitution of) y (for I taught in P. 6.1.77) should, on account of its
being antarahga, supersede (the substitution of) Guna for 7 taught in
P. 7.3.86), such a result would not be attained if P. 1.1.72 were to apply
also in rules like P. 6.1.77; for (in this case) the substitution of y (for i)
would depend on the combination of sounds ima, (the substitution
of) Guna (for I) on the combination of sounds na, and such being the
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case, (the substitution of) Guna would (contrary to what is desirable),
because of its being antarahga, (supersede the substitution of y)." (Cf.
K. pp. 226-227.)
Here then we see how use is made of BPi in the Mahabhasya. In the
hypothetical argument found therein two operations apply at the stage si-ii-
na of the derivation of syona. Substitution of y for I by P. 6.1.77 has, so it is
here assumed, the following cause ima\ substitution of Guna for I by P.
7.3.86 has the following cause na. Here, i.e., in this hypothetical argument,
the latter of the two operations is antarahga because its cause, na, lies
within the causes of the bahirahga operation, since na lies within una. It is
true that Nagesa here sets great store by a hypothetical argument in the
Bhasya. Anyone disagreeing with Nagesa might say that this passage from
the Bhasya gives the view of an opponent rather than that of Patanjali,and
this is indeed what SesadrisudhT does (P5419.1). The fact that this seems to
be the only time in the Mahabhasya that such an interpretation of theBP is
made use of further indicates that this passage is to be treated with the
utmost care.
But all this does not concern us at present. Here it matters only that
Nagesa considers this Bhasya passage authoritative. He, no doubt, does so
because the passage agrees so well with the analysis of the terms antarahga
and bahirahga he has given.
4. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF THE BP
We have obtained a fairly complete picture of what the BP means
according to Nagesa. To this he adds a few restrictions, which will be
studied in this chapter. These restrictions are two in number. The BP, so
Nagesa tells us, cannot be used in the last three chapters of Panini's
grammar (i.e., in the TripadT), nor in P. 6.4.22-175, the so-called Abhlya
section.
The passage which informs us that the BP cannot be used in the Tripadi
has been discussed earlier, where the Jnapaka of BPi made its appearance
(above, pp. 29f). The reason the BP has no concern with rules in the Tripadi
was that, the Jnapaka of this Paribhasa being part of a rule that precedes the
Tripadi, the Paribhasa itself is deemed to belong to the part of the
Astddhydyl that comes before the TripadT. Such being the case, the rules of
the Tripadi are asiddha with regard to this Paribhasa.
This is not the only reason Nagesa adduces to show that the BP does not
operate in the Tripadi. Against the earlier reason it could be objected that
on the Karyakalapaksa, where the Paribhasa would be placed near the
antaranga rule and where the latter would consequently not be asiddha
with regard to that Paribhasa, the BP should apply also in the Tripadi. This
objection is met in the following manner:
PS 86.8-87.6, App. I 11. 71-78
na ca karyakalapakse tripddyam etatpravrttir durvdreti vdcyarh / piirvam
prati parasydsiddhatvdd antarahgdbhdvena purvasya tannirupitabahirah-
gatvdbhdvdt tayd tasydsiddhatvapratipddandsambhavdt / na cdnayd
purvasydsiddhatvdt tadabhdvena tarn prati pardsiddhatvam purvatra ity
anena vaktum asakyam iti vdcyam j evam hi vinigamandvirahdd ubhayor
apy apravrttydpatteh / kim ca pitrvatrety asya pratyaksatvena
tendnumdnikyd asyd bddha evocitah / atah karyakalapakse pi tripddyam
asyd anupasthitir eva / /
"(Above it has been stated that this Paribhasa has no concern with
the rules in the three last chapters of Panini's grammar, in other
words, that a bahirahga operation taught in a preceding rule cannot
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by this Paribhasa be rendered asiddha in regard to an antaranga
operation which is taught in the three last chapters of Panini's work).
Now one cannot object that (although on the Yathoddesapaksa the
above statement may be correct) it is impossible to show why on the
Karyakalapaksa (at any rate) the Paribhasa should have no concern
(with the rules) in the three last chapters (of Panini's grammar); for (to
show this is easy enough). As a subsequent (rule) is (by P. 8.2.1)
asiddha in regard to a preceding (rule), the (subsequent) antaranga
(rule) ceases to exist (by P. 8.2.1); consequently the preceding (rule)
cannot be bahiranga in regard to it, and can therefore also not be
made out to be asiddha by the (Bahiranga-paribhasa). Nor can one
maintain that, because the preceding {bahiranga rule) is asiddha by
the (Bahiranga-paribhasa), the subsequent (rule) cannot be said to be
asiddha in regard to it by P. 8.2.1, viz. because the preceding rule
would have ceased to exist (by the Bahiranga-paribhasa). For (as) in
this manner (P. 8.2.1 would prevent the working of the Bahiranga-
paribhasa, and the Bahiranga-paribhasa in its turn prevent the
working of P. 8.2.1) it would, in the absence of any decisice authority
(in favour of either), come to pass that neither of the two would be
applicable. Moreover, as (the rule) piirvatrasiddham is actually
enounced (by Panini), whereas the existence of the (Bahiranga-
paribhasa) is (only) inferred (from the word uth in P. 6.4.132), it is
only proper thatpurvatrasiddham should supersede this (Paribhasa).
Therefore this (Paribhasa) is certainly also on the Karyakalapaksa not
placed near (any of the rules contained) in the three last chapters (of
Panini's grammar)." (Cf. K. pp. 240-241.)
The reason this passage has been reproduced here is that it enables us to
answer the following question. The first reason for accepting that the BP
does not operate in the Tripadi was, as we have seen, that the Jnapaka of
this Panbhasadoes not occur in the Tripadi. But we know that this Jnapaka,
viz. uth in P. 6.4.132, merely justifies the first interpretation of the BP, viz.
BPi. Does this mean that only BPi does not operate in the Tripadi, while
BP2 does operate there?
The first thing to notice is that where, out of a pair of rules used in a
derivation, one is asiddha with regard to the other both by P. 8.2.1 and by
the BP, there is no problem. Only such cases where P. 8.2.1 and the BP
conflict are interesting for us now. In such cases it is the antaranga rule that
finds itself in the Tripadi or, where, the bahiranga rule is also in the Tripadi,
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finds itself more towards the end of that section. But where P. 8.2.1 and the
BP are in conflict, only P. 8.2.1 counts-. This we learn from the last passage
discussed. This whole story is completely independent of the question of
whether BPi or BP2 is involved. Thus we can say, quite generally, that the
BP does not apply when the antaranga rule is in the Tripadi.
The question just discussed is of a very theoretical nature. I know of no
instances where BP2 would apply and the antaranga rule is in the Tripadi
and follows - in the order of the rules in the Astadhyayi - the bahiranga
rule. We shall therefore not linger here, but pass on to the second
restriction.
The second restriction presents itself as if it concerns both BPi and BP2,
since it comes at the very end of the discussion of Par. L, where the
expositions of BPi and BP2 have come to a close and where some final
general remarks find their place. In spite of that, this second restriction on
the BP is such that, by its nature, it can concern only BPi. This will become
clear in the sequel.
The passage we shall have to study is interesting in that it was completely
misunderstood by Kielhorn. Perhaps it may be said that Kielhorn's
confusion, a result of his ignorance Nagesa's intentions, here reached its
culmination. We shall carefully study what he has to say with respect to the
passage to come. But we begin with what seems to be its correct
interpretation.
P$ 98.8-100.1, App. I 11. 192-194
abhiyehtaranga abhiyasya bahirangasya samanasrayasya nanenasiddha-
tvam asiddhatvad ity asiddhavatsiitre bhasye spastam /
"From the Bhasya on P. 6.4.22 it appears that when an antaranga
(operation) taught in P. 6.4.22-175 (is to take effect), a bahiranga
(operation) which is taught in the same portion of Panini's grammar,
and which depends on the same (elements), is not by this (Paribhasa)
asiddha, because (all that is taught in that portion of Panini's grammar,
and therefore also the bahiranga operation itself, is) asiddha (by P.
6.4.22)." (Cf. K. p. 265.)
This translation deviates at the two places in italics from Kielhorn's
translation. The differences will be studied in detail below. Here it may
merely be remarked that the translation offered here does justice to the
word samanasraya of the Sanskrit text, where Kielhorn had left it
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untranslated. Let us, to start with, try to understand the passage as
translated here.
A rule from the Abhiya section of the Astadhyayi (P. 6.4.22-175) which
has taken effect is asiddha when another rule from the same section
subsequently applies. The Bhasya on P. 6.4.22 (Mbh. III. 190.22-23) adds a
limiting condition: both rules must depend on the same elements; they must
be samdnasraya. To find out what exactly is meant by this term, or at any
rate how Nagesa understood it, we turn to his comments on this word in the
Uddyota.
MPU IV, p. 697
asrayanam sthdnitvenaiva nimittatvenaiva iti ndgrahah / kim tu
yathakathamcit /
"There is no insistence that the element on which (the rules) depend
(must be) a substituend only, or a cause only; on the contrary, (that
element can be looked upon) in any way."
In the examples to be discussed presently, we shall see that one and the
same element will indeed be looked upon as cause from the point of view of
one rule, and as a substituend from the point of view of another rule.
What the last passage from the P$ tells us is that, if both an antaranga
and the corresponding bahiranga rule belong to the Abhiya section, the
bahiranga rule is asiddha, not by the BP, but by P. 6.4.22. But what
difference does it make whether a rule is asiddha on account of P. 6.4.22 or
as a result of the BP? It does make a difference, and a considerable one at
that. We have seen already that a rule from the Abhiya section is asiddha
when it has taken effect and another rule from the same section
subsequently applies. The BP, on the other hand, does not wait till one rule
has taken effect before it comes into action. A major part of the energies of
this Paribhasa are absorbed in deciding which of two simultaneously
applying rules takes effect first.
Let us take a concrete example to show the difference. In the derivation
of sddhi the following stage is reached: sds-hi. Here two rules apply. P.
6.4.35 (sahau) prescribes the substitution of sa for sds; its following cause is
hi. P. 6.4.101 (hujhalbhyo her dhih) prescribes substitution of dhi for hi', it
has no following cause. The former rule is bahiranga, the latter antaranga.
If the BP had free play here, it would say that the antaranga operation, viz.
substitution of dhi for hi, was to take place first. It is only because the BP is
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not allowed to exert its influence here that we are free first to substitute sa
for sas, and subsequently, because this earlier operation is asiddha on
\account of P. 6.4.22, we can substitute dhi for hi.
The procedure here described regarding the derivation of sadhi has the
full support of the Mahabhasya. There we find this same form sadhi
derived in the second way described above, i.e., in an order that would not
have been possible had the BP been valid there. The passage runs as
follows:
Mbh. III. 187.8-9
edhi sadhiti / astisastyor ettvasabhavayoh krtayor jhallaksanam dhitvam
na prapnoti / asiddhatvad bhavati j /
"When, in (the derivations of) edhi (from as-hi and of) sadhi (from
sas-hi respectively) e has been substituted for (the final s of the root)
as (by P. 6.4.119) and sa has been substituted for (the root) sas (by P.
6.4.35), substitution of dhi (for hi by P. 6.4.101), which applies when
(the preceding root ends in a sound contained in the Pratyahara)jhal,
would not apply (since now these roots do not end in such a sound
any longer. Substitution of dhi for hi) does (however) take place,
because (the rules P. 6.4.119 and P. 6.4.35, which had already taken
effect in the derivations of edhi and sadhi respectively, are here)
asiddha."
In this passage the BP is clearly not taken into consideration. This is even
clearer from Kaiyata's commentary on the same passage, where he explains
that in the derivation of edhi the substitution of e for s takes place first,
because it is nitya and because the rule prescribing this operation, P.
6.4.119, comes later in the Astadhydyi than the rule which prescribes
substitution of dhi for hi, i.e. P. 6.4.101; with regard to sadhi Kaiyata says
that the substitution of SA for sas comes first because it is nitya (MPIV, p.
687-688). Here the absence of a mention of Antararigatva is noteworthy.
We now understand how Nagesa could introduce the passage of the P$
last quoted with the words: "From the Bhasya on P. 6.4.22 it appears
that " And after the above explanation we also understand that the
word samanasrayasya ("which depends on the same elements") is essential
in that passage. Only when two operations, both taught in the Abhiya
section, depend on the same elements, does P. 6.4.22 come into action and
make the one that has taken place asiddha with regard to the one that is
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yet to take place. Only in such a case, and only if one of the two operations
is antaranga and the other bahiranga, can the question of whether
Asiddhatva is prescribed by P. 6.4.22 or by the BP arise.
Because he interpreted the BP differently, it is not surprising that
Kielhorn opted for the following translation of the passage from the P$:
From the Bhasya on P. 6.4.22 it appears that when an antaranga
(operation) taught in P. 6.4.22-175 (is to take effect), a bahiranga
(operation) which is taught in the same portion of Panini's grammar,
is not by this (Paribhasa) asiddha, because (all that is taught in that
portion of Panini's grammar, and therefore also the Paribhasa itself,
the existence of which is indicated by P. 6.4.132, is) asiddha (by P.
6.4.22). (K. p. 265.)
This translation is not satisfactory for several reasons. To begin with, the
word asiddhatvat is translated by Kielhorn as: "because... the Paribhasa is
asiddha." But asiddhatvat in the P$ passage under consideration cannot
mean that. Here it clearly means: "because the bahiranga operation is
asiddhar
It must be admitted that Kielhorn's translation creates the impression of
being in agreement with what was Nagesa's opinion at an earlier time. That
this impression is incorrect I shall show below. Let us first read some
passages from Kaiyata's and Nagesa's commentaries on P. 6.4.22 which
support Kielhorn. In these passages we read that the BP is asiddha in the
Abhiya section of the Astddhydyi, the reason being that this Paribhasa is
indicated by P. 6.4.132, which itself occurs in that section. Kaiyata states
this in the following terms:
MP IV, p. 697-698
asiddham bahirahgam antarange ity esd paribhasa vaha uth ity atra jndpitety
dbhdcchdstriya.
"The Paribhasa asiddham bahirahgam antarange is indicated in (P.
6.4.132:) vaha uth, which belongs to the Abhfya section; it)
belongs therefore (itself) to the Abrnya section."
Nagesa comments:
MPU IV, p. 698
vaha uth ity atreti / etad eva yuktam /
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"Regarding (Kaiyata's remark) 'in (P. 6.4.132:) vdha utK\ only this is
the correct (way of looking at the matter)."
Here Nagesa seems to endorse Kaiyata's view that the BP is part of the
Abhiya section and therefore itself asiddha with respect to rules belonging
to that section.
The same seems to follow from his remarks slightly later in the same
section. The Bhasya discusses here the derivation oipapusah out of papa-
vas-as. P. 6.4.131 (vasoh samprasdranam) substitutes u for va; its following
cause is as. Subsequently P. 6.4.64 (dto lopa iti ca) causes elision of A; its
cause is us. Clearly us precedes as. P. 6.4.131 is therefore bahiranga, and P.
6.4.64 antarahga. And P. 6.4.131 takes effect before there is a chance for P.
6.4.64 to come into play. In this connection the Bhasya says:
Mbh. III.191.8
tatra nimittam eva bahirahgam antarahgasya.
"Here the bahiranga (operation is) merely the cause of the antarahga
(operation)."
That is to say, the bahiranga operation is here not asiddha with respect to
the subsequently applying antarahga operation. From the point of view
adopted in the P$ this is not at all disturbing. For here, in the derivation of
papusah from papA-vas-as, B?2 applies, or rather, does not apply, since the
antarahga operation here applies after the bahiranga operation has taken
effect.
But Kaiyata cannot look upon this sentence from the Bhasya with the
same degree of equanimity. He thinks that something must be said in order
to justify that sentence:
MP IV, p. 698
tatra nimittam eveti / paribhdsdyd asiddhatvdd apravrttdv iti
bhdvah / vasusamprasdranam caikam paribhdsdyd dllopdcRndm cdsraya
iti samdndsrayatvdd bhavaty asiddhatvam paribhdsdydh / j
"The meaning of 'here the bahiranga...' is 'since the Paribhasadoes
not apply on account of the fact that it is asiddha\ The Samprasarana
(vowel u which is substituted for va of) vasfu) is the single element on
which (both) the Paribhasaand the elision of A etc. depend; since as a
result of this (the Paribhasaand the elision of A etc.) are samdndsraya
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the Paribhasa is asiddha (with respect to the elision of a etc.)"
As said above, here again Nagesa seems to agree with Kaiyata, for he says
MPU IV, p. 698
apravrttdv iti / paribhdsayd apravrttau satydm bahirahgam
samprasdranam antarahgalopasya nimittam ity art ha iti bhdvah /
"The meaning of'does not apply'is that on account of the fact that the
Paribhasa does not apply the bahirahga Samprasarana (vowel u) is
the cause of the elision (of A which is) antarahga. This is how
(Kaiyata) interprets (the Bhasya passage)."
But then, Nagesa suddenly makes a complete volte-face, saying:
MPU IV, p. 698
pare tu tatra nimittam eveti bhdsyasya paribhdsayd anityatvdd
ity art hah / evam cdsiddhavatsittrapratydkhydne'pi na dosa ity dhuh /
"But others (who know the true meaning of the Bhasya) say: 'The
meaning of the Bhasya (passage) "here the bahirahga..." is "because
the Paribhasa is not universally valid".' And such being the case, no
fault (results) even when P. 6.4.22 is rejected."
It is not necessary here to remind the reader that the words pare tu
introduce Nagesa's own opinion. Something will be said about that in
Appendix IV. Here it must be noted that this last passage from the MPU
cancels both the two earlier passages from that commentary. Or at any rate,
it denies that the BP is asiddha with respect to rules that belong to the Abhiya
section. If that Paribhasa does not apply there, it is because it is not
universally valid, not because it is asiddha by. P. 6.4.22.
Before we proceed, one more point may be clarified. We know that the
BP as interpreted in the PS would not in any way interfere with the
derivation of papusah. This has been explained above. Why then does
Nagesa tell us in his MPU that in this derivation no fault arises because the
BP is not universally valid?
The most obvious answer to this question is that Nagesa, at the time he
wrote his MPU, had not yet fully worked out the interpretation of the BP
which he was to present in the P$. And this is the answer we shall have to
accept. That Nagesa's ideas regarding the BP underwent profound changes
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in the course of his life will be shown in Appendix IV.
Let us return to the task at hand. I had argued that asiddhatvat in the
sentence from the P$ means: "because the bahiranga operation is asiddha"
and not "because the Paribhasa is asiddha". It could here be objected that
there is no need to make so much fuss about the translation of asiddhatvat,
since it makes no difference in practice. One might argue that in either case
the bahiranga rule will in the end be asiddha by P. 6.4.22, and not by the BP.
This is certainly correct. In the interpretation here offered of the passage
under discussion, both translations amount, for all practical purposes, to
the same thing. This, however, cannot be said of the interpretation
Kielhorn offers of the passage. A glance at the explanatory note which he
adds to his translation will be illuminating. It reads (K. p. 265, fn. 2):
E.g., papusah from papd-vas-as; by P. 6.4.131 Samprasarana is
substituted for va because as follows, and we obtain thuspapA-us-aH;
here a is elided before us by P. 6.4.64: papusah. The substitution of u
is here bahiranga, the elision of a antarahga, and the latter ought
therefore not to take place because the substitution of u would by the
/4NTaRaNga-paribhasa[i.e. Bahirariga-paribhasa] be asiddha. In reality
however such is not the case, because the Antaranga-paribhasa[i.e.,
Bahirahga-paribhasa] is itself by P. 6.4.22 asiddha in regard to the
antarahga elision of A, for it is likewise abhiya, i.e., taught in P. 6.4.22-
175, viz. indicated by P. 6.4.132, and also samandsraya, because it
aims at the same letters on which the antarahga elision of A depends.
Kielhorn thinks that our passage refers to the derivation of papusah. Here
the bahiranga operation is substitution of Samprasarana by P. 6.4.131, and
the antarahga operation, elision of A by P. 6.4.64. Kielhorn further thinks
that the BP, if it were valid in the Abhiya section, would make substitution
of Samprasarana asiddha. We know that this is incorrect. Substitution of
Samprasarana, though bahiranga, is bi, not b\. In other words, the second
aspect of the Paribhasa, i.e. BP2, or, more exactly, BP21 applies, and BP21
does not make substitution of Samprasarana asiddha. But back to
Kielhorn. In his opinion the BP would make substitution of Samprasarana
asiddha. Since, however, the Paribhasa itself is asiddha, the bahiranga rule
is not asiddha. So for Kielhorn the Asiddhatva of the Paribhasa and the
Asiddhatva of the bahiranga operation do NOT amount to the same thing.
Rather, the bahiranga operation is siddha because the Paribhasa is asiddhal
There is more. Kielhorn's interpretation does no justice to anena in
anenasiddhatvam. He translates: "a bahiranga operation is not by this
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Par ibhdsa asiddha r Indeed, but if Kielhorn is to be believed, the bahirahga
operation under discussion is not in any way asiddha, neither by this
Paribhasa, nor by P. 6.4.22. On the contrary, in his opinion it is very much
siddha.
Then there is Kielhorn's inability to tell us which is the Bhasya passage
referred to by Nagesa. This is not surprising. The whole of the Bhasya on P.
6.4.22 contains not a single remark that indicates what is here supposed to
be Nagesa's opinion. What we do find quoted in a footnote to Kielhorn's
translation is a passage from Kaiyata's Pradipa. Ironically, this passage
comments on the statement in the Bhasya that the BP does not apply in the
formation of papusah and similar forms. This is exactly what we have
learnt to view as Nagesa's position. For here substitution of Samprasarana
for vaby P. 6.4.131 is B2, elision of a by P. 6.4.64 is a2, and BP2 is such that it
does not make the former operation asiddha with regard to the latter.
Kaiyata is aware of the literal meaning of this Bhasya passage. But he
thinks that if the BP is allowed not to apply in the formation of papusah, it
will not apply in the formation of pacavedam either. But in this latter
derivation the BP is required, to prevent P. 3.4.93 {eta ai) from taking
effect. As we know, for Nagesa the difference between papusah and
pacavedam, as far as the BP is concerned, is that in the first form BP2
applies, or rather (in view of the shape of the derivation) does not apply,
whereas in the second form BPi applies. But clearly Kaiyata is not aware of
this distinction. And to get out of the difficulties, he suggests that the BP
itself be regarded as belonging to the Abhlya section, and therefore as being
asiddha with respect to rules from that section. He introduces this
suggestion with the remark (MP IV, p. 697) evam tarhy anyathd
vydkhydyate, as if it were another interpretation of the, for him,
problematic Bhasya passage. In reality it is, of course, far removed from
that passage.
It is these remarks by Kaiyata, the content of which does not correspond
to anything said in the Bhasya, that Kielhorn invokes in his footnote. If this
was what Nagesa had in mind in the above passage of the P$, it is not clear
why he did not make a reference to Kaiyata instead of to the Bhasya, as he
actually does.
But the most serious shortcoming of Kielhorn's interpretation is that the
word samdnasraya can find no place in it. We have seen that in his
explanatory note Kielhorn tries to show that the BP and the antaranga
elision of A are samdnasraya. By saying this, however, Kielhorn disregards
the rules of syntax: samdndsrayasya is in apposition to bahirangasya and
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qualifies the latter.
Obviously, Kielhorn had difficulties in interpreting this passage.1 And
indeed, he added, apparently as an afterthought, the following remark (K.
p. 265, fn. 2):
I now consider the reading of Ms. C, which omits the word
samdnasrayasya in the text p. 99,1. 1 to be the right reading, although
Payagunda does give that word; for in the instancespapusah etc. the
bahirahga substitution of Samprasarana and the antaranga elision of
a etc. are not samdndsraya.
This addition almost amounts to admitting defeat. Had Kielhorn known
the correct interpretation of the BP, he would have noticed that the
example papusah presented no problem at all to Nagesa, and that the
sentence of the PS under discussion could not therefore refer to this. Since
he did not, the sentence remained an enigma to him.
This chapter would not be complete without a mention of what might be
called the third restriction on the BP. In reality, as Nagesa points out, this is
not a restriction, since of the two rules that play a role in it, one is an
Apavada of the other and supersedes it on this account. The sentence which
contains this information is the last one of the discussion of Par. L.
PS 100.1-2, App. I 11. 193-195
evam sici vrddher yenanaprdptinydyendntarahgabddhakatvamulakam
na sky antarahgam astiiiko guna iti siitre bhdsye spastam / /
"We see likewise from the Bhasya on P. 1.1.3 that (an operation, such
as the substitution of Guna taught in P. 7.3.84) is not antaranga (in
regard to the substitution of Vrddhi taught in P. 7.2.1 etc.) before sic;
this (statement) is based on the circumstance that P. 7.2.1 supersedes,
in accordance with Par. LVII, the antaranga (rule P. 7.3.84 because it
is an Apavada of it)." (Cf. K. p. 266.)
When in the derivation of anaislt the stage a-rii-s-i-t is reached, two
operations apply. P. 7.3.84 (sdrvadhdtukdrdhadhdtukayoh) prescribes
substitution of Guna for i of rii\ the following cause is s. P. 7.2.1 (sici
vrddhih parasmaipadesu), on the other hand, prescribes substitution of
Vrddhi for that same i\ it has as following causes both s and it. Clearly, s is
included in s-lt. The former rule could therefore be expected to be
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antarahga and to take effect first. The present passage tells us that this is not
what happens. The reason is that P. 7.2.1 is an Apavada of P. 7.3.84.
This passage does not contain any real problems or provide us with new
insights, nor does it pose new questions. In spite of that, something must be
said regarding Kielhorn's translation of it. That translation contains a
mistake which, though most probably due to a slip of the pen more than to
anything else, is potentially very confusing. Where our translation uses the
word antarahga for the second time, Kielhorn has preferred the word
antahkarya. Now we have seen that antahkarya is synonymous with
antarahga as this word is used in the context of BP2; antahkarya is
synonymous with ai. But P. 7.3.84 in the present context is not ai, it is a\. So
the employment of the word antahkarya here is quite simply wrong. It is
not clear how Kielhorn came to use this word, because all manuscripts
seem to have antarahga.
5. THE TWO-WORD PRINCIPLE
All the main passages yielding information about Nagesa's interpretation
of the BP, insofar as they occur in that portion of the PS which deals
directly with this Paribhasa, have now been considered. This does not,
however, mean that our knowledge of Nagesa's interpretation of the
Paribhasa is now complete. An entirely new aspect of it makes its
appearance when Par. LI is discussed. The discussion of Par. LI, also
known by the name "Najanantarya-paribhasa" or NP for short, is difficult
and deserves close attention. This will be given to it in a later chapter
(Chapter 13, below). At present all that needs to be known is that the NP,
together with part of its discussion, is ultimately rejected. What is not
rejected, but merely put to a different use, is the alleged Jnapaka of this
Paribhasa. It is while establishing that Jnapaka that use is made of the
two-word principle.
P$ 101.3-8
NAJANANTARYE BAHISTVAPRAKLPTIH / / [Par. LIT
- aTRa satvatukoh iti sutrastham tuggrahanam jnapakam /
anyathddhltya pretyetyddau samdsottaram lyappravrttya purvam
samase jate tatra samhitaya nityatval lyabutpattiparyantam apy asamhita-
taydvasthdndsambhavenaikddese lyapi tugapeksayd padadvaya-
sambandhivarnadvaydpeksaikddesasya1 bahirangataydsiddhatvena tadvai-
yarthyam spastam eva /
"Par. LI: (Provided that an operation which by the BP would be
bahirahga has taken effect, it is, contrary to that Paribhasa,) not
regarded as bahiranga (and consequently not regarded as asiddha,
when an antaranga operation is to take effect) which depends on the
immediate sequence of a vowel (and something else).
The word tuk in P. 6.1.86 indicates (the existence of) this
(Paribhasa); else that {tuk, by which Panini intends to show that in the
formation of adhitya etc. the substitution of 7 etc. for the I of adhi etc.
and the radical / is asiddha in regard to the addition, by P. 6.1.71, of
the augment tuk to the root I), would evidently be useless. In (the
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formation of) adhitya,pretya etc. (from adhi-itva, pra-itva etc., the
substitution by P. 7.1.37 of) lyap (for ktva) takes place after (adhi or
pro) have been compounded (with itva)\ that composition therefore
takes place before {lyap is substituted. Now) as in a compound (the
final sound of a preceding member) must invariably be joined (with
the initial sound of a following member, the final sound of adhi orpra
and the following radical I) cannot remain unjoined even until lyap
takes the place (of ktva); the substitution of one (vowel for the final of
adhi or pra and the following radical i) precedes therefore (the
substitution of) lyap. (Were the BP here applicable), the substitution
of the one (vowel / or e, for i-i, or a-i,) dependent as it is on two sounds
of two words, would be bahiranga and would consequently (already
by the BP) be considered asiddha in regard to (the addition of the
augment) tuk (to the root I, and the special statement in P. 6.1.86
regarding the addition of the augment tuk would be superfluous; but
the BP does not apply in this case and tuk in P. 6.1.86 is therefore
absolutely necessary)." (Cf. K. pp. 267-269.)
In the derivation of adhltya, at the stage adhi-i-tva, two rules apply. P.
6.1.101 (akah savarne dirghah) prescribes substitution of i for i-i. P. 7.1.37
(samasehanpurve ktvo lyap) prescribes substitution of (l)ya(p) for Tva.
However, for the second rule to take effect it is required that adhi-i form a
compound; and in a compound internal sandhi must take place without
delay. We thus obtain the following two stages, in this order: adhi-tva and
adhT-ya. Then there is another rule, P. 6.1.71 (hrasvasya piti krti tuk),
which prescribes the addition of t(uk) after a short vowel, when a KRT-affix
having an indicatory p follows. In the above passage it is maintained that
this rule P. 6.1.71 is antaranga and P. 6.1.101 BaHiRaNga. Since P. 6.1.101 is
bahiranga, the substitution of i for i-i is asiddha. The antaranga rule P.
6.1.71 therefore finds i-i instead of i and experiences no difficulty in
applying.
Let us, to begin with, notice that the bahiranga rule takes effect, in this
derivation, before the antaranga rule. In spite of that, the bahiranga rule is
here said to be asiddha with respect to the antaranga rule. This leaves us no
choice: here BPi is at work. Let us see if we would also have reached the
same conclusion independently.
The bahiranga operation in the above derivation is the substitution of 7
for i-i; it has as following cause I.2 The antaranga operation consists in the
addition of t(uk) after I in i-ya\ its following cause is ya. It is clear that
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independently we would have reached the opposite conclusion to that of
our passage. We would rather call the substitution of i for i-i antaranga (a2),
because its following cause precedes the following cause of the addition of
TuK, which latter operation would therefore be bahirahga (B2). It follows
that it is not the criteria with which we are now familiar that have been
applied here.
The passage does not leave us in uncertainty as to what criterion has been
applied. The substitution of 7 for i-i is taken to be bahirahga because it is
"dependent on two sounds of two words". This, indeed, is a criterion not
met with hitherto. We shall, on future occasions, refer to it as the "two-
word principle".
We may do well to keep in mind that where the two-word principle
applies, it makes a pair of rules a\ and Bi, respectively. Only because such is
the case did it make any sense to introduce it in the discussion regarding the
derivation oiadhitya. It is for this reason that BPi comes into action, which
makes the bahirahga rule which had taken effect asiddha with respect to the
antaranga rule which does not take effect till later. And it is also worth
remarking that the two-word principle would not have been necessary to
make the substitution of 1 for i-i bi with regard to the addition of tuk, which
is ai. For Nagesa had explained earlier in the P$-v/e shall study the passages
in Chapter 7-that the operation which joins a root with an affix is antaranga,
i.e., aiy with respect to the operation that joins that root with a preposition*
As was remarked earlier and will be established in Chapter 13, Nagesa
'rejects the NP, but puts its Jnapaka to a different use. Immediately after
rejecting that Paribhasa he says:
P$ 104.9-10.
etajjndpakendntarahgaparibhdsdyd anityatvabodhanasyaiva
nydyyatvdt / /
"(And this is the correct view of the matter) because it is simpler that
(the word tuk in P. 6.1.86), which (has been assumed) to indicate (the
existence of) this (Par. LI), should merely teach us that Par. L is not
universally valid, (than that it should indicate the existence of a new
ParibhSsa)." (K. pp. 275-276.)
The conclusion to be drawn from this passage is as follows. The alleged
Jnapaka of the NP depended upon the two-word principle. Since that
Paribhasa has now been rejected, but the Jnapaka retained - it now indicates
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that the BP is not universally valid - we must accept that, in Nagesa's
opinion, the two-word principle is valid, even though no mention of it had
been made while the BP was under discussion.
It must be admitted that the comments in the P$ on Par. LI form a
confused lot. Any conclusion based on this part of the text deserves to be
looked at with suspicion as long as no corroborative evidence from
elsewhere is forthcoming. Fortunately, such evidence exists in our case. It is
the following passage from the PS on Par. LXXXV.
PS 164. 2-4
kim ca satvatukor asiddhah ity etadbaldt krti-tuggrahandc ca tugvijhau
bahirangaparibhdsdyd apravrtteh / /
"Moreover, in consequence of the (tuk in the) rule P. 6.1.86, and
because (Panini) has employed the words KRTI tuk (in P. 8.2.2) Par. L
has no concern (with an operation which would by it be asiddha) in
regard to the addition of (the augment) tuk." (K. p. 412.)
This passage merely repeats what we know already. If the BP were
universally valid, it would also apply in the derivation oiadhitya etc. and
thus make the word tuk in P. 6.1.86 superfluous. However, the BPcan only
apply in the derivation of adhitya when the two-word principle is valid.
A third argument to show that Nagesa had retained the two-word
principle consists in the fact that he makes explicit use of it3 in the passage
which introduces Par. LII.
P$ 105.4-6
nanv evam gomatpriya ityadau padadvayanimittakasamasasritatvena
bahirangam lukam bddhitvdntarangatvdddhalriyddilope4 numddayah5 syur
ata aha:
ANTARANGAN API VIDHINBAHIRANGOLUGBADHATE{Par.U\]
"Now one might say that (if) then (Par. L were valid in all except the
particular cases stated above, it ought to be applied) e.g., in (the
formation of) gomatpriyah (from gomat-su-priya-su, and in that case
the substitution of) Lopa (for the su of gomat-su, which is taught in P.
6.1.68) ought, being antaranga, to supersede the bahiranga
(substitution of) Luk (for the same su which is taught in P. 2.4.71 .The
latter substitution is bahiranga) because it is dependent on the
circumstance that (gomatpriya) is a compound (base and as such)
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made up of two words (viz. of gomat and priya, and because it
therefore indirectly depends on two words. If Lopa were accordingly
substituted for the su of gomat-su, gomat ought by P. 1.1.62 and
7.1.70 etc.) to receive (the augment) NUM etc. (The author of the
Paribhasas) says therefore
Par. LII: A bahiranga (substitution of) Luk supersedes even
antaranga rules." (K. pp. 277-278.)
At the stage gomat-su-priya-su two rules apply. P. 6.1.68 {halnydbbhyo
dirghdt sutisy aprktam hat) prescribes Lopa of su following gomat\ it has
no following cause. P. 2.4.71 (supo dhdtuprdtipadikayoh) prescribes Luk
of the same affix su. A cause, in the sense required for the BP, cannot be
found here either. There is Luk-elision of su because su is part of a
Pratipadika (P. 2.4.71). And gomat-su-priya-su is a Pratipadika because it
carries the name samasa (P. 1.2.46). It carries that name because it consists
of two sup-ending words (P. 2.1.4). So there is no cause in the required
sense. The fact that Luk-elision of su is all the same considered bahirarigais
due to the two-word principle.
It is to be noted that the two-word principle in the present passage is
somewhat more loosely formulated than on the previous occasion. There,
an operation was said to be bahiranga because it was "dependent on two
sounds of two words". Here an operation is said to be bahiranga merely
because it depends on two words, and not even directly, but indirectly. It
suffices therefore for an operation to be bahiranga by the two-word
principle that it, somehow or other, depends on two words. Needless to say,
the corresponding antaranga operation should not depend on two words.
The preceding discussion shows that Nagesa, though he has no reason to
be proud of the way he introduces the two-word principle, was apparently
of the opinion that he could not do without it. The two-word principle must
therefore be included in the list of interpretations given by Nagesa to the
terms bahiranga and antaranga. No addition, however, has to be made to
the number of interpretations of the BP itself. When out of a pair rules or
operations the one is bahiranga and the other antaranga, by the two-word
principle, it is simply BPi that applies.
6. SUMMARY AND ILLUSTRATIONS
All the passages which contribute to an understanding of the structure of
Nagesa's ideas regarding the BP have been discussed. It is true that he
imposes further restrictions on this Paribhasa in the Paribhasas that follow,
but since there are no difficulties regarding their interpretation and since
they modify the BP only at the periphery of its application they will not be
discussed here. And those passages which will be discussed in the next part
of this book and which seem to add to our knowledge do so only by
showing how Nagesa puts.,BP22 to use. They add nothing to the basic
structure. We seem to have reached the stage where a concise restatement
of our major findings can appropriately be made.
(1) The meaning of the terms antarahga and bahiranga fall into two
groups, aiBi and a2B2, to which correspond two interpretations of the BP,
BPi and BP2. BP2 itself consists of two parts, BP2i and BP22.
(2) A rule or operation is a\ with respect to another rule or operation
which is Bi, (i) when the causes of the former lie within the causes of the
latter; (ii) when the former has no cause whereas the latter has; (iii) when
the latter depends on two words, whereas the former does not (two-word
principle). A cause here is what is mentioned or understood in the rule
concerned in a locative case. Where out of a pair of rules one is a\ and the
other Bi, BPI applies: If both the rules apply simultaneously, the antarahga
rule supersedes the bahiranga rule. If the bahiranga rule has already taken
effect when the antarahga rule applies, the former is asiddha with regard to
the latter.
(3) A rule or operation is a2 with respect to another rule or operation
which is B2, when the cause of the former, in the order of the pronunciation
of the sounds, comes before the cause of the latter. In such cases BP21
applies: If both the rules apply simultaneously, the antarahga rule
supersedes the bahiranga rule.
(4) A rule or operation is a2 with respect to another rule or operation
which is B2, when the former directly or indirectly depends on a meaning
which presents itself earlier than the meaning on which the latter depends.
In such cases BP22 applies: What depends on a meaning that presents itself
earlier takes effect earlier. In short, first come, first served.
54
SUMMARY AND ILLUSTRATIONS 55
(5) The BP does not apply when out of a pair of rules the antaranga rule
is in the Tripadl,nor when both the antaranga and the bahirahga rule are in
the Abhiya section and depend on the same element.
Some illustrations of the BP have been met with in the preceding pages,
but they were few. The reason was Nagesa's parsimony in this regard. He
has been especially miserly where that part of BPi was concerned which
deal with the inclusion of the cause of an antarahga rule in the causes of a
bahirahga rule. So far, we have had to be content with the hypothetical
argument in the Mahdbhdsya on the derivation of syona (see above, pp.
35 i)- And in the derivation of asusavat, which seemed to fulfil the
conditions, a way was found to prevent BPi from applying (pp. 19 f)- It is
therefore high time to find some illustration where the cause of the
antarahga rule is really included in the causes of the bahirahga rule.
Such an illustration exists in the derivation of *atitat, the 3. sing. aor.
caus. act. of the root at, without the augment a(t) being attached to it. The
form can occur in such sentences as ma bhavan *atitat.l In this derivation
the stage at-(n)i(c)-(c)a(h)-t is reached. Here P. 7.2.116 (ata upadhdydh)
takes effect, which leads to at-i-a-t. Now two rules apply. P. 6.1.11 (cahi)
prescribes reduplication of ti\ its following cause is (c)a(h). P. 7.4.1 (nau
cany upadhayd hrasvah) prescribes substitution of short a for A of dt\ its
following causes are (n)i(c) and (c)a(h). Clearly (c)a(h) lies within the
combination (n)i(c)-(c)a(h). P. 6.1.11 is therefore antarahga (ai) and takes
place first, removing the conditions for P. 7.4.1 to take effect.
This explanation of the derivation of *dtitat has the support of the PS.
The Mahabhasya, while discussing this derivation, says that P. 6.1.11
supersedes P. 7.4.1 because the former is nitya (Mbh. III.344.22-345.3).
The PS refers to the Bhasya and remarks that in reality that rule is both
nitya and antarahga. The passage runs:
PS 76.4-5
nau cahi iti hrasvdpeksaya nityatvdntarahgatvayuktadvitvasya2
prathamatah pravrttau nityatvdd ity eva bhasya uktam / /
"In the Bhasya on P. 7.4.1 the only reason which has been assigned
for the fact that the reduplication would take effect before the
(substitution of the) short vowel is this 'that it is nitya\ although (the
reduplication) is both nitya and antarahga'' (K. p. 220.)
In this first example, the antarahga rule, i.e., the rule whose cause lies
within the causes of the bahirahga rule, applies simultaneously with the
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latter. What we need next is a case where the rule that is antaranga in the
above manner does not apply until the bahirahga rule has taken effect.
Such a case is not given anywhere in the PS, but here the commentaries
come to our help. The one known by the name Bhairavi (104.21) mentions
the derivation of atisthipat, 3. sing. aor. caus. act. of the root STHA. Here,
when the stage stha-p(uk)-(n)i(c)-(c)a(h)-t has been reached, P. 7.4.5
(tisthater it) prescribes substitution of I for A of stha. This leads to sthip-
(n)i(c)-(c)a(h)~t. Now P. 7.3.86 (pugantalaghupadhasya ca) applies. It
prescribes substitution of Guna for I of sthip. Its following cause is (n)i(c).
However, the following causes of P. 7.4.5 are (n)i(c)-(c)a(h). Clearly, (n)i(c)
is included in (n)i(c)-(c)a(h). The result is that P. 7.4.5 is bahirahga and
consequently asiddha, so that P. 7.3.86 cannot take effect.3
The derivation of mimarjisati (above, pp. 15f.) provides an instance
where the antaranga rule has no cause but the bahirahga rule has.The two
rules apply here simultaneously.
This same kind of Antarahgatva, caused by no cause, plays a role in the
argument that shows that iith in P. 6.4.132 indicates the BP (above, pp.
29 f.). There the bahirahga operation, substitution of u for vA, necessarily
precedes the antaranga operation, substitution of Guna for the resulting u.
But this is a hypothetical derivation, one introduced merely to show that it
does not lead to the desired form, and which is to be replaced by a better
one, by one that does not need, or rather, is not hampered by, the BP.
A derivation in which such a bahirahga rule and such an antaranga rule
apply in this order, and where BPi actually renders the former asiddha with
respect to the latter, exists in the formation of pacavedam out of pacava
idam. Here P. 6.1.87 causes a-i to be replaced by e, so that we get
pacavedam; the cause is I. The rule that presents itself at this stage, P. 3.4.93
(eta ai) aims at changing e into ai; it has no following cause. P. 6.1.87 is
therefore bahirahga, P. 3.4.93 antaranga, and BPi applies. As a result, e is
asiddha as far as P. 3.4.93 is concerned, and this latter rule does not take
effect.
The derivation of pacavedam may not be the perfect example of the
aspect of the BP under consideration. It can equally well be used to
illustrate the two-word principle. Unfortunately, I know of no derivation
that could take the place of pacavedam here. In the derivation ofdve, to be
sure, the conditions for the application of BPi are present. Here at the stage
dvi-au P. 7.2.102 (tyadadinam ah) teaches the substitution of a for I; its
cause is au. In the resulting dva-au P. 4.1.4 (ajddyatas tap) teaches the
addition of the feminine suffix (t)a(p); it has no cause. Clearly, P. 7.2.102 is
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bahiranga (b\) and has taken effect when the antarahga rule P. 4.1.4 applies.
We would expect that BPi would prevent P. 4.1.4 from taking effect. It
does not, however, because Panini's use of the forms yd and sd in P. 7.3.54
indicates that the BP is not unversally valid {bahirahgdsiddhatvan tu na
ydsayoh iti nirdesendnityatvdn na pravartate; LSS on SK 300,
Kumbakonam ed. II, p. 877).
It is difficult to find an example of the use of BPi where the antarahga
operation has no cause and does not apply until after the bahiranga rule has
taken effect, an.example that cannot also be covered by the two-word
principle. Nor is it easy to find an example that exclusively illustrates the
workings of the two-word principle. For the case where bahiranga rule has
taken effect when the antarahga rule applies, a second use must be made of
pacdvedam.
The derivation of dyukdma, pointed out by Kaiyata while commenting
on the Bhasya on P. 1.4.2 (MP II, p. 326), illustrates the use of the two-
word principle where antarahga and bahiranga rules apply simultaneously.
Here two rules apply at the stage div-kdma. P. 6.1.131 (diva ui) teaches the
substitution of u for v, since the latter is at the end of a Pada. P. 6.2.1
(bahuvrihau prakrtya purvapadam) inform us that in a Bahuvri the first
component gets its own accent. Neither of these two rules has a following
cause; but whereas P. 6.1.131 depends on only one word, P. 6.2.1 depends
on two - both divand kdma. The two-word principle brings it about that P.
6.1.131 supersedes P. 6.2.1.
A similar situation originates after P. 6.1.131 has taken effect in this same
derivation. At that moment we have di-u-kdma. The two rules that apply
here are the same accent rule P. 6.2.1 and P. 6.1.77 (iko yan aci), which
prescribes substitution of y for I before u. Even though P. 6.1.77 has a
following cause (viz. u), its activity is here confined to the single word di-u,
so that it is antarahga with respect to P. 6.2.1, which, as we know, depends
on two words.
While explaining BP2, Nagesa was considerably more liberal in giving
examples thanvhe had been with respect to BPi. It will therefore suffice here
to remind the reader of what has been elaborately discussed earlier, i.e.
asusruvat as illustration of BP21 (pp. 8 f.) and^aTvYA as illustration of BP22
(pp. 22 f.). It is true that patvyd can also be considered an illustration of
BP21. Illustrations which more particularly belong to BP22 will come as we
proceed. In point of fact, the majority of cases where in the /\£and in the
LSS the BP has been invoked belong to BP22.
For ease of reference the above examples are given in the following table:
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Type of BP Simultaneous bahiranga first
BP,
Inclusion (ma bhavdri) *dtitat atisthipat
No cause mimdrjisati pacavedam
Two-word principle dyukdma pacavedam
BP2I
BP22
asusruvat
antarahga first
patyyd
PART II
MORE FROM THE P$ ON PAR. L

7. SOME DIFFICULT PASSAGES IN THE DISCUSSION OF
PAR. L. (I)
The difficulties confronting anyone who wants to become acquainted with
Nagesa's ideas regarding the BP by reading his /\£are many and varied. We
have come into contact with a number of them, and more will come. It can
be said with regard to most of them that they can be solved, even if that
requires effort. But some difficulties are such that they cannot be solved
unless very drastic measures are taken.
In this chapter and the next I intend discuss two passages which - as far
as I can see - are of this latter type. Both occur in that part of the P$ which
deals with the BP. There can, therefore, be no excuse for passing them over
in silence. It would indeed be very tempting to do this, for the conclusions
that these two passages will force me to draw are such that they can hardly
fail to provoke protest on the part of my readers.
The situation being as it is, I can only request the reader not to lay this
book aside in exasperation, but to inspect my arguments closely. If they do
not convince him even after careful reading, let him then try to give an
explanation of these two passages that is more to his liking, and that also
agrees with the passages discussed in earlier chapters. If he succeeds in
interpreting the passages, without recourse to a deusex machina, I shall be
the first to admit that his interpretation is likely to be the correct one. But as
long as he has not succeeded in this, I shall stick to my own conclusions. Let
us now turn to the text.
The first of the two passages occurs, and this is an important detail, in the
discussion of BPi.
P$ 87.13-88.3, App. I 11. 146-151
ata evomahos ca ity ahgrahanam caritartham / taddhi khatva a udhety atra
param api savarnadirgham badhitvantarangatvad gune krte vrddhipraptau
pararupartham I sadhanabodhakapratyayotpattyanantaram purvam
dhdtor upasargayoge pascat khatvasabdasya samudayena yogad
gunasyantarangatvam iti samprasaranac ca Hi siitre bhasye spasjam /
"(Above it was stated that a bahiranga rule or operation which applies
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KHatva-A-UdHa
Bhasya
BaHlRaNga
paScA/ KHAtvASaBdasYa saMudAYeNa
KHaTvodHA.
odHa
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it is the other way round: an operation takes place first because it is
antarahga.
This same clause contains another indication that BP22 is talked about
here. It says that "the word khatva is joined with the combined preposition
and root, i.e., with odha" If BPi were under discussion, it would suffice to
say that a is joined with o. Mention of the complete words khatva and odha
would then be superfluous. If, on the other hand, this is a case falling under
the jurisdiction of BP22, then mention of the complete words becomes a
necessity. It is the whole words that are expressive of the meanings that are
combined. And the operations, in this interpretation of the Paribhasa,
follow on the heels of the meanings, so that, in our example, it is not a and o
that are combined, but khatva and odha.
What has been said so far seems to make satisfactory sense of the passage
under consideration. It has the appearance of being an instance of the use
of BP2 where we would have expected BPi.
Unfortunately, this cannot be true. Two problems remain, the second
more serious than the first.
As has been said repeatedly, the present passage occurs in the discussion
of BPi. It is, moreover, not part of a subsidiary argument. There is
therefore no justification whatever to introduce BP2 here. If, all the same,
Nagesa has at this place brought BP2 into the picture, we cannot but
conclude that such a procedure makes his line of reasoning confused to the
point of unintelligibility. If we have to admit this, we may well question our
basic assumption: that Nagesa's discussion of Par. L forms a coherent
whole (even if it may be hard to discover it). But perhaps the reader does
not take such a somber view of the situation. Let us therefore pass on to the
second problem.
Our translation of the above passage - which is nearly an exact copy of
Kielhorn's translation - was introduced - again in imitation of Kielhorn -
with the following sentence: "(Above it was stated that a bahiranga rule or
operation which applies simultaneously with an antarahga rule or
operation is likewise by the present ParibhasaasiddHa)."This introductory
sentence was followed by the translation of the first words of our passage:
ata eva, "only because such is the case . . . "
It is not directly obvious that this introductory sentence reflects the real
significance of aTa eva. The fact that "a bahiranga rule or operation which
applies simultaneously with an antarahga rule or operation is likewise by
the present Paribhasaasiddha"had been stated so much earlier (three pages
in Abhyankar's edition) that its connection with the present passage comes
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somewhat as a surprise. But a perusal of all that precedes our passage
reveals that there really is no other choice than to accept this connection,
and consequently this introductory sentence, as correct. Nothing else
qualifies for being referred to by ata eva "only because such is the case". So
let us assume that the introductory sentence has rightly been added here.
However, if this introductory sentence has rightly been added here, then
we must accept that the two rules which apply at the stage khatva-d-udhd
apply simultaneously. If, on the other hand, this passage is to be
understood as suggested above, i.e., with the help of BP22, then
simultaneity of application of those rules is out of the question. This
second formulation of BP2 causes an ordered application of rules, one after
the other: that is to say, not simultaneous. This has been discussed at length
(above, pp. 23 f.) and there is no need of repetition.
The problem that faces us can be summarized as follows. The context of
our passage requires that the derivation oikhatvodhd exemplify BPi, and
the wording of this same passage demands with equal force that it be
interpreted with the help of BP22.
In this situation I can conceive of only one solution. The context is
wrong! By this I mean to say that, for some reason or other, this passage has
been wrongly located in the P§.
It is this suggestion to relocate a portion of the PS that I referred to
earlier as a "drastic measure". A drastic measure it is indeed, and it requires
that all arguments which support it be enumerated and carefully studied.
Before doing so, let me specify what exactly is to be transferred and
where. A superficial glance at the P$ suffices to show that our passage is
intimately connected with what immediately follows it. Our passage
contains a passing mention of the fact that affixes are joined to roots before
prefixes are joined to the same roots. This statement is elaborately
discussed and substantiated in subsequent passages, some of which we shall
have occasion to study later in this chapter. Thus our passage cannot easily
be disconnected from what comes directly after it. Therefore, I propose to
shift the whole section, beginning with ata evomarios ca (P$ 87.13) and
extending up to asiity alam (P$ 92.3).
Where is this long section to be reaccommodated? The answer to this
question is at the same time the first argument, albeit the weakest, in
defence of the proposed translocation. The reason is that there exists a
place in the PS where the section fits as if it were made for it. As could have
been expected, this place is where the second formulation has just been
completed, i.e., after bodhyam at PS 97.3. I shall - even though this
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passage that certain operations take place in a specific order, by
demonstrating that the meanings on which those operations depend arise
in that order.
It may not have escaped the notice of the reader that Nagesa in the above
passage, even though he gives an argument which is based on the BP, does
not explicitly say so. He does not even use either of the words antaranga or
bahiranga. However, the next passage makes up for this.
PS 90.3-6, App. I 11. 163-167
upasargadyotydrthdntarbhdvena dhdtunaivdrthdbhidhdndd uktesu
karmani lakdrddisiddhih / pascdcchrotur bodhdya dyotakopasarga-
sambandhah / / evam cdntarahgatardrthakopasarganimittah sut sam-kr-
tity avasthdydm dvitvdditah purvam pravartate tato dvitvddi / /
"In the above-mentioned (passive forms anubhuyate etc.) the letter I
etc. could be added to the root to denote the object, because the root
conveys by itself the (transitive) meaning ('to experience'), the
meaning, to indicate which is the aim of the preposition (anu), being
inherent (in the root). After (/has been added to bhu), the preposition
which indicates (the presence of that sense in bhu) is combined (with
the root) in order that the hearer may understand (the special sense in
which the speaker wishes the root bhu to be taken). When we have
then (e.g. in the formation of the redupl. perfect of the root kr
preceded by the preposition sam) proceeded as far as sam-kr-ti
(where two operations apply, viz. the addition to kr of the augment
sut taught by P. 6.1.137 etc., and the reduplication of kr taught by P.
6.1.8, the addition of the augment) sut takes, in accordance with what
has just been stated, place before the reduplication etc., and
reduplication etc. take place afterwards, because (the former)
depends on the preposition the meaning of which, (being inherent in
the root itself which exists before the affix ti), is still more antaranga
(than the termination ti which causes the reduplication. Accordingly
the words kdtpurvah of P. 6.1.135 have in the Bhasya been rejected as
superfluous)." (K. pp. 247-248.)
We have seen that the meaning "that which accomplishes the action"
arises before the meaning "action to be accomplished", but is itself
preceded by the meaning of the verbal root. Such being the case, an
operation the cause of which is the meaning of the verbal root is ai with
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by that preposition as qualified (by the property of bringing to light
the meaning that is inherent in the root, and because that operation is
therefore really caused by the meaning of the root which exists before
the meaning of the affix); but where such is not the case, (i.e., where
the operation depends on the sounds of the preposition), there the
operation which is caused by that which causes (the action expressed
by the root, and therefore concerns an affix which denotes what
causes that action,) is antaranga, because (the meaning 'that which
causes the action expressed by the root') comes (into existence) before
(the meaning 'action to be accomplished', on the basis of which the
preposition is actually termed 'preposition', comes into existence)."
(Cf. K. p. 249.)
After what has been said earlier, this passage is in no need of comment.
What has become abundantly clear by now is that the section whose
transfer is here advocated makes a repeated use of BP22. This would be hard
to explain, were we to leave this section in its place. In the new place
assigned to this section there is nothing problematic about the employment
of BP22. On the contrary, this is exactly what we would expect there. It is for
this reason that the three passages last discussed constitute the third
argument for accepting that the section concerned was originally where we
now want to locate it.
It must be admitted that the above three arguments rely to some extent
on the interpretation of the BP that was put forward in the earlier chapters
of this book. In itself there is nothing wrong in that, for I see no reason to
doubt the correctness of that interpretation. But it is possible that some of
my readers have not been fully convinced of the its correctness. For them a
part of my argument will remain invalid. But even they will have to confess
that the position of the section under discussion is hard to explain. It begins
with the words ata eva "only because such is the case". Such a beginning
normally refers back to what immediately precedes it. That this is true can
easily be verified with the help of the portion of the /\£ dealing with Par. L,
where this expression is used a number of times. It always refers to what
immediately precedes.2
But this cannot be said about the aTa eva that stands at the head of our
section. What immediately precedes it is an argument purporting to prove
that the BP is not valid in the Tripddi, i.e., the last three sections of Panini's
grammar. The topic of discussion in our section, however, has nothing
whatever to do with the TripddT, or with any rule contained in it. It would
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therefore be absurd to say that because the BP is not valid in the TripadT, ah
serves a purpose in P. 6.1.95. This cannot possibly be the intended sense of
the beginning of our section.
We do not fare any better when we try to connect ata eva with the last but
one topic dealt with before it. That is the Jnapaka of the BP, which consists,
as we know (pp. 29 f, above) in the presence of iith in P. 6.4.132. To say that
ah serves a purpose in P. 6.1.95 because iith in P. 6.4.132 is the Jnapaka of
the BP is sheer nonsense.
It is only when we go back even further that we find something that could
serve as an antecedent of ata eva. There, three pages, or thirty lines, before
these two words, we read that "the meaning of the Paribhasa is this, that
when an antarahga rule or operation is about to take effect, a bahiranga rule
or operation which already has taken effect, and likewise a bahiranga rule
or operation which applies simultaneously with the antarahga rule or
operation is, regarded as not having taken effect or as not existing" (see p.
8, above). If we take the second part of this sentence, we obtain the
antecedent that Kielhorn described in the sentence which preceded his
translation of our passage: "(Above it was stated that a bahiranga rule or
operation which applies simultaneously with an antarahga rule or
operation is likewise by the present Paribhasaasiddha)" (see p. 61 above).
We have already seen how unsatisfactory this antecedent is. That is not
our concern now. Here I wish to emphasize that, even if this antecedent did
not give rise to the difficulties it actually does give rise to, its distance from
the words aTa eva would be enough to make us wonder if something is not
wrong in the text here.
There is one more argument, which I have kept for the end. It is the
circumstance that another portion of the PS on Par. L has clearly been
tampered with. This can be shown on grounds which to a far lesser extent
than those used in connection with our present discussion depend on the
results of our enquiry in earlier chapters. If with respect to another passage
it can convincingly be shown that our text has not preserved its original
form, it will be far easier to accept that it has also undergone some
rearrangement elsewhere. To study the new passage in detail, we turn to the
next chapter.
SOME DIFFICULT PASSAGES IN THE DISCUSSION OF
PAR. L (II)
The passage immediately following the section to be transferred reads as
follows:
PS 92.4-13
yat tu visesdpeksdt sdmdnydpeksam antarahgam visesdpekse
visesadharmasyddhikasya nimittatvat / yathd rudddibhyah sdrvadhdtuke
ity atra ruddditvam sdrvadhdtukatvam ca / tatra sdrvadhdtukatvajndndya
prakrter dhdtutvajndnam pratyayasya pratyayatvajndnam cdvasyakam iti
ydsud antarahgah / etena yad anuddttahitah iti sutre kaiyatenoktam
lamdtrdpeksaydntarangds tibddayo lakdravisesdpeksatvdd bahirahgdh
syddaya iti tat paras tarn / visesdpeksatye'pi tasya sdmdnyadharma-
nimittakatvdbhdvena tattvasya durupapddatvdt / paranimittakatvena
syddindm bahirahgatvdc ceti tan na j visesasya vydpyatvena vydpaka-
sydnumdnenopasthitdv api tasya nimittatve mdndbhdvenddhikadharma-
nimittakatvdnupapddandt / bhdsya evarnvidhdntarangabahirahgabhd-
vasya kvdpy anullekhdc ca 11
"(Some grammarians) say: 'That which depends on something general
is antaranga in regard to that which depends on something special,
because anything depending on something special is caused by the
special nature (of the latter) in addition (to being caused by what may
be its general nature). E.g., in the case of (the addition of the augment
it taught in) P. 7.2.76, (the causes on which that addition depends are)
"the being one of rud etc." and "the being a Sarvadhatuka"; here, in
order to form the conception of "being a Sarvadhatuka" we must
necessarily know that the base {rud tic.) has the nature of a root, and
we must also know that the termination (T etc.) has the nature of an
affix; accordingly (the addition of) ydsut (taught in P. 3.4.103) is
antaranga (in regard to the addition of the augments it, It, and at,
taught in P. 7.2.76; 7.3.98 and 99; and supersedes the latter). The
above proves Kaiyata's statement on P. 1.3.12, "that (the substitutes)
tip etc. are antaranga, because (their substitution) depends on L only,
73
BHavIsYaTl.
LRLUTOH)
DIFFICULT PASSAGES IN PAR. L (II) 75
addition of sya before Ir, has as following cause Ir. If the present passage did
not stand in our way, we would therefore say that the substitution of ti(p)
for L is antaranga, because it has no following cause, whereas the addition of
sya is bahirahga, because it has a following cause.
Surprisingly, this is exactly what we find in the statement that, to all
appearance, is rejected by Nagesa. There we read: "Moreover Kaiyata's
statement is incorrect, because sya etc. are bahiranga on account of their
being caused by something following." It seems as if Nagesa is here
criticizing his own views.
Those readers who have not yet been convinced of the correctness of
what was said in earlier chapters regarding Nagesa's interpretation of the
BP may not be impressed by the alleged incongruity of Nagesa's statements
here with what he says elsewhere. Indeed, they may think it constitutes
evidence that what was said in those earlier chapters is wrong. I suggest that
such readers read the following paragraphs especially carefully.
The above passage contains the views of three persons: of Nagesa, of an
unnamed opponent, and of Kaiyata. Nagesa rejects the opinion of the
unnamed opponent, and the opponent rejects the opinion of Kaiyata. We
saw that one of the arguments the opponent uses against Kaiyata is such as
we would have expected of Nagesa. I shall now show that the other
argument which the opponent uses against Kaiyata is the same as the one
Nagesa uses against the opponent.
All we have to do is look once again at the translation of the above
passage. There we read that, according to the opponent, "Kaiyata's
statement . . . [is] incorrect . . . because, although sya etc. depend on
something special, not being caused also by the general nature of the latter,
they cannot be shown to be bahirahga". But where Nagesa shows the
position of the opponent to be untenable, he says that "although the
general nature of something special may be inferred to be present when the
latter presents itself from the fact that that which is special possesses* that
general nature, yet there is no proof for its being a cause of an operation
which depends on that which is special".
So the argument that Nagesa employs against the opponent, the
opponent employs against Kaiyata. And the second argument that the
opponent uses against Kaiyata is one that would befit Nagesa better than
anyone. It seems that something is amiss in our passage.1
The opponent, who remains unnamed in Nagesa's PS, is identified as
Bhattoji Diksita by Vaidyanatha Payagunda in the latter's commentary on
the P$ called Gada (99.12). To see if this is correct, we may see what
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opinion the above passage ascribes to the opponent. It clearly illustrates the
general principle which the opponent is said to possess with the help of the
derivation of words like rudydt. Here rud-l(in) becomes rud-ti(p) by P.
3.4.78, and then rud-t by P. 3.4.100. At this stage - rud-t - a number of rules
apply. On the one hand, there is P. 3.4.103 {ydsut parasmaipadesiiddtto
n ic ca), which prescribes the addition oiyds(ut) before t. On the other hand,
there are three rules, of which the above passage specifies one, and the
translation all three. They are P. 7.2.76, which prescribes addition of i(t),
and 7.3.98 and 99, which prescribe addition of i(t) and a(t), respectively.
The opinion that the above passage ascribes to the opponent is that the
addition of yds (ut) is antaranga because it depends on the general conditions
that there be a stem and a suffix. That is to say, P. 3.4.103, which prescribes
the addition of yds(ut), requires little of the stem and the suffix on which the
addition of yds(ut) depends. On the other hand, P. 7.2.76, prescribing the
addition of i(t), has a list of demands that must be fulfilled by the stem and
the suffix if this rule is to take effect. In other words, P. 7.2.76, and P. 7.3.98
and 99 as well, require specific stems and suffixes. For this reason, still
according to the opponent, these rules are bahiranga.
The view here ascribed to the opponent is indeed found in one of
Bhattoji's writings; to be precise, in the SK on P. 7.3.99 (no. 2476, p. 220).
There we read:
prakrtipratyayavisesdpeksdbhydm adidbhydm antarahgatvdd ydsut,
rudydt /
"(In the formation of the 3rd person Parasmaipada of the potential
mood of the root rud, when at the stage rud-t several operations
apply, on the one hand the addition of ydsut by P. 3.4.103, on the
other hand the addition of It by P. 7.3.98 or the addition of at by P.
7.3.99, the addition of) ydsut (actually takes place) because it is
antaranga with respect to (the addition of) at and it which (are
bahiranga since they depend on special stems and suffixes."
So the first part of the opponent's opinion is indeed the opinion of
Bhattoji,
Before we proceed, there is something else worth noting. It is true that
what is ascribed to the opponent in the PS and what is expressed in the SK
agree in content, even though there is a difference in the way this opinion
has been put to words in the two books. A formal agreement, i.e., a close
similarity in wording, can be found between what is ascribed to the
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opponent in the PS and Nagesa's comments in his B$S on the passage just
quoted from the SK. What is remarkable is that the BSS shows no signs of
disagreement with the content of the passage from the SK. Indeed, we have
here a case where Nagesa changed his mind in the period between writing
the BSS and writing the PS (further instances in Appendix IV).
The relevant part of the BSS (p. 1759) reads:
sdmdnyadharmdpeksasdstrdpeksayd kascid visesadharmo 'dhiko
nimittakotau yasmin visesapeksasastre'sti, tat tato bahirahgam iti
tadarthah / yathdtra ruddditvam, sarvadhatukatvam ceti bodhyam /
sdrvadhdtukatvajndndya prakrter dhdtutvajndnam, pratyayasya tattva-
jndnam cdvasyakam iti sdmdnyadharmanimittakatvam atrdpy astiti
bodhyam2 \
It follows that Nagesa in the PS is not only criticizing Bhattoji. He is at
the same time criticizing the opinion which he himself had held earlier.
That Nagesa had changed his views is confirmed by what he says in his
L$$, a book which he wrote after the PS (see Appendix III). There, while
commenting on the same passage of the SK, he repeats what he had said in
the B$$, but then continues (Varanasi ed. II, p. 572):
vastuta idam bahirahgatvam bhdsye kvdpi ndsritam iti paribhdsdvrttau
nirupitam
"That in reality this (kind of) Bahirangatva has never been made use
of in the Bhasya has been stated in the commentary on the Paribhasas
(i.e., in the 3
We must return to our main topic. The first part of what was ascribed to
Nagesa's opponent is an opinion which we find again in the SK. It seems
therefore not unlikely that Vaidyanatha is right in identifying the two, the
unnamed opponent and Bhattoji Diksita. It will be interesting to see what
(if anything) Bhattoji has to say with regard to the opinion of Kaiyata,
which - as we have seen - was rejected by the unnamed opponent with
arguments which could also destroy the foundations upon which his own
ideas were built.
We find Bhattoji's thoughts about the topic discussed in K^iyata's
controversial statement in the former's Sabdakaustubha on P. 1.3.12 (p.
460). There we read:
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na ca syddisu dosah ... iti vdcyam / lamdtrdpeksaydntamhgesu tibddisu
krtesu lakdravisesdpeksatayd bahirahgdndm syadinam pravrtteh /
"And it should not be said that a fault would result in the case of sya
etc. For (the addition of) sya etc., which is bahirahga because it
depends on a special letter /(i.e., on /as specified by retc) , takes place
when (the substitution of) tip etc. (for I), which is antarahga since it
depends on / only, has taken place."
Instead of a rejection of Kaiyata's opinion, we find complete agreement
with it!
All the problems connected with the passage of the PS that we have
studied can be solved by one minor rearrangement of the text. This
rearrangement leaves the.opponent - who can now safely be identified with
Bhattoji DIksita - with the idea that what depends on something general is
antarahga with regard to what depends on something special. The
discussion of the derivation of rudydt, which serves to illustrate the above
general statement, also remains part of the section which describes the
opponent's point of view. But the rejection of Kaiyata's statement we now
apportion to Nagesa.4
The rearrangement I am talking about consists of a relocation of iti tan
na and the two sentences following it in the above passage to the position
immediately after iti ydsud antarahgah. The whole passage now comes to
look like this:
App. 111. 88-99
yat tu visesdpeksdt sdmdnydpeksam antarahgam visesapekse
visesadharmasyddhikasya nimittatvdt / yatha rudddibhyah sdrvadhdtuke
ity atra rudMitvam sdrvadhdtukatvam ca / tatra sdrvadhdtukatvajndndya
prakrter dhdtutvajfidnarn pratyayasya pratyayatvajndnam cdvasyakam iti
ydsud antarahgah iti tan na / visesasya vydpyatvena vydpakasydnu-
mdnenopasthitdv api tasya nimittatve mdndbhdvenddhikadharma-
nimittakatvmupapddandt / bhdsya evamvidhdntarahgabahirahgabhdvasya
kvdpy anullekhdc ca / etena yad anuddttahitah iti sutre kaiyatenoktam
lamdtrdpeksaydnttirahgas tibddayo lakdravisesdpeksatvdd bahirahga
syddaya iti tat pardstam / visesdpeksatve'pi tasya sdmanya-
dharmanimittakatvdbhdvena tattvasya durupapddatvat / paranimitta-
katvena syadinam bahirahgatvdc ca j j
"(Some grammarians) say: 'That which depends on something
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general is antaranga in regard to that which depends on something
special, because anything depending on something special is caused
by the special nature (of the latter) in addition (to being caused by
what may be its general nature). E.g., in the case of (the addition of
the augment it taught in P. 7.2.76, (the causes on which that addition
depends are) "the being one of rud etc." and "the being a
Sarvadhatuka"; here, in order to form the conception of "being a
Sarvadhatuka" we must necessarily know that the base {rud etc.) has
the nature of a root, and we must also know that the termination (T
etc.) has the nature of an affix; accordingly (the addition of) yasut
taught in P. 3.4.103) is antaranga (in regard to the addition of the
augments it, it, and at, taught in P. 7.2.76; 7.3.98 and 99; and
supersedes the latter.' However, this is untenable; for, although the
general nature (of something special) may be inferred to be present
(when the latter presents itself from the fact that that which is special
possesses that general nature, yet there is no proof for its being a
cause (of an operation which depends on that which is special), and it
cannot therefore be said with propriety that (such an operation) is
caused by that (general) nature in addition (to its being caused by the
special nature of that on which it depends); moreover such a meaning
of (the terms) antoranga and bahiranga(as would be expressed by the
words samanyapeksa and visesapeksa) has nowhere in the Bhasya
been ascribed to them. The above proves Kaiyata's statement on P.
1.3.12, 'that (the substitutes) tip etc. are antaranga, because (their
substitution) depends on I only, whereas sya etc. are bahiranga,
because (their addition) depends on a special letter / (i.e., on I
specified by r etc.)' to be incorrect, viz. because, although (sya etc.)
depend on something special, not being caused (also) by the general
nature (of the latter), they cannot be shown to be bahiranga.
Moreover, (Kaiyata's statement is incorrect,) because sya etc. are
bahiranga on account of their being caused by something following."
A number of questions remain with respect to the changes that the text of
the P$ has undergone, as has been argued here. They will be dealt with in
the following chapter. One question, however, is such that it can better be
studied in the present context. It concerns the issue of exactly what change
the passage under consideration here has undergone.
It will be remembered that this passage, in the printed editions of the P$,
immediately follows the section that, as was shown in the preceding
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chapter, originally occurred somewhere else in the P$, viz. where the
explanation of BP2 had just come to an end. Is it possible that the present
passage - which, according to the above analysis, has been altered - in the
original form of the PS, as well as in its present form, immediately followed
that section?
An answer to this question can be given, and must be negative. The
present passage, then as well as now, was part of the discussion of BPi. This
is indicated by the following circumstance.
BPi deals with rules that are antarahga because their causes lie within the
causes of the corresponding bahirahga rules. The specification is then given
that the causes must be formal {sabdarupd). Challenging this specification,
but remaining within the compass of BPi, the suggestion is made that rules
that depend on general conditions are antarahga with respect to rules
depending on special conditions, because general conditions lie within the
combination general + special conditions.
So the section to be transferred and the passage in which internal
changes must be brought about do not belong together. What is more, the
fact that both have undergone changes, the one in position, the other in
internal structure, does not seem to point at a common origin of these
changes: A single mistake on the part of a copyist, or something like it,
cannot account for the two irregularities. What then can explain the
present state of our text?
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What makes the irregularities which we discovered in the PS so
problematic is that all editions of this text give the same wrong readings. If
the original text has undergone changes, when can this possibly have taken
place? To answer this question, we turn to the last page of the preface to the
second edition of Kielhorn's The Pahbhasendusekhara of Nagojlbhatta,
Part II, Translation and Notes; second edition by K. V. Abhyankar, BORI,
Poona, 1960. There we find "a table showing the spiritual relationship of
Vyakarana Pandits with Nagesabhatta". A single glance at this table
suffices to show that of the grammarians who left their traces in the history
of the PS - usually in the form of a commentary on that text - only one,
Vaidyanatha Payagunda, was in direct contact with Nagesa. The changes
under discussion must therefore have been introduced by Vaidyanatha, or
by someone before him. We shall see (p. 831., below) that Vaidyanatha did
not introduce them.
Let us first try to find out what purposes could be served by the present
reading of the two passages under discussion. We start with the transposed
section.
Vaidyanatha's interpretation of Par. L does not as does our
interpretation of it - contain merely two justifications of that Paribhasa,
viz. one Jnapaka and one maxim from ordinary life. Among the additional
justifications, it counts a second Jnapaka, viz. the presence of an in P.
6.1.95.x This is, in the words of Kielhorn, a "special Jnapaka . . . to prove,
that a bahiranga rule which applies simultaneously with an antarahga rule,
is likewise asiddha" (K. p. 221, fn. 4). The reader may remember that the
discussion of an in P. 6.1.95 covered the beginning of the section which -as
was shown in Chapter 7 above - originally occupied another place in the
PS. It can hardly cause surprise that someone who was led by the idea that
the passage indeed contained a second Jnapaka could not but think that the
place where he found the passage was not fit for it. From his point of view it
would more easily perform its function when placed after the passage
dealing with the first Jnapaka, i.e., where we find it today. There seems no
difficulty in supposing that such a person, guided by his incorrect
interpretation of Nagesa's intentions, went to the extent of reordering the
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text to bring out the interpretation which he thought was the correct one.
Difficulties arise in connection with the second passage. Here, more
clearly even than in the case of the transposed section, the change has been
made deliberately. But what could possibly have been the aim of this
deliberate change?
We have to turn to another part of the PS to get a clue to the motives
behind the changes introduced in this second passage. The passage that will
throw light on our problem occurs in the discussion of Par. XLI. The
question there raised is as follows. P. 1.3.92 (vrdbhyah syasanoh) teaches
that the Parasmaipada terminations may optionally be substituted for Ir
after the roots vrt etc., when sya follows. However, sya is added to these
roots first, and once Ir is separated from the root by this Vikarana sya, P.
1.3.12 (anuddttanita atmanepadam), which restricts roots like vrt
to the Atmanepada, can no longer apply, since Ir no longer follows
immediately upon the root. Such being the case, P. 3.4.78 will prescribe
both Atmanepada and Parasmaipada terminations to be substituted for LR,
and clearly the optional prescription of Parasmaipada terminations by P.
1.3.92 serves no purpose.
The solution to this question, offered in the P$, is that P. 1.3.12 unites
with the general rule P. 3.4.78, so that one single rule results. Further, the
ablative dhatoh, which is understood in P. 3.4.78 from P. 3.1.91, is a
vihitapaneanfr. that is to say, dhatoh here means dhatoh vihitasya. The
meaning of P. 3.4.78 now becomes: dhdtor vihitasya lasya tip tas..., "in the
place of L which is placed after a root come tip, tas etc." The meaning of the
combination of P. 1.3.12 and P. 3.4.78 therefore is: "Let those terminations
which will be termed Atmanepada come in the place of L which, as has been
taught elsewhere, is placed after a root, provided the latter be distinguished
by a gravely accented indicatory vowel etc." (K. p. 203). When this
interpretation is accepted, there is no problem even when sya. is indeed
added to the root before the personal terminations have replaced L, and Lis
therefore separated from the root by sya.
But this is not the only solution to the problem Nagesa has to offer. He
has another one - one that interests us in particular at present - for he
continues:
P5 72.1-4
yad vd lamdtrdpeksatvdd antarahgd adesa lakdravisesdpeksatvdt syadayo
bahirahgd iti digyogalaksanapancamydm api na dosah j atra pakse
vrdbhyah sya iti sutram syavisaya2 iti vydkhyeyam /
VAIDYANATHA PAYAGUNDA AND SESADRISUDH1 83
"Or, (one may say that) the substitutes (tip etc.) are antaranga because
(their substitution) depends on (the presence of) / only, and that sya
etc. are bahiranga (and therefore to be considered as absent so far as
regards the substitution of tip etc.) because (the addition of sya etc.)
depends on (the presence of) the letter / specified (by such other letters
as r etc.); and (on this assumption) there would be nothing wrong were
one to explain the ablative (dhatoh etc.) in accordance with P. 2.3.29
(by 'in the place of / which follow upon a root', viz. because the
personal terminations would be substituted while sya etc. are still
absent). On this (second) alternative the rule P. 1.3.92 (or rather the
locative of sya in that rule) must be explained 'wherever sya is added
(to vrt etc. at some time or other')." (K. p. 204-205.)
It does not require deep study to see that the opinitm expressed in the
above passage is exactly the one ascribed to Kaiyata in the passage studied
in the preceding chapter. There we came to the conclusion that this opinion
was rejected by Nagesa. The original reading of the text left no room for
doubt in this respect. But here that same opinion is put forth, not to be
rejected, but as a possible solution to a problem, that is, as an opinion to be
accepted.
It cannot be denied that this passage is of a problematic character. More
will be said about it later.3 But what may be pointed out now is that the
existence of this passage can explain the changes introduced in the other
one. For this passage presents Kaiyata's opinion as correct, whereas the
other one - in its original form - rejects it. Nothing seems more natural than
to assume that someone, seeing the discrepancy between the two passages,
considered the manuscript he read to contain a mistake - which it did not -
and tried to bring the two passages into agreement with each other by
introducing the apparently innocent rearrangement which we have been
able to bring to light in the preceding chapter.
This then could be what happened. To Vaidyanatha or someone before
him the present passage, i.e., Kaiyata's opinion, did not appear
objectionable, and to him it could not but seem incorrect to see this opinion
rejected by Nagesa.
Unfortunately, it cannot be accepted that Vaidyanatha introduced the
changes in the text. Vaidyanatha's commentary testifies to the fact that
Kaiyata's opinion was objectionable to him as well. In the context of the
passage last quoted he remarks:
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Gadd 79.26-27
kaiyatdnurodhendha - lamdtreti / vastutas tv atra mdtrasabdena
paranimittamdtravyavacchedah / tathd cdparanimittakatvdd ity arthah /
"Following Kaiyata he says: 'one may say that ... ' . But in reality by
the word mdtra 'only' in this (passage is indicated) that there is not a
single following cause. And therefore the meaning (of'because their
substitution depends on the presence of/only') is 'because they have
no following cause'."
And there is another reason for doubting that Vaidyanatha was the
culprit responsible for the modifications we are studying. At Gada
179.19-23 Vaidyanatha refers to alternative explanations of the text of the
PS which had been given before him. Further, on numerous occasions his
commentary rejects a variant reading of Nagesa's text.4 This is explicable
only on the assumption that the PS already had quite some history behind
it when Vaidyanatha wrote his commentary. Indeed, many of the readings
rejected by Payagunda have survived in certain manuscripts, as a glance at
the footnotes to Abhyankar's edition will confirm.5 But not a single
manuscript seems to have preserved what we have come to think is the
unmodified text of the two passages studied above. This can only mean that
those modifications were introduced into the text not long after its
creation.
It is a matter of great regret, but hardly untypical in the history of
Sanskrit literature, that virtually nothing is known about Nagesa besides
what he has written. Not even probable guesses can therefore be made
regarding who gave the PS its present shape where the BP is concerned. As
we have seen, it must have been someone versed in grammar, not, that is, an
ignorant copyist. But it seems that all the commentators on the PS were
unaware of the fact that their text was not the original one.
Does this mean that our stock of arguments to prove our contentions
regarding the original text of the PS is now exhausted? Fortunately, it is
not. One remains, which, though it turns out to be an argument exsilentio,
is not for that reason without value. It is based on SesadrisudhT's
Paribhdsdbhdskara.
We have already been introduced to Sesadrisudhi, the eternal critic of
Nagesa. On that occasion we saw that this grammarian's interpretation of a
part of the PS was closer to Nagesa's intentions than that of Vaidyanatha.
Can it be that Sesadrisudhi also made use of a text that preserved the
original readings?
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Let us note, to begin with, that SesadrisudhT does not make use of
Vaidyanatha's commentary. This enhances the chance that the text used
by SesadrisudhT had indeed retained the modified passages in their original
form.
Unfortunately, Sesadrisudhi wrote no commentary on the PS. His
Paribhasabhdskara is an independent work, which, however, criticizes the
PS where it presents a different opinion. Where there is no such difference
of opinion, the PS is not mentioned. To find out how much help we can
expect from this side in finding the original reading of our text, we shall
therefore first read that portion of the Paribhasabhdskara which gives the
interpretation of its author with regard to the BP.
PS 420.12-15
idarrt cavadheyam - antarahgapadenaprathamopasthitiyogydrthakatvam
ucyate / tac calpakale sdbdabodhajanakatvam / yatsutrapadasravanam
drabhya yavati kale tadarthasahdabodho bhavati, tato'dhika-
kdldpeksasdbdabodhajanakatvam bahirahgatvam ucyate / laksye pra-
thamopasthitanimittakatvam cdnyad antarahgatvam, pascadupasthita-
nimittakatvam ca bahirahgatvam /
"The following is to be noted: What is expressed by the word
antarahga is the property of having a meaning suited to present itself
first. And that (property of having.a meaning suited to present itself
first) is the property of producing verbal knowledge in a short time
(i.e., shorter than the time required by what is bahirahga to produce
verbal knowledge). Starting from (the moment one) hears the words
of a certain sutra, the verbal knowledge of the meaning of that (sutra)
arises after a certain (amount of) time (has elapsed); the property of
producing verbal knowledge that requires more time (to come into
existence than the amount of time specified above) is called
Bahirahgatva. Another (kind of) Antarahgatva is the property of
having a cause that presents itself first in the actual form (of the
language which has to be formed or to be accounted for by Panini's
rules; the corresponding) Bahirahgatva is the property of having a
cause that presents itself later (in that actual form)."
As was the case in Nagesa's PS, here also we find that two meanings have
been assigned to each of the terms antarahga and bahirahga.But whereas
the second meaning here ascribed to these two terms closely resembles the
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second meaning Nagesa ascribed to them (PS96.2 ff.; App. 111. BOetseq.;
above, pp. 8f.), the first meaning here differs considerably from what we
found in the PS. Indeed, Sesadrisudhi repeats what he had said regarding
the first meaning in the following condensed form: alpapeksam antarahgam
bahvapeksam bahirahgam, "what is dependent on a smaller number of
causes is antarahga, what is dependent on a greater number of causes is
bahiranga" (PS 420.17-18). This is exactly what Nagesa had rejected as
unacceptable (PS 80.5-8; App. I 11. 24-28; above, p. 10). With respect to
the second meanings of the terms antarahga and bahirahga, Sesadrisudh!
remarks that they are the ones used in the Bhasya where the maxim from
ordinary life, which served as proof of part of the Paribhasa for Nagesa as
well (above, p. 33), is introduced (PS 420.16-17).
Besides two meanings for the terms antarahga and bahirahga, two
interpretations of the Paribhasa are offered, as was the case in the PS.
PS 420.18-21
alpdrthavisayakasdbdabodhasydlpakdlena jananat adhikapadajnana-
tadarthasmrtipurvakasabdabodhasyadhikakalena\jananat tatrobhayatra
antarahgabaliyastvam , prathamopasthitasya prathamam pravrttir nyaya-
siddhd I prathamapravrttikabahvapeksdpeksaydi nimittavasat pascad-
upasthitdlpapeksam praty asiddhatvam jnapakasddhyam j
"Since the production of verbal knowledge which concerns few
meanings (takes place) in a short time, and since the production of
verbal knowledge which is preceded by the memory of the knowledge
of more words and (by the memory) of their meanings (takes place) in
more time, the rules which are antarahga supersede (those which are
bahirahga) in both these (meanings assigned to the terms antarahga
and bahirahga). That (the operation which) presents itself first
(because its cause presents itself first) takes place first, is established
by the maxim (from ordinary life which served as an illustration of
the second meanings of the terms antarahga and bahirahga, and as the
proof of this aspect of the Paribhasa.) With regard to (a rule) which
has taken effect first and is (bahirahga in the first sense here assigned
to this word, i.e.,) dependent on a greater number (of causes), the fact
that it is asiddha with respect to (a rule) which - due to (the
circumstance that) its cause, (i.e., the cause which presents itself in the
actual form to be derived, presents itself later, - presents itself later
and which is (antarahga in the sense that it is) dependent on a smaller
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number (of causes), is to be established by the Jnapaka (which
consists in the presence of UTH in P. 6.4.132)."
The interpretations of the BP given here are identical with the ones given
in the PS. Where the terms antaranga and bahiranga are used in the first
sense assigned to them, the Paribhasa serves a double function. When an
antaranga and a bahiranga rule apply simultaneously, the antaranga rule
supersedes the bahiranga rule. If the bahiranga rule has already taken effect
when the antaranga rule applies, the former is asiddha with regard to the
latter. Where the terms antaranga and bahiranga are used in the second
sense assigned to them, the Paribhasa stipulates that when the two rules
bearing those names apply simultaneouly, the antaranga one supersedes
the bahiranga one. The last two sentences of the above passage are
formulated so that they also cover what we have come to know as BP22,
according to. which operations take place in the order in which the
meanings on which they depend present themselves.
What can be learned from the above is that, as far as BP2 is concerned,
there is no disagreement between SesadrisudhT and Nagesa. And indeed,
SesadrisudhT does not criticize any of Nagesa's statements pertaining to
BP2. The case is different where BPj is concerned. It is true that here also
the interpretation given to the Paribhasa is the same in the case of both
grammarians. But the meanings assigned to the words antaranga and
bahiranga now differ greatly. We may therefore expect much criticism from
SesadrisudhT directed at Nagesa's discussion of BPi.
A comparison of the two discussions of the BP - the one by SesadrisudhI,
the other by Nagesa - reveals that this expectation is borne out by the facts.
SesadrisudhT criticizes what Nagesa has to say on BPi in such a thorough
manner that not a single statement of Nagesa* whose content differed from
SesadrisudhT's ideas in this regard escapes attack. Line after line - either
quoted or more obliquely referred to in the Paribhasabhdskara - is
unmercifully condemned.This is true of all that precedes the passage that
begins with ata evomaho's ca . . . (PS 87.13).7 But there, all of a sudden,
SesadrisudhVs anger seems to be exhausted. He says not a word about all
that follows this point.
Sesadrisudhfs abrupt change of temper can easily be explained as far as
BP2 is concerned. Here his own and Nagesa's opinions coincide, so that no
room is left for criticism. The same can be said with regard to such opinions
as are rejected by both the authors. To this category belongs the first part of
the passage the latter part of which we suspected had been changed. In this
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first part the opinion that that which depends on what is general is
antaranga with regard to that which depends on something special was
explained with the help of the derivation of rudyat, and subsequently
rejected. We'may safely assume that here SesadrisudhT agreed with Nagesa,
for he maintains complete silence.
But SesadrisudhTs lack of critical spirit regarding the section that begins
with ata evomahos ca is wholly inexplicable as long as we assume that he
found this section where we find it at present, i.e., where it has been at least
since Vaidyanatha wrote his commentary. For at this place it can be
accounted for in no other way - and then only with great, far too great,
difficulty - than by assuming that it proves one half of BPi, viz. the half that
says that where an antaranga and a. bahiranga rule apply simultaneously,
there the antaranga rule supersedes the bahiranga rule. The proof here is in
the form of a Jnapaka, the presence of ah in P. 6.1.95.
The passage concerned has been studied in detail earlier (Chapter 7). We
found that the so-called Jnapaka could not serve as a Jnapaka, and on the
basis of this and much other evidence decided that the passage originally
did not belong at this place. But all this is at present not our primary
concern. What is important here is that if SesadrisudhT had found this
passage in its present position, he could not have failed to protest. For
SesadrisudhT had his own way of justifying the fact that, where an antaranga
and a bahiranga rule apply simultaneously, the former supersedes the
latter. In his opinion, the first meanings assigned to the terms antaranga
and bahiranga can be given as "what depends on a fewer number of causes
is antaranga, what depends on a greater number of causes is bahiranga" (see
above). And these meanings themselves already explain why an antaranga
rule supersedes a bahiranga rule. The meaning of the former rule comes
more quickly to our minds than the meaning of the latter rule. We could
perhaps say that for SesadrisudhT the antaranga rule has already taken
effect by the time the bahiranga rule is fully understood.
So SesadrisudhT has no need for the Jnapaka which consists of the
presence of an in P. 6.1.95. And now we may recall that besides the fact that
this Jnapaka was not capable of proving what it was supposed to prove, the
whole section of the PS that follows the passage dealing with ah in P. 6.1.95
contains a number of difficulties as long as it is supposed to be where it is at
present. Why then did SesadrisudhT not mention a single one of these in
order to criticize Nagesa, something which everywhere else he seems intent
on doing?
The answer has already been suggested: Because he did not find the
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section in the position where it has been since before Vaidyanatha! If he
found the section at the place earlier suggested to be the right one, i.e.,
immediately after the explanation of BP2 had come to an end, then there
was nothing objectionable in the section, even for Sesadrisudhi. There, this
passage introduced no faulty and superfluous Jnapaka, nor did a long
discussion about one of the consequences of BP2 find its place where BPi
ought to have been discussed. It seems safe to count Sesadrisudrffs silence
among the arguments which support the proposed relocation of the section
concerned.
With respect to the other passage which has been modified, as has been
argued above, we do not find any criticism on the part of Sesadrisudhi. This
is, at first sight, strange. If the original text of the PS contained two
contradictory passages, as we were led to believe,8 nothing would be easier
than to find fault with at least one of them. Why then did not Sesadrisudhi
raise his voice, as he was wont to do in such cases? Nothing certain can be
concluded from SesadrisudhTs silence here. But it is quite possible that it
indicates that once again this opponent of Nagesa had understood the text
of the PS better than Vaidyanatha, its defender. To see how it could
indicate this, we must turn to the next chapter.
10. AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION RESOLVED
In our attempt to explain why the second passage, i.e., the one which made
mention of an opinion of Kaiyata, had been changed, our attention was
drawn to another passage, elsewhere in the PS, which seemed to present
that same opinion, without the name'Kaiyata'being mentioned in it. Since
the two passages in their original form contradicted each other - one giving
Kaiyata's opinion as the correct one, the other rejecting the same opinion -
the second of these passages had been changed by an unknown hand in
such a way that now Kaiyata's opinion emerged as correct in both cases. It
appears therefore that our labours have unveiled the fact that originally the
PS contained two conflicting passages, which were, however, reconciled by
changes introduced in the text.
If this is indeed the true state of affairs, it may legitimately be asked if our
procedure was justified after all. It may be true that the 'restoration' of the
original reading did away with certain difficulties, but at the same time it
introduced a contradiction into the text. Can this be warranted in any way?
Nagesa's PS is not entirely free from contradictions (see Appendix II). It
is therefore not impossible that one of the two passages that engage our
attention at present expressed an opinion that Nagesa would otherwise not
like to call his own. If this is indeed the case, and if we are given the task of
dismissing the passage which is least in agreement with what we have found
to be Nagesa's interpretation of the BP, there can be no doubt which
passage would suffer eviction from the PS. It is the passage found at PS
72.1-4 and discussed above (pp. 821.). Let us recall what it had to say.
In the derivation of, say, bhavisyati the following phase is reached: BHii-
l(rt). Here two rules apply: P. 3.4.78 prescribes substitution of ti(p)for L; P.
3.1.33 prescribes the addition of sya before /. What is maintained in the
passage mentioned is that the substitution of ti(p)for /is antaranga because
it depends on the presence of/only; the addition of sya, on the other hand,
is bahirahgabecause it depends on the presence of /qualified by something
else.
The reader does not need to be reminded of all we now know about
Nagesa's interpretation of the BP in order to see that it is very hard to fit the
above into it. Is it possible that here Nagesa again made a mistake? Did he
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perhaps accidentally make use of an interpretation of the BP that he had
formerly believed to belong to it, but that was incongruous with his present
ideas? The temptation is great to give an affirmative answer to these
questions.1
Before we make any decision in this matter - either by considering the
above as not representing Nagesa's final opinion, or by undoing the change,
i.e., the restoration of the original reading proposed with regard to the
passage which mentions Kaiyata by name - we may do well once again to
look at this other passage in the form supposed to be the original one. In the
opinion here ascribed to Kaiyata, in the derivation of bhavisyati from bhii-l
the substitution of ti for /is antarahga because it depends on the presence of
/ only; whereas the addition of sya is bahirahga because it depends on the
specific feature of Ir (i.e., of Irt and Irh) in addition to the general feature of
/R, that is to say, in addition to / alone, on which the substitution of ti for /
depends. In other words, according to Kaiyata as interpreted by Nagesa,
the cause of the substitution of ti for / is in some way included in the causes
of the addition of sya.
That this is indeed the intention that Nagesa ascribes to Kaiyata follows
again from the first reason adduced by the former to support his rejection
of the latter's opinion. Nagesa says: "although sya etc. depend on
something special, not being caused also by the general nature of the latter,
they cannot be shown to be bahirahga'" (above, p. 79). It is the manner in
which Kaiyata - according to Nagesa - justifies the Bahirahgatva of the
addition of sya that evokes criticism. To say that the addition of sya is
bahirahga and the substitution of ti antarahga because the causes of the
former include the cause of the latter is unacceptable to Nagesa. But he is in
complete agreement with Kaiyata regarding the fact that the addition of
sya is really bahirahga and the substitution of ti antarahga. And our passage
does not even seem to exclude the possibility that the substitution of ti is
antarahga because it depends on / only, whereas the addition of sya is
bahirahga because it depends on a special letter /. If indeed it leaves this
possibility open, then the contradiction which we feared we were
confronted with disappears. In that case we have to conclude that Nagesa's
ideas regarding the BP permit two justifications of the precedence of//'over
sya in the derivation of, say, bhavisyati.
Let it be admitted, right at the outset, that if we are now indeed on the
trail of Nagesa's true intentions, he would have done his readers - and
himself, if he wanted to be understood - a great service by expressing them
more clearly. By using virtually identical words for describing both an
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opinion he rejects and one we must assume is his own, he must himself be
held largely responsible for the lack of understanding his work has
suffered.
But let us not run ahead of what we know at this stage. The most difficult
problem is still to come. How is the statement that ti is antarahga because it
depends on /alone and sya bahiranga because it depends on a special letter /
to be understood in the light of what we know to be Nagesa's interpretation
of the BP? When we look for formal causes, ti turns out to have no
following cause, whereas sya has the following cause Ir. This explains that ti
is antarahga - this indeed is the second justification Nagesa gives for
considering ti antarahga - but not that this is so because ti depends on /
only. Let us therefore try our luck with the other kind of cause we found to
play a role in the BP: meaning. According to BP22, operations take place in
the order in which the meanings on which they depend arise.
The expressive elements in the word bhavisyati are bhii-sya-ti. That it is
the substitutes sya and ti that are expressive, not the substituend L, is a point
of view that the grammarians defended against the Naiyayikas.2 More will
be said about it soon. In the present discussion this point of view may be
accepted. The question here is what the meanings are of which sya and ti are
expressive, and in what order those meanings arise. Once we know that, we
may be able to ascertain in which order the elements sya and ti come into
existence, and which of these two is therefore antarahga, which bahiranga.
To find an answer to this question, we turn to the PLM, probably the last
work Nagesa wrote on what may be called 'the philosophy of grammar'.
Before we study the relevant passages of that book, it must be remarked
that, properly speaking, of the two elements sya and ti only ti is a substitute
(of l(rt)), sya being a Vikarana, which comes into existence as a result of
l(rt), but not in the place of l(rt). The first passage from the PLM to be
studied seems to ascribe all meanings involved to the substitute of/(in our
case ti); the second, however, qualifies that first statement somewhat. Both
the passages are found in the chapter called Dasalakaradesarthanirnaya.
PLM pp. 243-244
vartamane lat ityadividhayaka-lah karmani-itisaktigrahakasutranam
adesartham sthaniny aropyapravrttih / tatrasamkhya-visesa-kalavisesa-
karakavisesabhavah ladesamatrasya arthah /
"The rules which enjoin (/ in one of its ten possible forms on the basis
of a particular meaning that is to be expressed,) such as P. 3.2.123,
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and the rule which informs (us regarding) the denotative power
(which resides in L,), viz. P. 3.4.69, (all these rules) superimpose (the
meanings that figure in them) upon the substituend (L), in order to
(ascribe those meanings to) the substitutes (ti etc.). Act the meanings
that belong to all substitutes of / are the being a particular number, a
particular time, and a particular karaka."
We learn a number of things from this passage. First of all, it confirms
what we had already accepted, viz. that for Nagesa the substitutes of I are
expressive (in view of what further study will teach us, it is better to say: for
Nagesa those substitutes are also expressive). Secondly, the meanings
expressed by the substitutes are three in number: a particular number, a
particular time, and a particular karaka.
All this can hardly be said to be very exciting information. We knew, or
at any rate suspected, it already. The same can, however, not be said of the
third bit of information we derive from this passage. It teaches us in what
order the meanings enumerated come into play, first the particular time,
then the remaining two meanings. How it does so can be seen as follows. In
the above passage our attention is drawn to the distinction between two
kinds of rules. Some rules enjoin I on the basis of a particular meaning,
others (in point of fact, there is only one such rule) inform us what other
meanings belong to /, or rather to its substitutes. It goes without saying that
the second type of rule can play no useful role until Lhas been enjoined, and
consequently has come into existence. As it happens, the rules which enjoin
I on the basis of a particular meaning all make use of such meanings as can
be described as "a particular time". We are subsequently informed (by P.
3.4.69) that "a particular karaka" is one of the meanings expressed by the
substitutes of /. And the meaning describable as "a particular number" does
not come into the picture until Lis being replaced by one of its substitutes.
So we know now in what order the meanings of, say, our form bhavisyati
arise. It is as follows: "future time", "agent", "singular number". But does
this help us in determining in what order the elements sya and ti make their
appearance? On the face of it, it does not. If, as seemed to be suggested in
the last passage, all three meanings are expressed by the substitute of L, i.e.
Ti, and therefore no meaning is left for sya, considerations of meaning are
not fit to solve questions about the order in which these elements appear.
Fortunately, what seemed to be suggested in the above passage is in need of
qualification, as appears from the sentence which immediately follows it in
the PLM. And this qualification enables us to put to use our knowledge of
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the order in which the meanings come into play.
The sentence concerned reads:
PLM pp. 244-245
tatha hi: ladadesasxa vurtamanakulah, sahadisamabhivvahare
karta, yakcinsamabhivyahare bhavakarmanL ubhayasamabhivyahare
ekatvadisamkhya cart hah
"For instance: 'present time' is (the meaning) of the substitute oil(at)\
'agent' is (the meaning of the substitute of l(at)) when there is the
utterance, together (with that substitute of l(at)), of (s)a(p) etc.;
'action' or 'object' is (the meaning of the substitute of l(at)), when
there is the utterance,"together (with that substitute of l(atj), of ya(k)
or (c)i(n); and 'number', such as oneness, is the meaning (of the
substitue of l(atj) when there is the utterance, together (with that
substitute of l(at)), of either (of the two, viz. one out of the group
'(s)a(p) etc/ or one out of the two elements ya(k) and (c)i(n))"
This last sentence qualifies and illustrates what was said in the earlier
passage with the help of the present tense. We may take our example
accordingly. In bhavati there are three expressive elements: bhu-a-ti. Of the
three meanings expressed by the substitute of L, i.e., by ti, one is expressed
by ti alone; this is "present time". The remaining two meanings - "agent"
and "oneness" - are expressed by ti in combination with a, i.e. by ati. If we
therefore want to know in what order the elements a and ti come into being,
we merely have to remember that the meaning "present time" presents itself
first, and also the operations that depend on this meaning. Among these
operations is included the substitution of ti for L, which gives rise to bhu-ti.
The Vikarana a, on the other hand, cannot come into existence until ti has
been substituted for L, since it aids in expressing the meaning "agent", which
makes its appearance later.
The outcome of this discussion regarding bhavati is in no way new. That
(s)a(p) has to wait for ti before it can make its debut is common knowledge.
The reason is that the rule which prescribes (s)a(p), i.e., P. 3.1.68, gives as
condition that a sarvadhatuka affix must follow which is expressive of the
sense "agent". Now the term sarvadhatuka applies to the substitutes of I (by
P. 3.4.113), but not to the substituend L itself. So the result of the above
discussion about bhavati is true, but trivial.
This triviality disappears when we pass on to bhavisyati. There is nothing
in the rule that prescribes sya (P. 3.1.33) to show that it has to wait for ti. In
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spite of that, this rule is an exception (apavdda) to P. 3.1.68, which
prescribes (s)a(p). This is pointed out in the Siddhanta-Kaurnudi(on rule
2186; p. 182). It is therefore safe to include sya in the group "(s)a(p)eic." of
the passage last studied. Of the elements that make up bhavisyati, viz. bhu-
sya-ti, only ti is therefore expressive of the "future time" (which is meant by
sese in P. 3.3.13, see SK 2193, p. 182), while the combination sya-ti
expresses the meanings "agent" and "oneness". And just as we saw was the
case in the derivation of bhavati, so here also it is the particular time which
finds expression first; this leads to bhu-ti. Only afterwards is there occasion
for sya to enter into that form, since it aids the meaning "agent" to express
itself.
That in Nagesa's opinion ti of bhavisyati is expressive of the meaning
"future time" is confirmed later in the same chapter of the PLM:
PLM p. 253
Irttinas tu bhavisyatsdmanyam arthah.
"The meaning of (an affix contained in the Pratyahara) tin (when this
has come in the place) of Irt is future time in general."
The outcome of our discussion can be summed up as follows. In
bhavisyati the meaning "future time" is expressed by ti alone. The
meanings "agent" and "oneness" are expressed by sya and ti jointly. Of
these three meanings, the first one, "future time", comes into action before
the other two. As a result, the element ti comes into existence before sya.
The aim of the above exposition was to find an interpretation of a
passage in the PS. How well does this interpretation fit Nagesa's actual
words? He says that the substitution of ti for / depends on / only. This is true
if we understand it to mean that ti depends on the meaning that gave rise to
L, i.e., in the case of bhavisyati the meaning "future time". Nagesa further
says that sya depends on the letter /specified by something. This is true if we
understand it to mean that sya depends on the meaning that was ascribed to
/ by P. 3.4.69 after this letter had come into existence. The "something" that
specifies / is, in this interpretation, not R, but the new meaning ("agent")
recently assigned to it.
So even though Nagesa's choice of words is unfortunate, it is possible to
interpret the two passages which deal with the Antarangatva of Ti with
respect to sya in such a way as to resolve the apparent contradiction
between them. The difference turns upon what specifies /: in the one case, R;
in the other, the meaning "agent". And perhaps Nagesa's choice of words is
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not accidental. For these are indeed the words that Kaiyata used in his
Mahabhasya-Pradipa in the passage referred to by Nagesa. When therefore
Nagesa uses Kaiyata's words once approvingly, once disapprovingly, does
this perhaps mean that Kaiyata's statement is correct when interpreted in
one way, i.e., in accordance with BP22, but incorrect when understood as
illustrating the principle that that which depends on something general is
antaranga, while that which depends on something special is bahirahga, a
principle which itself is not valid?3
Be this as it may, we must direct our attention to a problem which has
made its appearance as a result of the suggestions made above. If indeed the
derivation of bhavisyati, and more particularly the priority of ti over sya,
can be accounted for by BP22, does this not interfere with the alternative
justification Nagesa gives of this derivation? Nagesa gives, as may be
remembered, a second ground for rejecting Kaiyata's opinion. He says:
"Moreover, Kaiyata's statement is incorrect, because sya etc. are bahirahga
on account of their being caused by something following" (above, p. 79).
This, as we have seen, explains the Bahirahgatva of sya with the help of BPi.
Does this imply that we are at liberty to choose here between BPi and BP22,
guided only by personal preference?
Earlier in this book we came across an example where either of
two aspects of the BP could be applied. It was the derivation of patvya.
Either BP21 or BP22 could be used to secure a smooth derivation. But the
choice between BP21 and BP22 was not an arbitrary one. It depended on the
kind of derivational pattern that was to be followed. When the
kramenanvakhyana was adopted whereby expressive elements would arise
one after the other, the derivation was an illustration of the employment of
BP22. When, on the other hand, the vibhajyanvakhyana was resorted to and
the derivation started from patu-1-a, BP21 was required. So here it was the
derivational pattern adopted, that decided which aspect of the BP was to be
employed, not anybody's whim.
In the derivation of bhavisyati from bhu-l, BP22 is called upon to play a
role when the kramenanvakhyana is followed. This much is clear enough.
What aspect of the BP is needed when the vibhajyanvakhyana is adopted?
The answer is certainly simple, but nonetheless disturbing. The initial
string from which the vibhajyanvakhyana starts, i.e., bhu-sya-ti, is one in
which the question of whether ti or sya is antaranga already belongs to the
past. That is to say, in determining which of the two is antaranga, ti or sya,
and which therefore comes into being first, there is no place for the
vibhajyanvakhyana. Here there is only room for the kramenanvakhyana,
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and consequently for BP22.
As said before, this is very disturbing. A result of these findings is that the
statement which at first we thought to be difficult to understand and
perhaps due to error on the part of Nagesa now comes to be the one that
makes sense. The other statement, according to which the substitution of ti
is antarahga because it has no following cause, a statement which we
initially considered completely perspicuous, now appears to be the
problematic one. What can be done about this reversal of values?
There is, as far as I know, only one way of returning meaningfulness to
Nagesa's second reason for rejecting Kaiyata's opinion, viz. that ti is
antaranga because it has no following cause.This remark of Nagesa makes
sense only on the assumption that it is not sya and ti which are primarily
expressive of meaning, but L. On this assumption, all meanings to be
expressed by the finished form bhavisyati have already played their role at
the time the phase bhu-l has been reached, thus leaving no room for the
kramenanvakhyana, nor for BP22. Only in this situation is there scope, and
even need, for BPi.
It may seem that here we have come to ascribe to Nagesa ideas directly
opposed to the ones he was claimed to have a few pages earlier. If Nagesa
held the substitutes ti etc. to be expressive of meaning, then he must have
denied expressiveness to the substituend L. And whichever of these two he
ultimately considered expressive, it seems a plain absurdity to maintain
that in his opinion both the substituend and its substitutes were expressive.
It is exactly this "plain absurdity" which seems to reflect the true state of
affairs. In the PLM we find both views side by side, something which
greatly puzzled its editor. We shall go through some of the relevant
passages.
PLM p. 10
sthdnino ladayah, ddesds tibddayah kalpitd eva / tatra rsibhifi sthdninam
kalpitd arthdh kantharavenaiva uktdh / ddesdndm tu sthdnyarthdbhidhd-
nasamarthasyaivddesatd Hi bhdsyanydydt te arthdh / evam ca sthdninam
vdcakatvam ddesdndm vd iti vicdro nisphala eva, kalpitavdcakatvasya
ubhayatra sattvdt / mukhyam vdcakatvam tu kalpanayd bodhita-
samuddyarupe pade vdkye vd /
"The substitends I etc. as well as the substitutes tip etc. are only
imagined. With respect to these (substituends and substitutes,) the
meanings which the seer (Panini) imagined to belong to the
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substituends have been uttered by him in his own voice. But those
(same) meanings belong to the substitutes because of the rule
accepted in the Bhasya that only that is a substitute which is capable
of expressing the meaning of the substituend. And therefore the
discussion whether substituends are expressive or substitutes is
completely fruitless, because imagined expressiveness resides in both
(the substituends and the substitutes). But the most important (kind
of) expressiveness resides in the word or sentence, which is conceived
of as being a collection (of expressive elements) due to (our)
imagination."
This passage gives us, at one blow, the two opinions of Nagesa as to what
is really expressive, the substituend or the substitute, as well as the reason
why he does not choose one at the expense of the other. The reason is that
the expressiveness, both of the substituend and of the substitute, is no more
than imagined and is therefore not ultimately real.
It could be asked why, if neither substituends nor substitutes are really
expressive, Nagesa bothers to attribute imagined meanings to them. The
answer is easy enough. In the course of a grammatical derivation we find
that meanings are ascribed to, supposed to be expressed by, certain
elements which figure in that derivation. In the case of the substituend L, it is
P. 3.4.69 which endows it with the meaning "agent", and P. 3.3.13 which
gives it the meaning "future time", if some such form as bhavisyati is to be
derived. We can leave these meanings where Panini's sutras have
introduced them, or, following the rule accepted in the Bhasya, we may
pass them on to the substitutes. Since the expressiveness of these
grammatical elements (L, sya, ti) is imagined, there is no answer to the
question of which of the two courses of action open to us is the correct one.
This, however, does not imply that our decision regarding what we
imagine to be expressive, the substituends or the substitutes, has no effect
on grammatical derivations. BP22 says that operations take place in the
order in which the expressive elements on which they depend are imagined
to come into existence, because the meanings of which these elements are
expressive are imagined to be understood in that particular order (see p.
22, above). There can be no doubt that it is meanings which are imagined
to belong to the grammatical elements concerned that Nagesa talks about
in this passage of the PS. An instance where a difference in assigning
meaning, i.e., to the substituend or, alternatively, to the substitute, leads to
a difference in grammatical derivation we find in bhavisyati. If here we
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imagine the substituend / to be expressive, BPi is needed to ensure a correct
derivation from bhu-l onward. Since at this stage, on the present
alternative, the meanings "agent" and "future time" have already been
expressed, viz. by L, BPi can be used to continue the derivation,
independent as it is of meanings. If, on the other hand, we imagine the
substitutes ti and sya to be expressive, it is BP22 which is to be responsible
for the form the derivation is to assume.
The few passages of the PLM discussed above were all we needed for our
purpose, i.e., to understand how Nagesa could use both BPi and BP22 to
account for the formation of bhavisyati. Since, however, doubts have
recently been raised regarding the authenticity of certain portions of the
PLM, we must dwell somewhat longer on the opinions regarding the
expressiveness or otherwise of substituends and substitutes vented in this
text. I shall endeavour to show that, as far as these opinions are concerned,
there is no reason for regarding them as not stemming from Nagesa.
Kapil Deva Shastri, in an article entitled "On the Authenticity of
Parama-laghu-manjusa", which constitutes his contribution to the
Charudeva Shastri Felicitation Volume, draws attention to two passages of
the PLM which, in his opinion, cannot be brought into agreement with
each other. He says (p. 301):
. . . in sakti-nirupanam the author, following the Naiyayika's views,
opines that it is the sthanl which is meaningful and not the adesa. But
in the chapter of dasalakaradesarthah the same author clearly
supports the views propounded by Bhattoji DIksita, which go against
Naiyayika's views. Here the author of PLM says that the adesa is
meaningful and not the stharii. Obviously these two contradictory
views cannot go together by the same author.
The first of the two passages here referred to (and reproduced in a
footnote) is the first half of the passage we have discussed last, or, to be
more precise, the second and third sentences of it.4 There indeed it is said
that the seer Panini imagined meanings to belong to the substituends, and
that those same meanings belong to the substitutes because of a certain rule
accepted in the Bhasya. Kapil Deva Shastri apparently is under the
impression that this means that those meanings really belonged, or should
be imagined to belong, only to the substituends. But he could be under
this impression only because he had not taken the sentence immediately following
into consideration. There, as we have seen, it is said that imagined
expressiveness resides in both the substituends and the substitutes. It is
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significant that this sentence has not been given together with the two
earlier ones in the footnote. The sentences on which Kapil Deva Shastri
bases his conclusion that expressiveness is here granted only to the
substituends are in themselves not completely clear, and can be fully
understood only with the help of the following sentence.
The second passage quoted by Kapil Deva Shastri, which is supposed to
be incompatible with the one discussed just now, suffers from the same
defect. Here Nagesa is believed to say "that the ddesais meaningful and not
the stharii". That he does not say this will become clear from the quotation
- here completed with the help of Kapil Deva Shastri's own edition of the
PLM - and its translation.
PLM p. 243
yady api lakaranam evdrthanirupanam tarkikaih krtam, tathapi uccarita
eva sabdo arthapratyayako nanuccaritah iti bhasyat loke tathai-
vdnubhavac ca tadddesatindm artho nirupyate / vartamdne lat ityddi-
vidhdyaka-lah karmani-iti saktigrdhakasutrdndm, ddesdrtham sthdniny
dropya, pravrttih
"Even though meaning has by the logicians been ascribed to the
letters I only, yet meaning is ascribed to the substitutes of those (letters L,
viz. the suffixes contained in the Pratyahara) tin (also,) because of the
Bhasya (which reads) 'only a word that is uttered conveys meaning,
not (a word that is) not uttered', and because such is the experience in
the world. The rules P. 3.2.123 etc. which enjoin {lat etc. in the sense
'present time' etc.), and the rule P. 3.4.69 which lends denotative
power (to the letter I) attribute (meaning) to the substituend (which,
on this alternative, is meant) for the substitute."
The word eva in the first sentence of this passage is important. It shows
that the Naiyayika - it is the Naiyayika who is referred to by means of the
word "logician" (tdrkika) - is not criticized for ascribing meaning to the
letters L, but for ascribing meaning to the letters L only, to the exclusion of
their substitutes ti etc. Nothing in this passage, insofar as it is expressive of
Nagesa's views, militates against this interpretation, i.e., the interpretation
which does full justice to the first word eva. In other words, this passage is
not in disagreement with the earlier one, in which Nagesa had stated that
both substituend and substitute could be considered (imagined) expressive.
The only disturbing element is the quotation from the Mahdbhdsya, which
APPARENT CONTRADICTION RESOLVED 101
denies expressiveness to everything that is not uttered, which includes the
letter /. But just as in the previous passage Nagesa was not intimidated by
the express statement of Panini that / was to be expressive, similarly, we
may assume, he did not consider this sentence from the Mahabhasya an
obstacle to maintaining the view that the letter / could also be imagined to
be expressive.
But let us, for the sake of argument, suppose that Kapil Deva Shastri is
correct in stating that the present passage contradicts the earlier one. Let us
further suppose that this contradiction is to be explained by assuming that
someone else, other than Nagesa, added to the text, or perhaps we should
say, completed the work that had been left unfinished by Nagesa. To realize
the consequences fully, we must see which portions of the PLM are to*be
ascribed to that mysterious person.
In the case of the two passages discussed last, the choice is an easy one.
The earlier one occurs in virtually identical form in the LA/(p. 9), a work
with respect to which the authorship of Nagesa has, as far as 1 know, never
seriously been doubted. If, therefore, one of these passages is from a hand
other than Nagesa's it must be the second one, according to which, so it is
claimed, expressiveness of substitutes only is allowed. Indeed, this second
passage, as far as I have been able to ascertain, does not occur in
the LM.
In order to find more passages that originally were not part of the PLM,
we return to Kapil Deva Shastri's article. On pp. 299-300 the author points
out that even though "some earlier chapters" of the LM and the PLM "are
somewhat similar in nature and content,... the chapters of the latter half of
the works (from dasalakaradesarthah to samasadivrttyarthanirupanam)
differ. These chapters of PLM are in no way the abridged versions of those
found in LM" No more is said with respect to this problem in the article,
but its writer takes up the same question again in the introduction to this
edition and translation of the PLM. One of the sections there mention-
ed as having no counterpart in the LM is the chapter called
Lakararthanirupana, which explains the position of the Naiyayikas.
Kapil Deva Shastri is of the opinion that this chapter does not really belong
in this "extremely short" {parama laghu) work and characterizes it as
altogether superfluous (p. 22 and again p. 27). So this section ranks high on
the list of portions of the PLM suspected of not being original. But the
opening passage of this section states the very opposite of what the "later
added" passage studied above proclaims. It should remembered that, for
the sake of argument, we had admitted that this last passage maintained
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that only substitutes are expressive. With this in mind we may look at the
next passage.
PLM p. 263
atha naiyayikanam mate samksepat lakaranam artho nirupyate / tatra
ladddilrnantah dasa lakarah / tatra lakarasya karta kalah samkhyd iti
trayofrthah / tatra karta iti patamjaldh-lah karmarti ca ... iti sutre
cakarena kartuh pardmarsdt / kartrsthdne vydpdrah iti bhdtfah / yatnah
iti naiydyikah /
"Now the meaning of the letters I will be described in brief in
accordance with the opinion of the Naiyayikas. In this connection (it
is to be remembered that) there are ten letters L, beginning with lat and
ending with Irh. Here the letter I has three meanings: 'agent', 'time'
and 'number'. Here (it must be noted that the first of these three
meanings is) 'agent' according to the followers of Patanjali, because
(the meaning) 'agent' is considered (to be present) in the sutra lah
karmani ca . . . (P. 3.4.69) by dint of (the connective) ca. According
to the followers of (Kumarila) Bhatta 'activity' (must stand) in the
place of 'agent' (in the three meanings enumerated above). According
to the Naiyayikas it is 'effort'(that must stand in the place of'agent9)."
The followers of Patanjali are the grammarians, among whom we have
to count Nagesa himself. We learn from the present passage that according
to the followers of Patanjali the letter L has three meanings: "agent", "time"
and "number". Whereas the previous passage granted expressiveness to the
substitutes only, or so it was maintained, the present one allows this
privilege only to the letter L. But both these passages are "later added". Are
we to assume that the person who added these passages was not capable of
seeing the contradiction between the added passages; or rather that a host
of interpolators was at work to give the PLM its present shape?
Of course, we are not called upon to entertain these improbable
assumptions. All the passages considered can be made to yield satisfactory-
sense by accepting that Nagesa looked upon both substituends and
substitutes as expressive, albeit that their expressiveness is only imagined.
In the initial passage of the chapter called Dasalakdranirnaya5 Nagesa
emphasizes the expressiveness of the substitutes, while in the initial passage
of the chapter called Lakdrdrthanirnaya it is the expressiveness of the
substituend that is stressed.
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The above discussion may be summed up by saying that it may be true
that the PLM contains passage that were not written by Nagesa; but as far
as those passages are concerned which deal with the expressiveness of
substituends and substitutes, there is no reason to regard them in this way.
11. EXCURSUS: ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN OF
NAGESA'S IDEAS REGARDING THE PHILOSOPHY
OF GRAMMAR
The preceding discussion has left us at a place where it is very inviting, and
possibly also fruitful, to tarry a bit and draw into the picture Nagesa's other
works on the philosophy of grammar besides the PLM. These other works
are the VSM, the LM, and the SV.
The VSM, LM and PLM were written in this order,1 and seem to
represent three stages in the development of Nagesa's thought, at least as far
as his ideas on the expressiveness of substitutes and substituends are
concerned. The first of these three books, the VSM, has not been published
yet, but for our limited purposes the description that Kapil Deva Shastri
gives of its contents in the introduction to his edition and translation of the
PLM may suffice.2 We learn from this (p. 23) that the first part of the VSM,
which covers most of the chapters of the book, is called
Varnasphotasdmdnyanirupana. In this part of the book, among other
things, the meanings of verbal roots, particles, nominal stems, and the
various kinds of affixes are discussed. We may conclude from this that at
this early stage Nagesa was not yet ready to look upon the vamasphota as
something secondary; he had not yet accepted the opinion that the
expressiveness of grammatical elements, be they substituends or
substitutes, is merely imagined, not ultimately real. That Nagesa held such
views appears again from his SV, a short treatise in which the view that
substitutes are expressive, not substituends, is defended with fervour (SV
5.8-8.11). This, incidentally, enables us to ascribe the SV to roughly the
same, relatively early, period of Nagesa's life in which he also wrote his
VSM.3 At this time Nagesa was still convinced that individual grammatical
elements, but only those that occurred in utterances of the Sanskrit
language, i.e., substitutes, not substituends, could be really expressive.
These ideas changed drastically in the time that elapsed between writing
the VSM and the LM. At the second stage of development of Nagesa's
ideas, only the sentence remained really expressive. The expressiveness of
all smaller units was now no more than imagined. Indeed, the very first
words of the LM, those which immediately follow the opening verse, are
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significant. They are (p. 1): tatra vakyasphoto mukhyah, "here the
vakyasphota is the main thing." Not so much as a mention is made of the
other kinds of sphota, eight varieties of which had been enumerated in the
SV (p. I). The LM (9.2-8) then proceeds to state that the discussion
regarding what is really expressive, the substituend or the substitute, is
futile, since there is only an imagined expressiveness here, and that resides
in both. It uses here practically the same words as the PLM, the relevant
passage of which has been quoted and translated above (p. 97). As far as I
have been able to ascertain, the LM never again questions the correctness
of this its initial point of view, nor does it feel compelled, in certain
contexts, to stress the expressiveness of the substituend rather than of the
substitute, or vice versa.
This again changes when we come to the PLM. Indeed, it seems that we
have to assume a second time that Nagesa's opinions regarding what is
expressive, the substituend or the substitute, had undergone modifications.
By assuming that these modifications were of the kind to be described now,
a number of peculiarities of the PLM vis-a-vis the LM become
understandable.
In the PLM Nagesa still thinks that the vakyasphota is the main thing.
But whereas in the LM he considered the lesser kinds of sphota not worthy
of mention in the introductory passages of his work, in the PLM they are
again enumerated there (p. 2), as they were in the SFand perhaps in the
VSM. It is true that much has changed since those early books. As noted
above, the vakyasphota is now, as in the LA/, regarded as most important
(p. 5), and the expressiveness of both the substituend and the substitute is
proclaimed, again as in the LA/, both being ultimately only imagined. But it
is with regard to this imagined expressiveness of substituend and substitute
that something important seems to have happend to Nagesa. In the LM he
thought that, since the expressiveness of substituend and substitute was
only imaginery, it did really not matter in which of the two one chose it to
reside in a particular context. But at the time he wrote the PLM he had
realized that in certain situations it does make a difference which choice is
made. Those situations include, as has been extensively discussed above
(Chapter 10, especially pp. 96 ff), the derivation of words like bhavisyati.
Here, to recapitulate, if the substituend / is held to be expressive, BPi is
required; if the substitute ti - and with it the Vikarana sya - is held to be
expressive, BP22 is required.
There are various reasons for assuming that Nagesa in the PLM had
become aware of the differences in derivation entailed by the difference
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between imagining expressiveness to reside in the substituend or in the
substitute, and that he had not been aware of these differences in the LM.
The first reason has been mentioned already: all eight kinds oisphota have
again been enumerated in the beginning of the PLM, though they were
absent in the LM. This may indicate, or at the very least is compatible with
the view, that those other kinds of sphota, and consequently also the
expressiveness of other - smaller - units than the sentence, had gained
importance in the eyes of Nagesa.
This first reason by itself is not very strong. The second reason is
stronger. In the derivation of bhavisyati, while assuming that the elements
sya and ti were expressive, we had to make use of the information provided
by the PLM, viz. that ti alone is expressive of the meaning "future time",
whereas ti and sya combined are expressive of the meanings "agent" and
"oneness". Only this information enabled us to decide in which order the
elements sya and ti were to be added to the root. The sentence which
contains this crucial information is conspicuous by its absence in the LM.
This does not necessarily mean that Nagesa had different ideas about what
expresses what. It appears that he had simply overlooked the difficulties
posed by the derivation of bhavisyati.
The third reason is based on the presence in the PLM of the chapter
called Lakararthanirnaya. In this chapter the meanings of the letter I are
determined in accordance with the point of view of the Naiyayikas. There is
nothing in the LM which corresponds to this chapter of the PLM. This led
Kapil Deva, as we have seen (p. 101), to suppose that the chapter was not
written by Nagesa. We have already raised an objection against this
supposition (above p. 102), but the question remains why such an
"altogether unnecessary" chapter should have been added to increase the
bulk of a book that aims at being "extremely short".
We know that, according to Nagesa, imagined expressiveness belongs to
both the substituend and the substitute. When Nagesa wrote the LA/he was
of the opinion that the mere statement of this fact was enough, and that he
did not need to worry about the consequences of assigning this imagined
expressiveness to one or another of its two possible places of residence. He
simply thought that this would have no consequences When, therefore, he
devotes a long chapter in his LM to the "description of the meanings of the
suffixes contained in the short form tin" (Tinarthanirupana), he is under the
impression that these same meanings can also be imagined to belong to the
letters /.
But at the time Nagesa started writing the PLM, he knew that the
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assignment of imagined meaning to the one or to the other of the pair of
substituend and substitute could very well have consequences for the
derivation of a word. So the discussion had to be split into two. One
chapter would deal with the meanings of the substitutes of the letters /; here
expressiveness was imagined to reside in those substitutes. Another chapter
was to deal with the meanings of the substituend, i.e., of the letters /; here
the underlying assumption was that now expressiveness was imagined to
reside in those letters L.
Writing the first of these two chapters was relatively easy for Nagesa.
Here he could draw upon earlier writings, especially the Vaiya-
karanabhiisanasara of Kaundabhatta, verses from which he indeed
regularly quotes there.
The second of these two chapters was going to be more difficult. In it,
expressiveness was to be imagined as residing in the letters I. Such a point of
view had never been represented in grammatical writings. It is therefore not
surprising that Nagesa here turned to the Naiyayikas for help. They had for
a long time defended the view that L is expressive. Besides this point of
agreement, that expressiveness belongs to L, there were not many points of
disagreement. The main difference between Nagesa here and the
Naiyayikas is one that could be described - borrowing a term, but not its
meaning, from the philosopher Quine - as "semantic ascent". Where
Nagesa imagines the meaning "agent" (kartr) to reside in the substituend /,
the Naiyayikas ascribe the meaning "activity" (krti) to the same. The
difference is only one of level, since "agenthood" (kartrtva) is the same as
"activity" (krti). The theory of the Naiyayikas would therefore largely fulfil
Nagesa's needs in the subject matter under consideration, if only it would,
so to say, come down one step.
The device that Nagesa adopts in the end is as follows. On the face of it he
devotes the chapter concerned (called Lakararthanirnaya) to what the
Naiyayikas have to say regarding the matter. But right in the beginning (p.
263) he states where grammarians and Naiyayikas differ. What is more, he
gives the opinion of the grammarians first, viz. that "agent", "time" and
"number" are the three meanings of L, and not till later in the passage does
he point out in what respect the Naiyayikas differ from this. He also gives
the views of the followers of Kumarila Bhatta, the famous Mimamsaka,
perhaps because it was inviting to add this information where it was
possible without many extra words, but this does not concern us now.
That at least part of Nagesa's intention in writing the chapter called
Lakararthanirnaya was to describe the opinions of the grammarians - i.e.
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his own opinions on the alternative that expressiveness is imagined to
reside in / - follows again from the fact that on a few occasions, viz. where
the views of the Naiyayikas deviate from those of the grammarians, the
views of the grammarians are separately mentioned. Two instances of such
a procedure can be found on p. 281 of the PLM.
This completes the third, and last, argument supporting the claim that
Nagesa, while writing the PLM, was aware of the difficulties connected
with the derivation of forms like bhavisyati, which he was not aware of
when he wrote the LM. If this claim is correct, an obvious corollary would
be that the PLM was composed after the PS or simultaneously with it, or at
the earliest not long before that work, when Nagesa's ideas regarding the BP
had reached their final form,4
One final remark before we leave the PLM. This whole long train of
arguments, at the end of which we arrive at the rather satisfactory result of
being able to throw some light on certain peculiarities of the PLM which
had puzzled its editor, started from a change we had introduced in the text
of the PS. Those readers who are more pleased with the outcome of the
discussion than they were with its beginning may like to turn the whole
argument round and join us, after all, in assuming that the correction made
in the text of the PS is justified.
12. A USE OF BP2 IN THE CONTEXT OF BPi
In an earlier chapter we have transposed a whole section of the /*£, and taken
it back to where it belongs. A secondary gain of this was that a number of
passages which make use of BP2 were relocated in their proper places, i.e.,
in the part of the PS that deals with BP2. This removed a potential source of
confusion. However, those who think that the earlier part of the PS, where
it discusses BPi, has thus become free from stains are wrong. One passage
employing BP2 remains in it. It constitutes our object of study in the present
chapter.
It is important that we be aware of the location of the passage to be
discussed. It may be remembered that Nagesa had launched an attack on
those who maintained that a rule could be bahirahga on the basis of a
technical term. Nagesa had illustrated the advantages of his point of view
with the help of the derivations of gaudherah andpacet. It had been argued
by some that in the derivation of gaudhera from godha-dhra(k), to confine
ourselves to the first example, the substitution of ey for dh by P. 7.1.2 is
bahirahga, because it depends on the technical term "Anga"that belongs to
godha. When the stage godha-eyra is then reached, the subsequent elision
of Y before R, by P. 6.1.66, being antarahga, would be prevented by the BP.
The desired form gaudhera would not be obtained.
Of course, Nagesa grasped the opportunity to point out that the difficulty
is a result of the misapplication of the terms antarahga and bahirahga. As
soon as Nagesa's point of view is adopted, viz. that only formal causes
count where BPi is concerned, the difficulty disappears like snow in the
sun. All this has been discussed earlier (pp. 5f., above).
However, another solution to the problem is conceivable. It might be
that the BP does not apply where P. 6.1.66 operates. This way, too, a
smooth derivation of gaudhera, as well as of pacet, would be secured.
It goes without saying that this alternative solution would undermine
Nagesa's position. Consequently, Nagesa is bound to reject it. He does so in
the following passage.
PS 81.4-82.3, App. I. 11. 37-41
vali lope'ntarahgaparibhasa na pravartata iti tu na yuktam /'tatsutre
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bhasya eva vrascadisu lopdtiprasangam dsankyopadesasamarthydn
na I na ca vrscatltyddau caritarthyam bahirahgatayd samprasdrana-
sydsiddhatvena purvam eva tatprdpter Hi bhdsyokteh /
"To say that the BP does not apply when (v or y) may have to be
elided by P. 6.1.66, is improper (because the author of the Bhasya has
applied the Paribhasa in a case of that description). For in the
Bhasya on that very rule (P. 6.1.66, first) the question is raised
whether the elision (of v or y taught by P. 6.1.66) would not, beyond
(its proper sphere) apply to (the initial v of) vrasc etc.; subsequently
this is denied, on the ground that (vrasc etc. in the Dhatupatha etc.)
have been put down (with an initial v, which would be absurd if v were
always elided by P. 6.1.66). Nor, it is said, would (their enumeration
in the Dhatupatha with an initial v) have any sense in the case of forms
like vrscati (where, as v is not followed by one of the sounds contained
in the Pratyahara val, one might think P. 6.1.66 would not apply), for
(even here) the elision of v would apply before (the substitution of)
Samprasarana (for R) because the latter is bahiranga and therefore
(regarded as) not existing (so far as regards P. 6.1.66)." (Cf. K. pp.
230-231.)
In order to understand the passage, we may first turn to the explanation
which Kielhorn gives in a footnote (K. p. 231, fn. 1). It reads:
In the formation of vrscati, from vrasc-a-ti, the elision of v is
antarahga because it is caused by R, the substitution of Samprasarana
for ra bahiranga, because it is caused by the Vikarana a (P. 6.1.16).
This is correct as far as it goes. What must be added is that here BP2i is at
work. For the cause of the elision of v is r. And R, being part of the root,
presents itself, in the order of the pronunciation of the sounds, before the
Vikarana a, which is the cause of the substitution of Samprasarana. So here
we catch BP2i redhanded in the domain of BPi, as announced. The excuse
is, of course, that it is needed to settle a subordinate point, which had
arisen, more or less accidentally, in the discussion of BPi. It is needed to
reject the opinion that the BP does not apply where P. 6.1.66 operates.
The fact that in this passage BP2 is active, not BPi (and this is also the
opinion of Nagesa), finds unexpected confirmation in another passage.
Before we turn to it, we may make the following observations.
That it is BP2 that plays a role in the discussion of vrscati has a practical
consequence. We know that v of vrasc is not to be dropped, for the simple
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reason that if it were to be dropped the occurrence of vrasc with initial v in
the Dhatupatha would be futile. But if this had not prevented us, we would
have elided v by P. 6.1.66 first, and after that would have substituted
Samprasarana for ra. The reverse order: first substituting Samprasarana,
and afterwards because Samprasarana is to be considered as not having
taken effect - dropping v, is not allowed under BP2. Indeed, that this is not
allowed under BP2, whereas it is allowed under BPi, constitutes one of the
major differences between these two aspects of the BP.
It is exactly this, viz. that in cases like vrscati the reverse order is not
allowed, that Nagesa tells us in the next passage. The first sentence of it we
have read earlier (above, p. 7). It is here repeated to provide the necessary
context for the second one.
PS 84.1-2, App. I 11. 51-53
antarahge kartavye jatam tatkalaprtiptikam ca bahirahgam asiddham ity
art hah / vrscatyadisu padasamskarapakse samanakalatvam eva dvayor iti
bodhyam / /
"The meaning (of the Paribhasa) is this, that when an antaranga (rule
or operation) is about to take effect, a bahirahga (rule or operation)
which (already) has taken effect, and likewise (a bahirahga rule or
operation) which applies simultaneously (with the antaranga rule or
operation), is (regarded as) not having taken effect or (as) not
existing. One ought to remember that in (in the case of) vrscati etc.
(where the Paribhasa has been applied by Patanjali,) on the
alternative (that the various elements) of which a word (like vrscati) is
made up, (viz. vrasc-a-ti, are all placed side by side before the rules
of Panini's grammar are applied to them, the Paribhasa can) only (be
applied) when both (the antaranga elision of v and the bahirahga
substitution of Samprasarana for ra apply) simultaneously."(Cf. K.
p. 234.)
When the elements of which the word vrscati is made up are placed side
by side, we get vrasc-a-ti. Here the BP applies only when the antaranga and
the bahirahga operation apply simultaneously. When, on the other hand,
the bahirahga operation, i.e., substitution of Samprasarana for ra, takes
place first, then the BP is not in a position to make that bahirahga operation
asiddha. All this we knew already, since vrscati falls within the jurisdiction
of BP2. The above passage therefore contains a warning not to confuse BPi
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and BP2. Having introduced an element relating to BP2 into the discussion
of BPi, Nagesa feels obliged to bring this to the notice of his readers.
But this passage does more than merely warn us not to confuse BPi and
BP2. It also confirms that BP2 exists in two forms, which we have called
BP21 and BP22. That it does so follows from the fact that it talks about "the
alternative that the various elements of which a word is made up are all
placed side by side before the rules of Panini's grammar are applied to them"
{padasamskdrapaksa). It is not hard to see that this is what we have come to
know by the name vibhajydnvdkhydna in our study of BP2. The reader will
remember that this vibhajydnvdkhydna was there contrasted with the
kramendnvakhyana ("explanation by making each expressive portion of
the word arise one after the other"). He will further recall that whereas the
simultaneity of application of the rules concerned was a condition for the
application of BP2 where the vibhajydnvdkhydna was adopted, i.e., of BP2i,
this same simultaneity was no condition for the application of BP2 where
the kramendnvakhyana had been accepted, i.e. of BP22. In this latter case
simultaneity is not even possible. It is in view of this state of affairs that our
passage adds the restriction padasamkdrapakse.
So the above passage sounds a note of caution not to apply BPi to cases
which belong to the sphere of BP2. Unfortunately, it was of no avail. It is
partly, no doubt, Nagesa's obscurity of expression that is responsible for
the fact that this passage was not correctly understood by his followers. To
illustrate this, we may turn to Kielhorn's translation of the second sentence
of the above passage. It reads (K. p. 234):
One ought to remember that in (the case of) vrscati etc. (where the
Paribhasa has been applied by Patanjali, it can) only (be applied)
when both (the antaranga elision of v and the bahiranga substitution
of Samprasarana for ra apply) simultaneously, (and that such is the
case only) on the alternative (that the various elements) of which a
word (like vrscati) is made up (viz. vrasc-a-ti, are all placed side by
side before the rules of Panini's grammar are applied to them).
Thus Kielhorn's rendering excludes the possibility that the antaranga
elision of v takes place before the bahiranga operation, i.e., substitution of
Samprasarana for ra, has even presented itself. But we have seen (pp. 22f,
above) that Nagesa gave a second formulation of BP2 for no other reason
than to allow for possibilities like this. In Nagesa's opinion elision of v in
vrasc may take place before the affix ti and the Vikarana a have made their
appearance; this is the case when the kramendnvakhyana is accepted. And
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this too is an effect of the BP, viz. of BP22.
This much may suffice to show that when Kielhorn in a footnote (K. p.
234, fn. 1) explains that on accepting the kramenanvakhyana, "the
Paribhasa would not be applicable in the formation of vrscati etc. because
the elision of v would apply before the substitution of Samprasarana", he is
in disagreement with Nagesa's express statement, which we discussed
earlier (p. 23f., above). In other words, as on other occasions, Kielhorn
leaves what seems to be a contradiction in Nagesa's text unaccounted for.

PART III
THE REMAINDER OF THE P$

13. PAR. LI
Until now we have, with few exceptions, only studied such passages of the
PS as occur in the discussion of Par. L. And, it may be added, in all cases we
have been able to interpret them in accordance with what we had found to
be Nagesa's interpretation of the BP in the first part of this book. It is high
time that we turned to Par. LI. The discussion of that Paribhasa contains
probably the most formidable challenge to the main thesis of this book. It
contains this challenge in its very first sentence, i.e., in the sentence that
introduces the Paribhasa. It reads:
PS 101.1
nanv evam aksadyu r ityadau bahirahgasyothosiddhatvad antarahgo yan
na syad . . .
"Now one might say that (if the BP were) then (valid in all but the
three exceptional cases mentioned above), the bahiranga
(substitution, by P. 6.4.19, of) uth (for the v of div) in (the formation
of) aksadyu (from aksa-div-kvip) etc. would have to be considered as
asiddha (in regard to the antarahga substitution by P. 6.1.77 of y
for I before u), and in that case the antarahga (substitution of the)
(semivowel y (for I) would not take place." (Cf. K. p. 267.)
The derivation of aksadyu h passes through the following stages:
aksa-div-(k)vi(p)-s(up)
aksa-di-u(th)-(k)vi(p)-s by P. 6.4.19
aksa-dy-u-(k)vi(p)-s by P. 6.1.77
P. 6.4.19 (cchvoh sud anunasike ca) prescribes substitution of u for v;
the cause of this operation is kvip, or more correctly, since the whole of
kvip is dropped, this operation has no cause that fulfils the requirements
(cf. p. 32f. above). P. 6.1.77 (iko yan aci) prescribes substitution of y for I;
the cause of this operation is u. It follows that P. 6.4.19, not having a cause,
is antarahga\ P. 6.1.77, depending on the cause u, is bahiranga. Since P.
6.4.19 takes effect first, P. 6.1.77 afterwards, it is clear that the BP presents
no obstacle in the derivation of aksadyuh.
Ill
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This conclusion of ours is exactly the opposite of what the present
passage maintains. There it is stated that the substitution of u for v is
bahiranga and the substitution of y for I antaranga, where we had
found that the former operation is antaranga and the latter bahiranga. And
this does not exhaust the problems evoked by this passage. For let us
accept, for argument's sake, that kvip fulfils the requirements for being a
cause in the sense necessary in connection with the BP. Then substitution of
u for v does indeed become bahiranga, and substitution of y for I antaranga.
But they become so in the second sense of these terms; the two operations
will be bi and ai, respectively. And this would mean that even on the
assumption that substitution of u for v is bahiranga, this operation would
not for that reason be asiddha. For here the second aspect of the BP would
apply - BP2, which, as we have seen (p. 11, above) has no concern with a
bahiranga rule that has taken effect.
As said above, this passage constitutes a formidable challenge to the
interpretation of the BP assigned to Nagesa in this book. I shall answer it by
showing that although the NP is ultimately rejected in the PS, considerable
space has all the same been reserved for the defence of that Paribhasa. This
defence of Par. LI, which can be shown to represent ideas which Nagesa
held earlier in his life, does indeed cover the larger part of what the PS has
to say about this Paribhasa, from the beginning up to P$ 104.5.
The PS on Par. LI is not always as straightforward in its expressions as
we we might wish. The reader has already acquired a first taste of its style
when we studied the two-word principle (Chapter 5 above). This principle,
it may be recalled, was introduced to aid the alleged Jnapaka of Par. LI in
performing its task, viz. establishing that Paribhasa. Later on, the
Paribhasa was rejected, but its Jnapaka retained. The latter was now said to
indicate that Par. L is not universally valid. But together with the Jnapaka,
the two-word principle was also retained. This, at any rate, we were forced
to conclude, since without the two-word principle the Jnapaka would be
worthless. This was our introduction to the NP. The two-word principle
was here made part of the interpretation of the BP, not in a
straightforward, open manner, but through a back door, as it were. We
shall find more obscurity soon.
Our first task is to make sure that our earlier statement that Par. LI is not.
accepted by Nagesa is in accordance with the facts. We shall see that
Nagesa's remarks concerning this question are not as clear as we would like
them to be. The passage that will be studied consists of two parts. And a
single reading will suffice to show that they represent different opinions.
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The first part defends Par. LI; the second rejects it. But what is most
remarkable is that our text contains no clear indication that one opinion is
rejected to make way for the other. Let us read the passage before we say
more about it.
PS 104.2-10
aTa eva1 nalopah sup iti sutre krti tuggrahanam caritdrtham / anyathd
vrtrahabhyam ityddau bahirbhu tabhydmnimittakapadatvdsrayatvena
bahirarigatayd "nalopasydsiddhatvena1 siddhes tadvaiyarthyam
spastam eva / mama tu tuky ajdnantaryasattvdn na donah / na caivam sat?
hrasvasya piti iti sutrasthabhdsyavirodhah / tatra hi gramaniputra ity
atreko hrasvo'riyah iti hrasve krte tukam ds'ahkya hrasvasya
bahirangdsiddhatvena samdhitam / ndjdnantarya ity asya sattve tatra
tadaprdpter asamgatih spastaiveti vdcyam / tena bhdsyenasyd and-
vasyakatvabodhandt / etajjndpakendntarangaparibhdsdyd anityatva-
bodhanasyaiva nydyyatvdt / /
"It is only for (the existence of) this Paribhasathat the words KRTI TUK
in P. 8.2.2 serve a purpose; otherwise they would evidently be useless;
for in (the case of) vrtrahabhyam etc. the elision of the n (of vrtra-
han etc.) - being bahirahga on account of the dependence on the fact
that (vrtrahan etc.) is a Pada, and that it is termed so only because (it
is followed by the termination) bhydm which stands beyond (the affix
kvip, the cause of the addition of the augment tuk), - would (by Par.
L) be considered asiddha (in regard to the addition of TuK), and (such
being the case, the object of the words krti tuk in P. 8.2.2) would be
accomplished (by Par. L). But according to my (view those words krti
tuk in P. 8.2.2) are quite appropriate (for in my opinion Par. LI does
exist and applies in the case of vrtrahabhyam etc.) because (the
antarahga addition of) tuk is dependent on the immediate sequence of
a vowel (and something else. The elision of n cannot therefore be
considered asiddha by Par. L, Panini was obliged to state that it is
asiddha).
And one ought not to say that, in case this (Par. LI were admitted
to exist), the Bhasya on the rule P. 6.1.71 would be incorrect. There
namely the question has been raised whether after the substitution by
P. 6.3.61 of short (I for the final of grdmani) in gramaniputra the
augment tuk {should be added to the final I of grdmani by P. 6.1.71);
subsequently this (question) has been (answered in the negative and
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the non-addition of tuk) been accounted for by the fact that (the
substitution of) the short (I for the /" of gramani) is bahiranga and
therefore asiddha. (Here then one might maintain that) if Par. LI did
really exist, (the substitution of i) in that (word gramaniputra) would
not be (bahiranga), and that consequently (the Bhasya in which it is
considered bahiranga) would clearly be incorrect. (But to maintain
this would be wrong) because that (passage of the) Bhasya shows that
this4 (Par. LI) is unnecessary; (and this is the correct view of the
matter) because it is simpler that (the word tuk in P. 6.1.86), which
(has been assumed) to indicate (the existence of) this (Par. LI), should
merely teach us that Par. L is not universally valid, (than that it
should indicate the existence of a new Paribhasa)." (K. pp. 274-276.)
There can be no doubt that the first part of the above passage defends
Par. LI. It emphasizes one of the advantages of accepting that Paribhasa.
The second part of the passage initially seems to proceed in the same vein,
but quite suddenly one discovers that it rejects the Paribhasa whose glory it
was expected to sing. If it were intended to contrast the two views expressed
in the two parts, more effective means would have been available to attain
that end.
But let us not be unduly harsh with respect to what may, after all, be no
more than a stylistic shortcoming on the part of Nagesa. Perhaps Nagesa
adopts here, be it in a clumsier way, the procedure which he also employed
elsewhere in the PS: He introduces a Paribhasa, gives arguments to support
it, and then rejects it. He did so, for example, in the case of Par. XLI, which
was discarded in favour of the considerations which we studied earlier (pp.
82f). If we can just condone the way Nagesa makes the transition from
defence to attack, this seems to be the way his comments on the NP are to
be understood. The last sentences on the NP, i.e., the ones that follow our
passage, show how well the rejection of this Paribhasaaccords with the Bhasya.
And the rejection of the NP is confirmed by the LSS on SK46(P. 1.3.11)
where Nagesa writes (Kumbakonam ed. I p. 267): najanantaryaparibhasa
tu nasty eveti na ayaje indram ityadau dosah iti paribhasendusekhare
vistarah, "In (the derivation of) ayaje indram etc. there is nothing wrong
since the NP does not exist; this has been extensively discussed in the PS."
So we may agree that Par. LI is rejected by Nagesa. Let us now see what
Nagesa had to say in defence of it before he turned against it. We may begin
with the first part of the last-quoted passage. The last sentence of that first
part begins with the word mama "according to my view". This word does
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not refer to Nagesa as he was while writing the PS, for this sentence, as well
as all that precedes it, defends Par. LI, while the PS, as we have seen, rejects
it. We are given the impression that some unidentified person is here
allowed to speak in defence of Par. LI.
This impression becomes stronger when we study the arguments used in
support of the N P in more detail. Many of them are such as could not have
been used by Nagesa, at least not at the time he wrote the PS. In order to be
able to investigate them, we may once again bring to mind the form and
meaning of the NP:
NAJANANTAR YE BAHISTVA PRAKLPTIH
"(Provided that an operation which by the BP would be bahirahga
has taken effect, it is contrary to that Paribhasa) not regarded as
bahirahga (and consequently not regarded as asiddha, when an
antarahga operation is to take effect) which depends on the
immediate sequence of a vowel (and something else)."
Armed with this knowledge we can begin our task.
We do not have to search long. The first argument, which does not
seem to suit Nagesa as we know him from the remainder of the PS, occurs
right in the first half of the passage from the PS last quoted. It explains the
role of the words krti and tuk in P. 8.2.2. In the derivation of
vrtrahabhyam, so it is argued, the elision of n in vrtrahan~(kvip)-bhyam is
bahirahga because it depends, indirectly, on bhyam. The addition of tuk to
the final a of the resulting vrtraha is antarahga, for it depends on kvip. Such
being the case, the elision of n would be asiddha, and the addition of tuk
would be prevented by_the BP alone, were it not that the NP disturbs the
course of events. The NP does so because the antarahga operation, viz.
addition of tuk to a, depends on the immediate sequence of a vowel and
something else, in our instance on the immediate sequence of a and kvip.
Since the addition of tuk cannot then be prevented by the BP, the words
krti and tuk are required in P. 8.2.2 to accomplish that.
This is one of the arguments intended to show how advantageous it is to
accept Par. LI. It is, however, in conflict with what Nagesa says elsewhere in
the PS. As a matter of fact, two other justifications of the presence of krti
and tuk in P. 8.2.2 are given in that book. They are discussed in Appendix
II. It is especially the first of these that conflicts with the present
explanation of krti and tuk in P. 8.2.2. In the discussion of Par. L we read
that KRTI and tuk serve a purpose because an indirect cause cannot make an
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operation bahirahga; in the discussion of Par. LI, on the other hand, we
read that they are needed because of the NP. The two passages seem to
wilfully contradict each other.4 We therefore assume that the defence of
Par. LI in no way reflects Nagesa's ideas, so much so that he made no effort
to bring it in agreement with his other statements.
Something very similar may be said concerning the fact that the same
Bhasya passage is invoked twice, each time to prove something different.
The Bhasya passage concerned (Mbh. 1.51.8-9) states that in the derivation
oipreddha from pra-indha-ta the substitution of Guna for a-i is bahirahga,
the prohibition of Guna by P. 1.1.4 antarahga. The PS on Par. LI sees in this
passage the justification of the two-word principle (PS 101.8-10, K. p. 269;
also see Chapter 5, above), whereas in the discussion of Par. L the same
Bhasya passage was said to be explained by the circumstance that only an
operation which depends on the meaning of the preposition is antarahga,
but one that depends only on the form of the same is bahirahga(PS 91.1-4,
App. 111. 170-173 K. p. 249; also see above p. 70f.) The fact that the two-word
principle is accepted by Nagesa (see Chapter 5, above), does not imply that
this justification of it has his approval. If it had, he would have been more
likely to introduce the two-word principle and its justification in the
context of Par. L.
Who then is this person who is allowed to speak in defence of Par. LI?
This person is Nagesa himself as he was at a younger age. In order to show
that this is the case, I shall quote a passage from the Laghusabdaratna
(LSR), a commentary on the Praudhamanoramd(PrM), Bhattoji DTksita's
own commentary on his SK. That the LSR was more likely than not
written by Nagesa rather than by Hari DIksita as the colophons indicate
will be discussed in Appendix V. The passage to be quoted is almost
identical with PS 101.4-8, but, unlike this passage from the PS, it is here in
the LSR not subsequently rejected. The PrM reads:
PrM on SK 76 (163.4-164.3)
na ca najanantarye iti nisedhah / . . . yatra pascat pravartamdne
ajdnantaryam5 iti kaiyatamate nisedhdpravrtteh6 /
"And (the BP) is not prohibited, on account of the NP, (from
applying in the derivation of prdrcchati from pra-rcchati. Here P.
6.1.91 and P. 1.1.51 bring it about that a-r is substituted by dr.
Subsequently P. 8.3.15 would cause substitution of visarga for R, were
it not for the fact that BP prevents this Prohibition (of the BPby
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the NP) does not take effect (here) since (we accept) Kaiyata's opinion
that (the NP applies) where there is an immediate sequence of a vowel
in what takes effect later."
The LSR comments (164.22-27):
pascat pravartamdne iti / antarahge ity art hah / atra ca satvatukoh iti
sutrastham tukgrahanam jnapakam j anyathd adhityetyddau
lyappravrttaye purvam samdse jdte, tatra samhitdyd nityatvdt
lyabutpattiparyantam apy asamhitayd avasthdndsambhavena ekddese,
lyapi, tugapeksayd padadvayasambandhivarnadvaydpeksaikddesasya
bahirangatayd asiddhatvena, tadvaiyarthyam spastam eva / tatra pascat
pravartamane tuki aco'nyanantaryanimittakaryatvan na dosah /
ajanantaryam iti / aco hydnantaryam ity arthah /
"The meaning of 'in what takes effect later' is 'in the antaranga
(operation).' Further, the word tuk in P. 6.1.86 indicates (the
existence of) this (Paribhasa); otherwise that (TuK, by which Panini
intends to show that in the formation of adhitya etc. the substitution
of i etc. for the I of adhi etc. and the radical I is asiddha in regard to
the addition, by P. 6.1.71, of the augment tuk to the root 0, would
evidently be useless. In (the formation of) adhitya etc. (from adhi-itvd
etc.,) in order that (the substitution by P. 7.1.37 of) lyap (for ktva)
take place, first the composition (of adhi with itvd) takes place. (Now)
as in a compound (the final sound of a preceding member) must
invariably be joined (with the initial sound of a following member,)
the final sound of adhi (and the following radical I) cannot remain
unjoined even until lyap takes the place of (of KTVA); the substitution
of one (vowel for the final of adhi and the following radical I) precedes
therefore (the substitution of) lyap. (Were the Bahiranga-paribhasa
here applicable), the substitution of the one (vowel /" for i-i,)
dependent as it is on two sounds of two words, would be bahirahga
and would consequently (already by the Bahiranga-paribhasa) be
considered asiddha in regard to the addition of the augment) tuk (to the
root /, and the special statement in P. 6.1.86 regarding the addition of the
augment tuk would be superfluous). No fault attaches to the (mention of
tuk in p. 6.1.86) because (the addition of) tuk, which (in adhitya etc.)
takes place after (the single substitute i etc. has replaced i-i etc.) is an
operation the cause of which is the immediate sequence of a vowel and
something else. The meaning of 'immediate sequence of a vowel' is
'immediate sequence of a vowel and something else'."
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The close similarity of this passage with PS 101.4-8 (which wediscussed
on p. 49, above) is obvious. Besides this, our passage agrees with the
account of the NP in the PS on the following three points:
(1) The Jnapaka of the NP is not the rule P. 6.1.86 (satvatukor asiddhah)
as a whole, but merely the occurrence of tuk therein.
(2) The word ajanantarye, which occurs in the Paribhasa, is interpreted as
aco'nyanantarye, "when there is an immediate sequence of a vowel and
something else".
(3) This immediate sequence of a vowel and something else must
characterize an antaranga operation that follows a bahirahga operation.
The first of these three points found expression in PS 101.4, which I
mentioned just now. The second and third points are explained in the
following passage.
PS 102.6-103.4
e*paribhasarthas tv acohyanantaryanimittakehtarahge* kartavye jatasya
bahirahgasya bahistvapraklptir na / bahispadena bahirahgam / tasya
bhavo9bahirahgatvam / tatprayuktasiddhatvasya na praklptih / na
praptir iti / asiddham bahirahgam ity uktva najanantarya iti vaksyamiti-
bhasyoktya tatratyasyantarahga ity asyanuvrttisucanat / /
"The meaning of the Paribhasa is this, that a bahirahga (operation)
which has taken effect is not regarded as bahirahga, when an
antaranga (operation) is to take effect which is caused by the
immediate sequence of a vowel and something else. The word bahih is
equivalent to bahirahga, and 'the state of that' (which is bahih, viz.
bahistva,) means bahirahgatva. ('Not regarded as bahirahga' means
'contrary to Par. L by which a bahirahga operation) should be
regarded as asiddha, not regarded (as asiddha\ The Paribhasa must
be explained thus) because the remark of the (author of the) Bhasya
'after having said asiddham bahirahgam antarahge I shall say
najanantarye\ shows that (the word) antarahge of the previous
(Paribhasa) is valid (also in this Paribhasa)." (K. p. 271.)
Although of these three points the first one is found, among others, is
Siradeva's Brhatparibhasavrtti (see PS 235.22-25), and the second and the
third in Bhattoji DIksita's Sabdakaustubha on P. 1.1.4 (120.23-25), 1 do
not know of any grammatical work which connects all these three points
with the NP, with the sole exception of the LSR. We may therefore take it
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as proven that Nagesa in his PS first presented the view of the LSR with
regard to the NP with no other aim, of course, than to reject it in order to
make place for something better.
It may quite generally be said that we can with advantage look upon the
discussion of the NP in the PS as consisting of a presentation of earlier and
later ideas of Nagesa regarding this Paribhasa, arranged in such a way that
the later views supersede the earlier ones. That those earlier ideas are not
only those found in the LSR, I shall show below.
The PrM on SK 54 contains a remark to the effect that the NP is not
universally valid (PrM 122.3). The LSR initially states that the the non-
universality of the NP is indicated by Panini's use oikenah in P. 7.4.13. In
this respect it follows the BSS, which gives the same argument at BSS
163.9-13. But then the LSR rejects its earlier statement, saying:
LSR 122.24-26
vastutah omdhos ca ity dhgrahandd anityatvam j taddhi siva a ihiti sthite
param api savarnadirgham hadhitva dhatupasargakdryatvendntarahgatvad
gune vrddhibddhandrtham / asyd uddharanan tu aksadyur iti / anyathd
antarahge yani u th asiddhaht sydt /
"In reality (we know) from the word ah in P. 6.1.95 that (the
Najanantarya-paribhasa is) not universally valid; for an is meant to
show that, when in the case of siva-d-ihi the Guna (vowel e) has been
substituted by P. 6.1.87 (for d-i), the (substitution by P. 6.1.88 of) the
Vrddhi (vowel ai for the a of siva and the e oiehi) is superseded (by the
substitution of the Guna vowel e for a-e. The substitution of) Guna
(for d'i) supersedes here, because it is an operation which concerns
the root (I) and its preposition (A), and because it is on that account
antarahga, the substitution of the homogeneous long vowel (A for the
a of siva and the preposition A), in spite of the latter being (taught in
the) subsequent (rule P. 6.1.101. Were however Par. LI applicable in
a case like this, then the substitution of A for the a of siva and the
preposition A would not by Par. L be superseded by the substitution
of e for the preposition A and the radical I; we should form first sivd-
ihi, and afterwards by P. 6.1.87 sivehi, which shows that the word ah
of P. 6.1.95 would in that case be altogether superfluous.) An
example of this (Najanantarya-paribhasa) is, however, aksadyuh.
Otherwise, (if the Najanantarya-paribhasa) did not exist, the
substitution of) u TH (for v in aksa-div-kvip-su by P. 6.4.19) would be
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asiddha (by the Bahiranga-paribhasa) with respect to (the substitution
of the) yan (vowel y for I by P. 6.1.77, which is) antarahga, (and
consequently the substitution of y for I would not take place.)"
From this passage, or rather from the end of it, we learn that the author
of the LSR considered aksadyuh a good example of the use of the NP. This
is not very surprising, for the Paribhasais mentioned in the Bhasya exactly
in order to account for the derivation of this form (Mbh. 1.310.4-9). All the
same, it explains the mention of aksadyufi in the PS, which puzzled us
earlier.
But the first part of this passage from the LSR is far more interesting, for
it cannot but be based on a mistake on the part of its author. The reason is
that it cannot be brought into agreement with the passage from the LSR
which we studied earlier. There we had read that the NP applies only there,
where an antarahga rule applies after the corresponding bahiranga rule has
taken effect (point 3 of the above-mentioned three points). At the stage
siva-a-ihi, on the other hand, the antarahga rule (P. 6.1.87, which wants to
substitute Guna e for a-i) and the bahiranga rule (P. 6.1.101, which strives
to put A in the place of a-a) apply simultaneously. There is therefore no
chance whatever for the NP to apply here.
This mistake in the LSR is therefore so interesting that Nagesa has
grasped the opportunity in his P$ of rectifying it. He uses exactly the same
sentence (taddhi . . . vrddhibadhanartham\ PS 103.8-10), but this time
gives a different introduction to it, as a result of which the presence of an in
P. 6.1.95 no longer indicates that the NP is not universally valid; now it has
come to illustrate the fact that NP applies only where the antarahga
operation follows the bahiranga operation. This introduction reads as
follows:
PS 103.5-8
jdtasya bahirahgasyety uktyayaje indram dhiyatltyddau bahirahga-
di rghagundder asiddhatvam siddham j . . . aTa evomdhos ca ity
dhgrahanamw caritdrtham / taddhi . . .
"As we have stated that (only) a bahiranga (operation) which has
taken effect (is not regarded as bahiranga, this Paribhasa does not
apply in the formation of ayaje indram, dhiyati etc. from ayaja-i-
indranudhi-a-ti etc. and) the bahiranga (substitution of) long(f for I-
I) and (of the) Guna (vowel e tor the I of dhi) etc. is therefore in the
case of ayaje indram, dhiyati etc. (in accordance with Par. L) justly
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regarded as asiddha It is for the same reason that the word an in
P. 6.1.95 serves a purpose; for an " (K. p. 272.)
What follows in the PS we know already, for it is a word-for-word
repetition of the LSR.
It serves no purpose to try to show that every sentence of the PS that
defends Par. LI has its counterpart in the LSR. It may or it may not. It has
already become sufficiently clear that by and large the discussion of Par. LI
in the PS consists of two parts. One part defends that Paribhasa and is a
restatement of what we find in the LSR; the second rejects the NP and
contains Nagesa's considered opinion at the time of writing the PS.
However, one question remains, which we shall discuss now.
As we know, the defence of Par. LI considers the word tuk in P. 6.1.86
the Jnapaka of this Paribhasa. After establishing this much, it turns its
attention to another word in that same rule, viz. satva, and dedicates a
whole passage to showing that this word satva does not indicate the NP.
Why this waste of words to expel an idea from another idea which itself is
going to be rejected? Against whom is this attack directed? The passage
reads:
PS 101.10-102.6
yat tu satvagrahanam api jndpakam anyathd ko'sicad ityadau
padadvayasambandhivarnadvaydpeksatvena bahirahgasyaikddesasydsi-
ddhatvena satvdpravrttau kim teneti tan na / inah purvapada-
sambandhitvena satvasydpi padadvayasambandhivarnadvayd-
peksatvenobhayoht samatvdt / ekddesasya parddivattvenausicadu ity
asya padatvena1 paddditvdbhdvdn na sat padddyoh ity anena
nisedhah13 / traipadikehtarahgekdryakdlapakse'pi bahirahgaparibhdsdyd
apravrtteh purvam upapdditatvac ca / /
"But it is wrong to maintain that (not merely tuk, but) also the word
satva (in P. 6.1.86) indicates (the existence of this Paribhasa), and to
support this statement by saying that that (word satva) would be
useless if the present Paribhasa did not exist, because in ko'sicat etc.
the substitution (by P, 6.1.109) of the one (vowel o for o-a), being
bahiranga on account of its dependence on two sounds of two words,
would (already by Par. L) be asiddha (in regard to the substitution, by
P. 8.3.59, of s for the s of skat), and because (that substitution of s
would consequently) even without the special statement in P. 6.1.86
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not take place. (This is wrong) because the (substitution of) s depends
likewise on two sounds of two words, (the vowel o which is contained
in the Pratyahara) in (of P. 8.3.59) forming part of the preceding word
(ko), and because both (the substitution of o and that of s) are
therefore alike (in this respect. Nor can one say that saTva in P. 6.1.86
is altogether superfluous, viz. because sicat is a Pada and because the
substitution of s for the initial s is therefore prevented by P. 8.3. Ill;
for) as the one substitute (o for o-a) is (by P. 6.1.85) regarded as the
initial of the subsequent word, the (combination of sounds) osicat is a
Pada, and (the sound s) not being therefore the initial sound of a
Pada, (the substitution of s for it) is not prevented by P. 8.3.111. (The
above statement according to which satva in P. 6.1.86 likewise
indicates the existence of this Paribhasa, is) moreover (untenable),
because, as was shown above, even on the Karyakalapaksa, Par. L
does not concern an antarahga (operation) taught in the three last
chapters of Panini's grammar, (and because consequently it can have
no concern with the substitution of s which is taught in P. 8.3.59, even
should the latter be really antaranga.)" (Cf. K. pp. 269-70.)
This passage, so it seems, is directed against an opinion Nagesa had held
even earlier, when he wrote the BSS. In that bobk we find the opinion
offered that satva in P. 6.1.86 is the Jnapaka of the NP, and the opinion that
tuk in that same rule plays that role rejected.
I shall not here reproduce and translate the passage concerned. The
interested reader will find it at B$S 192.3-19, and it is reproduced in
Appendix IV.14 Here it suffices to note that the PS on Par. LI contains
many, if not all, of the opinions that Nagesa held, or had held, regarding
that Paribhasa. They are arranged in this way: at the end come Nagesa's
latest ideas. These latest ideas imply a rejection of earlier ideas - a slightly
improved version of what we find in the LSR. These ideas of the LSR are
fully explained and contain a rejection of a still earlier stratum of thought,
which we can identify as belonging to the BSS.
This analysis of the PS on Par. LI, I submit, takes away the force of the
challenge posed by the mention of aksadyuh as being in conflict with the
BP, where in reality it is not. The force is taken away, since this mention of
aksadyuh is part of a restatement of a position abandoned long ago. In
fact, the formation of aksadyuh is not in conflict with the BP, at any rate
not with the BP as understood and explained in the P§. A final remark
regarding the sentence introducing Par. LI can be found in the last
paragraph of Chapter 14, below.
14. FURTHER PASSAGES FROM THE PS
We have reached a stage where no more need be said about the BP and the
NP, or rather, about their discussion in the PS. We know what
interpretation Nagesa, in all likelihood, gave to the first of them, and also
how the passages that at first sight seem to conflict with that interpretation
are to be understood. None of those passages, on closer inspection, turned
out to be a threat to what we think are Nagesa1 s ideas regarding the BP.
Most of the passages considered so far occurred in that part of the PS
that was directly devoted to the Paribhasas L and LI. But other references to
the BP remain. They are scattered through the PS. They will be studied in
the present chapter in order to find out whether or not they fit Nagesa's
interpretation of that Paribhasa. As might have been expected, we shall find
that they do.
It goes without saying that only those passages in which Nagesa himself
makes explicit use of the BP have to be studied. Where Nagesa cites the
view of someone else in order to reject that view, there is no reason for us to
come into action when that rejected view includes some ideas as to what is
bahiranga and what antarahga. The passages that remain are eight in
number. It is remarkable that six of them give instances of the application
of BP22, the aspect of the BP that had almost died an untimely death at the
hands of Kielhorn. We shall begin with these.
Par. XV teaches that "when a word besides its primary meaning
possesses a secondary meaning, an operation which may be taught in
grammar concerning this word, takes effect only when the latter conveys its
primary, but not when it conveys its secondary meaning." (K. p. 86.) An
alarming consequence of a strict application of this Paribhasa would be that
no case-endings could be added to a word that is to be used in a secondary
meaning. For here, so one might say, an operation taught in grammar, viz.
the addition of case endings, would have to take effect while the crude form
of the word conveys its secondary meaning.
The solution to this problem is easy. Par. XV, we are told, has nothing to
do with an operation which concerns the crude form of a word. Why not?
This is explained as follows:
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PS 31.14 16
parmisthitasya padantarasambandhe hi gaur vahika ityadau
gaunatvapratltir na tu prdtipadikasamskaraveldydm ity antarangatvaj
jatasamskarabddhayogah pratipadikakdrye pravrttyabhdve bljam.
"The reason why (this Paribhasa) has nothing to do with an operation
that concerns a crude form, is namely this that (a word) conveys a
secondary meaning (only) when, after its formation has been
completed, it is combined with another word, as e.g. (go *ox') ingaur
vdhikah 'the Vahika is an ox, an unintelligent person', but not at the
time when its crude form is liable to undergo grammatical operations,
and that therefore the changes which, because they (are antarahga,
i.e.) apply first, have taken place already (when this Paribhasa is
applicable), cannot be prevented (by the latter)." (Cf. K. p. 88.)
The formation of gauh out of go-s(u) depends upon the meanings "ox"
and "agent". Not till the formation of gauh is completed does the meaning
"unintelligent person" come into the picture. Any operation that has
anything to do with the secondary meaning "unintelligent person" is
therefore bahirahga by BP22, because that meaning arises later. The
operations that participate in the formation of gauh, on the other hand, are
antaranga, because they make use of meanings that arose earlier. There can
be no doubt that this passage provides an instance of BP22.
Another such instance is provided by a passage which, in the PS, almost
immediately follows the passage just discussed. It reads:
PS 31.21-23
agnisomau manavakdv ity atra prasiddhadevatddvandvavdcyagnisoma-
padasya tatsadrsaparatve 'ntarangatvad Jttvasatve bhavata
eva I sadrsalaksanikagnisomapadayor dvandve tannamakav ityarthake ca
na
1
 satvam adye gaunaldksanikatvdd antye'prasiddhatvat2
"When the word agni soma which denotes the two gods who really are
(Agni and Soma) is in agnisomau mdnavakau 'two men Agni and
Soma' applied to (two men) who resemble Agni and Soma, 7 and s
(that have been substituted for the / of agni, and the s of soma by P.
6.3.27 and P. 8.3.82,) remain because they (are antaranga,i.e>) have
been substituted before (agnisoma received a secondary meaning.
But) in the formation of a Dvandva compound of the two words agni
and soma employed metaphorically to denote (two men) who
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resemble (Agni and Soma), and (in the formation of a Dvandva
compound) in the sense of 4a man named Agni and a man named
Soma', s is not substituted (for the s of soma), because in the former
case (the words agni and soma) are metaphorically applied to two
men on account of their having certain qualities in common (with the
gods Agni and Soma), and because in the latter case the two men are
not really Agni and Soma (but are only named thus)." (K. p. 90-1.)
So as long as the words agni and soma are used in their primary sense and
denote the gods Agni and Soma, they will cause no tribulation and unite
into agnisomau. Once this has taken place, the word agnisomau may be
used in a secondary sense to refer to something that resembles Agni-and-
Soma. But clearly this new meaning, "what resembles Agni-and-Soma",
does not come into being until the primary meaning "Agni-and-Soma" has
done its job. Since the primary meaning appears before the secondary
meaning, the operations depending on the former take place first, on
account of the rule "first come, first served", which is our paraphrase of
BP22 (see p. 24, above).
The next two passages are found in the PS on Par. LIII. This Paribhasa
states that "the substitution of one vowel for the final of the first and the
initial of the second member of a compound does, even when it is
antarariga, not take place before an operation which concerns the first or
the second member of the compound" (cf. K. p. 294). The Paribhasa has a
long introduction, where examples are given in which, without it,
something would go wrong. Our first passage opens this introduction.
PS 110.1-2
nanv evam saumendre'ntarahgatvdd3 ad gune4 purvapaddt
parendrasabdabhavena nendrasya parasya iti vrddhinisedho vyarthah.
"Now one might say that (if) then (Par. L were valid in all except the
particular cases stated above), the Guna (vowel e) ought in (the
formation of) saumendra (from soma-indra-a(n)) to be substituted (for
the a of soma and the I of indra), because (its substitution) is
antaranga (when compared with the substitution by P. 7.3.21 of
Vrddhi for the first vowels of soma and indra\ and that after the
substitution of Guna) the prohibition of (the substitution of) Vrddhi
(for the I of indra) which is contained in the rule P. 7.3.22 would serve
no purpose, because the first member (of the compound) would (after
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the substitution of Guna) no longer be followed by the word indra."
(K. pp. 289-90.)
What interests us in this passage is that, in the derivation of saumendra
from soma-indra-a(n), the substitution of e for a-i by P. 6.1.87 is antarahga,
and the substitution of Vrddhi for o, as well as the substitution of Vrddhi
for I, both by P. 7.3.21, bahirahga.
This is exactly what we expected. As a matter of fact, this state of affairs
can be accounted for in two ways, with BP22 and with BP2i. First BP22.
There is no uncertainty regarding the order in which the meanings that
play a role in saumendra make their appearance. After "Soma" and
"Indra", first comes "and" (cdrtha; see P. 2.2.29), as a result of which soma
and indra form a Dvandva compound - to be exact, a Devatadvandva.
After that, the meaning "this is of that" (tasyedam; see P. 4.3.120) finds
expression in the affix a(n). The substitution of e for a-i in soma-indra is
dependent only on meanings that appear earlier - "Soma", "Indra" and
"and" - and is therefore antarahga, in the sense this word has in BP22.
It is also possible to leave meanings out and decide what is antarahga on
purely formal grounds. In soma-indra-a(n) the substitution of e for a-i has
as following cause I. The other operation, substitution of Vrddhi for I, by P.
7.3.21 has as following cause a(n). We come to the same conclusion as
before, this time by BP21, that the substitution of e for a-i is antarahga.
The case of purvaisukdmasama "born in eastern IsukamasamT" is in all
details parallel to the above. It is mentioned not long after, or rather in the
midst of, the discussion of saumendra. The passage concerned will not be
reproduced here; it occurs at PS 111.2-3. What is of importance here is that
in purva-isukdmasaml-a(n) two rules apply. P. 6.1.87 prescribes
substitution of e for a-i. P. 7.3.14 prescribes substitution of Vrddhi for I.
The former operation depends on meanings that arise earlier; it also has the
following cause I. The second operation depends on the meaning of the
affix, which arises later; it further has as following cause a(n). As in the case
of saumendra, here also both BP22 and BP21 lead to the desired end.
The next passage introduces Par. LXXV.
PS 156.9-10
nanu vydghri kacchapityddau subantena samdsdt tato'py antarahgatvdt
tdpy addntatvdbhdvdj jdtilaksano his na sydd...
"One might say that in the case of vydghri, kacchapi etc. (the
feminine affix) his ought to have been added by P. 4.1.63, because (vi-
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A and kaccha) are compounded (with ghra and pa) after the addition
(to the latter) of a case-termination; (previously namely to this
addition of a case-termination the feminine affix tap must be added
to ghra and pa because its addition) is antarahga even in regard to that
of the former, and when tap has thus been added, we have (no longer
a base) ending in short a (to which P. 4.1.63 could be applicable)." (K.
p. 380.)
Kielhorn explains in a footnote why case terminations must be added to
ghra and pa before compounding. He says (K. p. 380, fn. 2): "The
supposition being that supa of P. 2.1.4 is valid in P. 2.2.19 and in the rule
gatih which we obtain when we take gatih in P. 2.2.18 as a separate rule. It
will be shown in the sequel that in reality supa is not valid."
So the supposition that vi-a and kaccha are compounded with ghra and
pa after the addition to the latter of a case termination is rejected in the
sequel. But here, in this passage, it is held to be valid. And on this
assumption the passage tells us nothing new. It repeats that a feminine affix
is added before a case termination. The reason is, as we know, that the
meaning "a particular gender" arises before the meaning "a particular
karaka". Nagesa himself had stated this clearly earlier in the PS (sec p. 22,
above), and further explanation is not necessary. This is therefore an
instance of the application of BP22.
But the above passage contains another case of Antarahgatva. By saying
that the addition of tap is antarahga even (api) in regard to the addition of a
case termination, it tells us that the former is even more antarahga in regard
to the compound formation: to be exact, the ascription of the name
samasa, by P. 2.2.19 or by the newly created rule gatih. This again is in
perfect agreement with the BP as we have come to know it. First all those
meanings that come to be expressed in an individual word make their
appearance, and only afterwards can other meanings be joined to those. In
our case that means that first the components of the compound are fully
formed and afterwards they are joined together into the compound. Here
also use is made of BP22.
The following passage offers some difficulties of interpretation at first
sight, but a closer inspection reveals that it is an instance of the use of BP22.
The passage introduces Par. LXII.
PS 145.5-6
nanu dadhatityadav antarahgatvdd antadese'lvidhausthanivattvabhavad
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adadeso na syad . . .
"Now one might say that, if, e.g., in the (formation of the) 3. plur.
pres. ind. par. of dha, ant were, because (its substitution) is antarahga,
substituted (by P. 7.1.3 for they'H oidha-jhi), then the substitution of
aT (which is taught in P. 7.1.4) would be impossible, for (the substitute
ant for jh) would not be equivalent to the original (/H), because (the
original jh) with reference to which P. 7.1.4 teaches (the substitution
of at), is a single sound " (Cf. K. p. 340.)
What this passage tells us is that the substitution of ant for jh of/Hi by P.
7.1.3 (jhohtah) isantarahga. The question is: antarahga with respect to
what? What is the corresponding bahirahga operation? One might think
that the reduplication of the root dhd owing to P. 6.1.10 (s7au) is the
bahirahga operation, for both the substitution of ant for jh and
reduplication apply at one and the same stage of the derivation, viz. at the
stage dha-(slu)-jhi. Unfortunately, this suggestion cannot stand criticism,
since neither of the two operations has a cause. And what is more,
reduplication is not so much as mentioned in our passage. We can only
conclude that the corresponding bahirahga operation is the substitution of
at for jh by P. 7.1.4.
But questions remain. Are we to look upon these two operations -
substitution of ant or at for jh - as applying simultaneously at the stage da-
dha-jhP. If this were the case, the fight for priority between the two rules P.
7.1.3 and 4 would be an unequal one indeed. For even if the former rule is
antarahga with respect to the latter, the latter is an Apavada of the former.
And "an Apavada possesses greater force even than an antarahga rule" (K.
p. 320). So why should our passage bother to specify that the substitution
of ant fory'H is antarahga, and even suggest that, but for the intervention of
Par. LXII, this substitution of ant would take place before, and in spite of,
the substitution of aft
A solution comes within reach when we realize that the expressive
elements of dadhati arise in a certain order. At the stage dha-l(at), first l(at)
is replaced byy'Hi, and only after that the Vikarana (s)a(p) is added, sap inits
turn is elided by P. 2.4.75 (juhotyadibhyah s'LuH), after which reduplication
takes place by P. 6.1.10 (slau). Such being the case, we can apply BP22,
which says that operations take place in the order in which the elements on
which they depend come into existence. In the derivation of dadhati this
means that the substitution of ant for jh in dha-jhi takes place as soon asy'Hi
has made its appearance, for this substitution requires nothing but/Hi. The
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substitution of at for jh, on the other hand, does not depend only on jhi. It
requires that jhi follow a reduplicated root (abhyasta). But reduplication
does not take place until sap has been elided by P. 2.4.75, and sap itself does
not come into being until kfter jhi has made its appearance. We can
therefore safely say that the substitution of ant for jh is antarahga,and the
substitution of at for jh bahirahga.5
Let us tarry a while and see how Nagesa solves the problem raised in the
above passage. As a remedy he cites Par. LXII:
PURVAMHYAPAVADAABHINIVISANTEPASCAD UTSARGAH
"Apavddas, it is certain, are considered first (in order to find out
where they apply); afterwards the general rules (are made to take
effect in all cases to which it has thus been ascertained that the
Apavddas do not apply)." (K. p. 340.)
In practical terms this seems to mean that, in the derivation of dadhati,
once jhi has come into being, this jhi remains unchanged while other
operations take place, such as the insertion and elision of sap, and the
reduplication of the root. In other words, substitution of ant is not even
thought of until the stage has been reached where the substitution of at can
be considered, or rather, has been considered; and then it is too late for ant.
An instance of BPi in action, or rather, in inaction, is found in the
following passage, which comes in the trail of Par. LXVI. The meaning of
that Paribhasa is that "so far as changes of a reduplicative syllable are
concerned, rules which teach those changes do not supersede one another"
(K. p. 349). This meaning is further specified, and exemplified, in our
passage.
PS 149.4-150.1
iyambparantarahgddibddhakdndm apy abadhakatvabodhika / tendci karat
mlmdmsata ityddi siddham / . . . antye mdnbadha iti dirghendn-
tarahgatvdd ittvasya bddhah prdptah / /
"This (Paribhasa) teaches that subsequent, antarahga, and other
(rules) which (according to preceding Paribhasas) would supersede
(other rules), do likewise not possess that superseding power (when
both concern changes of a reduplicative syllable); the result thereof is
(the correct formation of forms like) acikarat, mimdmsate etc.; . . . in
the latter (i.e., in mimdmsate) the substitution of short 7 (taught in P.
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7.4.79) would be superseded by the substitution taught in P. 3.1.6 of a
long vowel (for the vowel of the reduplicative syllable), because (this
latter rule is) antarahga (in regard to the former)." (K.pp. 349-350.)
In the derivation of mimamsate the following stage is reached: ma-man-
sa-te. Here two rules apply. P. 3.1.6 (manbadhadansanbhyo dirghas
cabhyasasya) prescribes the affix sa(n) after man and lengthening of the
vowel of the reduplicative syllable, i.e., substitution of A for a of ma. This
operation has no following cause. P. 7.4.79 {sany atah), on the other hand,
prescribes substitution of I for a of ma. The following cause is sa. Clearly,
the former operation if antarahga (a\), and the latter bahirahga (Bi).
We conclude with a problematic case. It is the introduction to Par. CXII.
PS 190. 11-13
nanu syandudhatoh sy antsy atityadau1 atmanepadanimittatvabhavani-
mittatvan na vrdbhyas caturbhyah iti nisedhasya bahirahgatvenan-
tarahgatvad udillaksanasyedvikalpasyapatti [H] . . .
"(P. 7.2.44 enjoins the optional addition of the augment it to
ardhadhatuka affixes commencing with one of the sounds contained
in the Pratyahara va/, after roots characterized by an indicatory u;
and P. 7.2.59 prohibits the addition of it to ardhadhatuka affixes
commening with s, after the roots syandii etc., in the absense of the
Atmanepada terminations. Such being the case,) one might say that,
e.g., in (the formation of) the simple fu. par. of the root syandu,
(characterized by the Anubandha u), it ought (by the former rule) to
be optionally prefixed (to the affix sya), because (the rule P. 7.2.44
which enjoins its optional addition) is antarahga in regard to P. 7.2.59
which prohibits it, the latter rule being bahirahga because (the taking
effect of it) depends on the absence of any reasons for the
Atmanepada terminations." (Cf. K. 503-4.)
In syand(ii)sya-ti two rules apply. P. 7.2.44 (svaratisutisuyatidhimudito
va) prescribes the optional addition of i(t) to sya\ this operation has no
following cause. P. 7.2.59 (na vrdbhyas caturbhyah) prohibits the addition
of i(t) to sya. The prohibition is, in the above passage, said to be bahirahga,
the prescription antarahga. The prescription of it has, as we saw, no
following cause; we may therefore expect that the prohibition of it does
have a following cause. Such a following cause can indeed easily be found.
P. 7.2.59 is preceded by P. 7.2.58, which contains the word
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parasmaipadesu. This word is, by anuyrtti, to be understood in our rule 59
which prohibits the addition of it in syand-sya-ti. This means that the
following cause of the prohibition is ti. Since, moreover, the prescription of
IT has no following cause, that prescription is antarahga, and the
prohibition bahiranga. To be precise, they are a\ and b\, respectively.
So we find ourselves in agreement with the above passage in believing
that the optional prescription of it by P. 7.2.44 is antarahga, and the
prohibition of it by P. 7.2.59 bahiranga. But this is where the harmony ends.
For the reason which our passage gives to show that the prohibition is
bahiranga is of a kind unheard of in the PS. This reason is that the
prohibition "depends on the absence of any reasons for the Atmanepada
terminations". It goes without saying that an "absence of reasons" cannot
be a formal cause. Formal causes are required for BPi and BP21. Nor can
"absence of reasons" be considered the meaning of some expressive
element. But such a meaning is needed as cause in BP22. How then are we to
understand this reason given by Nagesa?
It is not difficult to find the origin of Nagesa's peculiar mode of
expression. P. 7.2.59 is explained in the following manner in the
Siddhanta-Kaumudi'.
SK on rule 2348, p. 203
na vrdbhyas caturbhyah [P. 7.2.59] / ebhyah sakarader ardhadhatukasyen
na sydt tandnayor abhdve
"P. 7.2.59 (means:) After these (four roots vrt etc.) let there not be IT
(added) to an Ardhadhatuka affix beginning with s, when there is
absence of (an affix contained in the Pratyahara) tahor of (the affix)
ana."
The affixes contained in tan, and ana, together constitute what is known
as "Atmanepada", by P. 1.4.100. So it seems that Nagesa, while writing the
passage under consideration, was influenced by the above explanation in
the Siddhdnta-KaumudT.
This explanation in the Siddhdnta-Kaumudi does not do much harm
where it stands. In fact, Nagesa points out in his BSS that the word
parasmaipadesu, which is understood in P. 7.2.59 by anuvrtti, implies
(upalaksaka) that there is absence of tan and ana (BSS 1704. 15-16). But
this does not yet mean that such an absence is the cause of the prohibition
of it, certainly not a cause of the sort required by the BP. It must be concluded
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that Nagesa, whether by mistake or deliberately, used an argument that,
properly speaking, did not belong to him, but to Bhattoji DIksita. What is
more, this argument violated all that Nagesa had said about the BP in the
PS.
This conclusion finds confirmation in a passage of the LSS. This work,
as we know, was written after the PS and represents, so it seems, the same
views as that book (see Appendix IV). Here it comments on the following
line of the Siddhanta-Kaumudi:
SK on rule 2348, p. 203
vrdbhyah syasanoh iti parasmaipade krte udillaksanam antarangam api
vikalpam bddhitvd caturgrahanasdmarthydt na vrdbhyah iti nisedhah /
"When (in the derivation of syantsyati) a Parasmaipada (affix) has
been substituted (for I) by P. 1.3.92, the prohibition (of it) taught in P.
7.2.59 (takes effect) on the strength of the presence of catur 'four' (in
P. 7.2.59, thus) preventing the optional employment (of it prescribed
by P. 7.2.44) on account of (the fact that the root syandu) has u as
Anubandha, even though (that optional employment of it) is
antaranga."
Nagesa comments:
LSS (VaranasI ed. II, p. 526)
antarangam apiti / sakdrddivisesdpeksatvdd dtmanepadanimit-
tatvdbhdvanimittatvdc ca nisedhasya bahirahgatvam ity
abhimdnah /
"On 'even though(that optional employment of it) is antarahga\ It is
the mistaken opinion (of Bhattoji DIksita) that the prohibition (of it
by P. 7.2.59) is bahiranga for (the two reasons that it) depends on
something special, (viz. that the following Ardhadhatuka affix must)
begin with s, and (that it) depends on the absence of any reasons for
the Atmanepada terminations."
We could not possibly have expected more of Nagesa. Here he clearly
disavows the opinion which seemed to be his in the PS.
What does this mean? Did Nagesa change his views on the BP in the time
that elapsed between the PS and LSS? There is no reason to assume this.
We have found that the passage of the PS under discussion is in conflict
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with the rest of that book. It can indeed only mean, as we observed earlier,
that Nagesa, by mistake or purposely, gave expression to an opinion that
was not his own.
We may draw a moral from this discovery. If Par. CXII is introduced in a
way that does not reflect Nagesa's own views, it becomes far less
improbable that Par. LI is introduced in the same way. Of course, we had
already come to this conclusion regarding Par. LI, but at that time we may
have appeared to be defending a very exceptional point of view. We see
now that the case of Par. LI has a corroborative parallel in that of Par.
CXII.

PART IV
WHAT WENT WRONG?

15. VAIDYANATHA PAYAGUNDA ON PAR. L
In the beginning of his comments on the PS on Par. L Vaidyanatha gives a
survey of the meanings of Antararigatva. It reads as follows:
Gada 84.24-26; 85.6-18
tattvam ca purvasthitatvdt1 paranimittdbhdvdd alpatvdt purvo-
pasthitatvdd va / atra trtlyam ghatakatvena samkhyayd va / antyam
api prakriyakramena prayogiyoccaranakramena va / adyam apy evam
dvidhd / ... tatra sarvdntyapaksena2 tattvam yugapatpravrttau
piirvapravrttiniydmakam eva na tu purastdj3 jatasya bahirangasya
tddrse'ntararige karye'siddhataniyamakam / tavatestasiddhav api lokatas
tathaiva labhdt / TaTRa krte punar bahirahgapraptau bhavaty eva
tat I anyathd tu na tat / ddyapaksena tu tattvam tatraiva-
siddhatdniydmakam / dngrahandt tathaiva labhdt / aTa eva
tadanantaram bahirangam naiva j evam cedam ubhayam yugapat-
prdptivisayakam / dvividhasarvddyapaksena tattvam tu kvacit
purvapravrttiniydmakam kvacid asiddhatdniydmakam / ata evedam
jdtayaugapadyasvamdtraprdptikatvarupatritayavisayakam / ata eva
tadanantaram kvacit tatpravrttih kvacin na / etalldbhas tu lokato
jndpakdc ca yathdyatham bodhyah / laksydnurodhena sarvesdm
vyavastheti na dosah kvdpi / etadanyapaksadvaye tu tattvam
asiddhatdniydmakam jdtasyaiveti punar bahirangasya prasanga
eva na / uthgrahandt tathaiva labhdt / evam cedam dvayam yugapat-
prdptivisayakam na / tatrddyah paksah patvyetyddau kramendn-
vdkhydne / . . . dvitiyah pacdvedam ityddau / triiyddyah syona
ityddau / taddvitiyo visvauha ityddau j turiyddyah khatvodha
ityddau / tadantyo vibhajydnvdkhydne patvyetyddau prddudruvad
ityddau ceti bodhyam /
"(Causes of rules or operations, which, on this account, are
antaranga, are) that (viz. antarbhuta4) (1) because they stand earlier
(than the causes of the corresponding bahiranga rules or operations),
(2) because there are no following causes, (3) because they are fewer
(than the causes of the bahiranga rules or operations,) or (4) because
they present themselves earlier (to our understanding than the causes
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of the bahiranga rules or operations). Here the third (reason why
causes of rules or operations can be considered antarbhuta, viz.
because they are fewer, means (3a) that these causes are fewer)
because they are included (in the causes of the bahiranga rules or
operations,) or (3b) (that they are fewer simply) in number. Also the
last (reason"given above can be divided into two, according as (4a) the
causes present themselves earlier to our understanding) following the
order of the derivation, or (4b) following the order of the
pronunciation (of the utterance) as it is used in language. Also the
first (reason) is twofold in the same way (as the fourth reason, which
yields : (la) the causes stand earlier following the order of the
derivation, and (1 b) the causes stand earlier following the order of the
pronunciation of the utterance as it is used in language)
The fact of being antaranga5 in accordance with the view
(presented) last of all in the (list of reasons for being antarbhuta given
above, i.e., in accordance with (4b)) only determines that, when (two
operations) apply simultaneously, (the antaranga operation) shall
take effect first, but it does not determine that a bahiranga (operation)
which has taken effect earlier is asiddha in regard to such an
antaranga operation. That such is the case is learned from (the maxim
from) ordinary life (on the basis of which this aspect of the Paribhasa
is established; this) in spite of the fact that by (accepting) that
(rejected possibility) desired (results) would be obtained. In case the
bahiranga (operation) applies again after the {antaranga operation)
has taken effect, that {bahiranga operation) does take place. But (if it
had been) otherwise, (i.e., if the fact of being antaranga in accordance
with (4b) had determined that a bahiranga operation is asiddha, then)
that {bahiranga operation would) not (take place). The fact of being
antaranga (of an operation) in accordance with the first view
(contained in the fourth reason, i.e., in accordance with (4a)),
however, determines, in that same (situation - where the bahiranga
operation applies again after the antaranga operation has taken effect
-) that (the bahiranga operation) is asiddha, nonexistent. That such is
the case, is learned from the word AN(in P. 6.1.95, which indicates this
aspect of the Bahirariga-paribhasa). For this reason the bahiranga
(operation does) not (take place) after the {antaranga operation has
taken effect). And so both these (views, (4a) and (4b),) have as object
simultaneous application (of an antaranga and a bahiranga
operation). On the other hand, the fact of being antaranga in
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accordance with the first view, which (itself) consists of two parts
((la) and(lb)),determines in some cases (which operation) shall take
effect first; in other cases it determines that (the bahiranga operation)
is asiddha. For this very reason, this first (view) concerns itself with
the (following) three (possibilities: (i) an antaranga operation applies
after a bahiranga operation) has taken effect, ((ii) an antaranga
operation and a bahiranga operation) apply simultaneously, (iii) only
(the operation) itself (which is under consideration) applies. For this
reason the {bahiranga operation) in some cases takes effect after the
{antaranga operation has taken effect,) in other cases it does not. It
must, however, be understood that this is learned from (the maxim
from) ordinary life and from the Jnapaka (of this Paribhasa - which
consists in the word uth in P. 6.4.132 - ) , respectively. No fault results
anywhere, because all (cases) are settled in such a way that they suit
the actual forms (of the language which have to be formed or to be
accounted for by Panini's rules). In the two views different from these,
(i.e., in (2) and (3),) on the other hand, being antaranga determines
that only (a bahiranga operation) which has taken effect is asiddha.
Consequently, there is no occasion whatever for a bahiranga
(operation to apply) again. That such is the case, is learned from the
word uth (in P. 6.4.132, which indicates these aspects of the
Bahiranga-paribhasa). And such being the case, these two (views) do
not concern themselves with simultaneous application (of both an
antaranga and a bahiranga operation).
Among these (four views) the first one (i.e., (1), is illustrated) in (the
formation of) patvya etc., (on the alternative that) in accounting for
the formation of a word (one makes each expressive portion of it
arise) one after the other. The second (view, i.e., (2), is illustrated) in
(the formation of) pacavedam etc. The first (part) of the third (view,
i.e., (3a), is illustrated) in (the formation of) syona etc. The second
(part) of that (third view, i.e., (3b), is illustrated) in (the formation of)
visvauhah etc. The first (part) of the fourth (view, i.e., (4a), is
illustrated) in (the formation of) khatvodhah etc. The last (part) of
that (fourth view, i.e., (4b), is illustrated) in (the formation of)patvya
etc. on (the alternative that) the word is dissolved (into its constituent
parts) and (its formation out of those parts) accounted for (by the
rules of grammar), and in (the formation of) pradudruvat etc. This
(the reader) should know."
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Vaidyanatha's style is far from easy. The following schematization of the
most important points may be helpful.
antarbhutatvam
1. purvasthitatvdt
a. prakriyakramena b. prayogiyoccaranakramena
characteristics:
(i) kvacit purvapravrttiniydmakam kvacit asiddhatdniydmakam
(ii) jatayaugapadyasvamatraprdptikatvarupatritayavisayakam
examples:
patvyd (kramendnvdkhydne)
2. paranimittdbhdvdt
charateristics:
asiddhatdniydmakam jdtasyaiva
examples:
pacdvedam
3. alpatvdt
a. ghatakatvena b. samkyayd
characteristics:
asiddhatdniydmakam jd tasyaiva
examples:
a. syonah b. vis'vauhah
4. purvopasthitatvdt
a. prakriyakramena b. prayogiyoccaranakramena
characteristics:
a. yugapatprdptau asiddhatdniydmakam b. yugapatpravrttau purvapravrttiniydmakam
examples: ?vo ubhayam yugapatprdptivisayakam
a. khatvodhah b. (i) patvyd (vibhajydnvdkhydne)
(ii) prddudruvat
Our passage contains some information about the way the several
aspects of the Paribhasaare established. More information of this kind is
contained in another passage (fiada 102.25 ff.), which we are not going to
study here. The above scheme provides sufficient material for criticism.
To begin with: Where does Vaidyanatha get this fourfold (or should we
say, sevenfold) division of Antarbhutatva, and consequently of
Antarangatval Certainly not from the PS, which makes a completely
different division, as we know.
One might think that Vaidyanatha here presents another arrangement of
the material that is found in the P$. But even this is untenable. Vaidyanatha's
scheme contains at least one element that has been explicitly rejected in the
P$. This is (3b), according to which an operation which has fewer causes is
antarahga in regard to one that has more causes. This is in direct
contradiction with P$ 80.6-8 (App. I 11. 26-28).
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Further, Vaidyanatha's point (1), where he uses^the termpiirvasthitatva,
seems to be an invention of his own. The PS only uses the word
purvopasthita6 in connection with the BP, which is Vaidyanatha's point (4).
It seems hard to doubt that Vaidyanatha's interpretation of the BP,
whatever its merits and demerits, is not the one meant in the PS. But in
view of what we now know about the text of the PS, it is equally hard to
blame Vaidyanatha for this. Let us recall the most important factors which
contributed to the unintelligibility of the text as Vaidyanatha knew it:
(1) The section beginning with ata evomdnos ca ity angrahanam
caritdrtham (P$ 87.13 ff.; App. I 11. 146 et seq.) was in the wrong place (see
Chapter 7 above). The words ata eva can be made to yield sense in this place
only if the twofold division of the BP (in BPi and BP2) is sacrificed. This
means that the words antar madhye in the beginning of the text (PS 76.9;
App. 11.3) must be interpreted freely in order to accommodate the whole of
the interpretation of the BP. This is exactly what Vaidyanatha has done in
the passage studied above. Once the literal interpretation of antar madhye
is thought to be insufficient, there is no limit to what meanings can be
ascribed to these words. In point of fact, the above passage from
Vaidyanatha's Gadd illustrates to what extremes this belief can lead.
(2) The repeated use of BP2 in a section which was erroneously thought to
precede the introduction of BP2 (above, pp. 67 ff.) could not but
strengthen Vaidyanatha in his impression that the full interpretation of the
BP was meant to be conveyed by the initial sentences of the PS on Par. L.
(3) The incorrect form of P$ 92.4-13 (cf. App. 1 11. 88-89, and see
Chapter 8, above) may not have influenced Vaidyanatha much. In spite of
that, the passage further contributed to the general confusion of the PS on
Par. L. No wonder Vaidyanatha attempted to impose order from without,
with the help of the total interpretation which we have come to know in the
above passage.
(4) But the perhaps most important single factor which almost forced
Vaidyanatha to give his own interpretation of the BP, is the sentence
introducing Par. LI. Here the derivation oiaksadyuh is depicted as being in
disagreement with the BP. Indeed, this fact posed the most serious threat to
our interpretation of the BP. Fortunately, we were able to dispel this threat
by showing that the first part of the P§ on Par. LI, including the
introductory sentences, is no more than a restatement of a position which
Nagesa had abandoned long before. But Vaidyanatha was not aware of this.
For him the derivation of aksadyuh must really be prevented by the BP. The
scheme which he adopts in his commentary is, it goes without saying,
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admirably suited to lodge this case. It is classified under point (1), which,
for the occasion, is said also to concern derivations where the bahirahga
operation has taken effect when the antarahga operation applies.
The above four factors shed some light on the question of why
Vaidyanatha presents us in his commentary with an interpretation of the
BP which is not directly derived from the PS. They do not tell us much yet
about why Vaidyanatha gives exactly THIS interpretation of the BP. In order
to gain some insightinto this, let us put ourselves in Vaidyanatha's position
for a while, and look at the text of the PS the way he did.
It cannot be denied that according to Nagesa an operation can be
antarahga because its cause presents itself earlier to our understanding
(purvopasthitatvat). This is clearly stated in PS 96.1-3. It is equally clear
that, when an operation is antarahga on this account, Antarahgatva merely
determines that, when two operations apply simultaneously, the antarahga
operation shall take effect first (PS 96.9). How then is the formation of
aksadyuh out of aksa-div-kvip-su prevented by the BP? This is the
question, we may imagine, that occupied Vaidyanatha. In aksa-div-kvip-su
the substitution of uth for v by P. 6.4.19 has kvip as its cause. The
subsequent substitution of y for I by P. 6.1.77 has u as its cause, u precedes
kvip. How could this derivation NOT fall under the heading
purvopasthitatvat
Vaidyanatha, we may assume, realizes the difficulty. If the derivation of
aksadyuh falls under the. heading purvopasthitatva, the BP will not
interfere with-it. But the sentence introducing Par. LI says that the BP does
interfere with the derivation of aksadyuh. Vaidyanatha's solution is easy:
The derivation of aksadyuh does not fall under the heading
purvopasthitatva: it falls under the different heading purvasthitatva. And
where this new heading is valid, there the BP does not confine itself to
determining which operation shall take effect first out of a pair of
simultaneously applying operations. Here the BPaLso brings it about that a
bahirahga operation, which has taken effect, is asiddha when subsequently
an antarahga operation applies. So the sentence introducing Par. LI is
saved.
In the account of the derivation of aksadyuh here given, it has been
assumed that kvip counts as cause, even though it is elided before the
derivation comes to an end. Indeed, Vaidyanatha had no choice but to
make this assumption. If he had considered kvip to be a non-cause, he
would have lost all hope of making satisfactory sense of the statement
according to which the BP would interfere with the formation of aksadyuh.
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But if the disappearing element kvip is here accepted as cause, then the
disappearing element nvi in the derivation of visvauhah must also be
accepted as cause.
This, however, is not without consequences for the way Vaidyanatha
looks upon the Jnapaka of this Paribhasa, uth in P. 6.4.132. The argument
runs, as we remember,7 as follows. If the BPdid not exist, uth in P. 6.4.132
would serve no purpose. That rule would read, without uth, vahah, and
prescribe substitution of Samprasarana u for v of vah, provided vah had the
technical denomination "Bha". The derivation of visvauhah would look
like this: visva-vah-nvi-sas —• visva-u-ah-nvi-sas (P. 6.4.132: vahah) —•
visva-u-h-nvi-sas {P. 6.1.108) —> visva-oh-nvi-sas(P. 7.3.86)-* visvauh-nvi-
sas (P. 6.1.88) and so on. But if the BP is valid here, P. 6.4.132 {vahah) will
be bahirahga with respect to the subsequently applying P. 7.3.86. P. 6.4.132
{vahah) will be asiddha with respect to P. 7.3.86, and the latter rule will not
take effect.
The reason we accepted for P. 7.3.86 being antarahga in regard to P.
6.4.132 {vahah) was that P. 7.3.86 has no following cause, whereas P.
6.4.132 {vahah) has. In order to accept this, we had to assume that
disappearing elements, in the present ca£e nvi, do not count as causes (see p.
32f., above). But for Vaidyanatha, disappearing elements do count as
causes. He must therefore find another device to make it understandable
that P. 7.3.86 is antarahga in regard to P. 6.4.132 {vahah).
Vaidyanatha has already created such a device in the context of the
derivation of aksadyuh, and it can be employed here without modification.
The following cause of P. 7.3.86 is nvi, the following cause of P. 6.4.132
{vahah) is sas. nvi occurs before sas, and P. 7.3.86 is therefore antarahga
because it falls under the headingpurvasthitatva. Here an earlier applying
bahirahga operation is indeed asiddha with respect to a subsequently
applying antarahga operation, so that, once again, the text of the PS is
saved for Vaidyanatha.
However, this time there is a drawback. The Jnapaka of a Paribhasa is
rather important to that Paribhasa. It not only indicates the existence of the
Paribhasa, it also helps us in determining how the Paribhasa is to be
interpreted. But if Vaidyanatha is correct, the Jnapaka of the BP indicates
that Paribhasa because it falls under the heading purvasthitatva,which is
not even mentioned once in the PS. This is very strange, to say the least.
No wonder Vaidyanatha looks for another reason why the word UTH in P.
6.4.132 should indicate the BP. Such a second reason is not easily to be
found. But Vaidyanatha seems to feel desperately in need of one, ready to
150 CHAPTER 15
go to any length to get it. This I conclude from the surprising reason for
which he settles in the end. What he says is that P. 6.4.132 (vahah) is
bahiranga because it depends on a greater number of conditions. And what
are those conditions? That what follows vah-kvip, i.e., sas, "be one of the
suffixes up to kap" etc. Let us remind ourselves that P. 6.4.132 (vahah)
prescribes substitution of Samprasarana u for v, provided vah has the
technical domination "Bha". And according to SK 231, something is called
"Bha" when "a suffix follows, which begins with y or with a vowel, which is
one of the suffixes from su up to kap, and which is not a Sarvanamasthana"
{yakaradisv ajadisu ca kappratyayavadhisu svadisv asarvanamasthanesu
paratah purvam bhasamjnam syat). Vaidyanatha's own words are:
Gada 90.28 91.12
na ca ...paranimittakatvasya tulyatvat katham tattvam /8 kapprat-
yayavadhltyddivisesanabahulyena tasyddhikanimittakatvena
samkhyakrtatattvena tattvasattvat / ubhavathapi parasthitatvena tattvac
ca)
"And (one should) not (ask) how (the substitution of Samprasarana u
for v in visva-vah-kvip-sasby P. 6.4.132 (vahah) can be) bahiranga,
(objecting that in reality it is not bahiranga) because (the substitution
of Samprasarana is) equal (to the subsequently applying substitution
of Guna o for u by P. 7.3.84) in that (both these operations) have a
following cause. (Such an objection should not be made,) for (the
substitution of Samprasarana) is bahiranga. It is bahiranga on
account of the number (of its causes) since it has more causes (than
the corresponding antarahga operation, substitution of Guna o for u.
And that it has more causes is) due to the fact that it (is dependent
upon) many conditions, such as 'being one of the suffixes up to kap/
Moreover, (the substitution of Samprasarana by P. 6.4.132 (vahah)
is) bahiranga since its cause(sas) stands later (than the cause kvip of
the substitution of Guna by P. 7.3.84) on both the alternatives (of our
opting for the order of the derivation or for the order of the
pronunciation of the utterance as it is used in language)."
Apparently Vaidyanatha wanted to make up for the lack of one good
reason by giving two bad ones. And bad reasons they are. The one which we
discussed first, and which falls under the heading purvasthitatva, is of a
kind not met with in the PS. The other one, according to which an
operation can be bahiranga because it has many causes, is in direct
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contradiction to the express statement of the PS9 All this we know. It is
interesting to note that the validity of this last reason seems to have been
accepted merely to make sense of the Jnapaka of the BP. Indeed, the
illustration that Vaidyanatha gives of this point (3b) is precisely the
formation of visvauhah.
It is clear from what has been said so far that this same formation could
also serve to illustrate Vaidyanatha's point (1), which carries the heading
purvasthitatva. But obviously, a repeated mention of visvauhah, both
under point (1) and under point (3b), would make it all too obvious that
these points were introduced in order to come to terms with the obscure
Jnapaka. Fortunately, something else was at hand to illustrate point (1).
The examplepatvya is used in the PSio illustrate both BP2i and BP22. In
the first case the vibhajyanvakhyana is adopted; inpatu-I-a the substitution
of v for u is antarahga because its cause, 7, presents itself earlier than A, the
cause of the substitution of y for 7. This case, further, is the first mentioned
after Nagesa used the term purvopasthita.10 Vaidyanatha therefore places it
under that heading.
In the second case, i.e., in the derivation of patvya in accordance with
BP22, the kramenanvakhyana is adopted. Here the grammatical elements
come into being one after the other, so that the following stages are passed
through: patu, patu-i (-* patvi), patvi-a (— patvya). It may be recalled that
we had understood this derivation to take place in such a way that the
grammatical elements come into being in the order of the meanings which
they express. This we came to see as a second kind of purvopasthitatva,
different from the one used in the first derivation of patvya just described
(see pp. 22 ff., above).
Vaidyanatha cannot look upon these two derivations of patvya in this
light. For him the PS on Par. L is $ot divided into two parts, the one
describing BPi, the other BP2. So for him the restriction that meanings
cannot make an operation bahirahga (PS 76.13; App. I 1. 8) covers the
whole of the BP. He cannot therefore accept BP22 the way we have accepted
it. And consequently he cannot accept the division of purvopasthitatva
into two, which we approved of.
But what then does he do with the second derivation of patvyat How
does he classify it? The first derivation of patvya has come under the
heading purvopasthitatva, so here there is no place for the second
derivation. Where does that go? Again Vaidyanatha's solution is easy. The
second derivation of patvya is classifed under the heading
purvasthitatva, newly introduced to solve some other difficulties.
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Clearly, the heading piirvasthitatva is used as a kind of garbage-can,
ready to accept everything that would preferably have been apportioned to
purvopasthitatva, but for some reason or other could not be
accommodated there. That this is indeed the case is again corroborated by
the circumstance that purvopasthitatva and piirvasthitatva have identical
subdivisions, viz. (a) prakriyakramena and (b)prayogiyoccaranakramena.
Moreover, the "characteristics" accompanying the heading
piirvasthitatva are such that almost everything can be accommodated
here. The "characteristics" of point (4), purvopasthitatva, on the other
hand, are more directly derived from the text of the PS and are therefore so
austere that only a selected few derivations comply with them.
One of the happy candidates which Vaidyanatha has allowed into his
fourth category is the derivation khatvodhah from khatva-a-udhah. We
are already familiar with this derivation (see pp. 61 ff., above), and the
similarity with the derivation of patvya from patu-I-a is clear. But there is
one important difference. In khatvodhah the union of a-u into o presents
itself earlier to our understanding in the order of the derivation, not in the
order of pronunciation. This explains the division of point (4) into (a)
prakriyakramena and (b) prayogi yoccaranakramena. It may be remarked
in passing that Vaidyanatha correctly classifies the derivation of
khatvodhah under the heading purvopasthitatva. Ironically, this correct
classification would have been impossible, had Vaidyanatha understood
the basic structure of Nagesa's argument - this, of course, in view of the
corrupted state of the text which Vaidyanatha used.
The remaining points ((2) and (3a)) can go without comment. They are in
agreement with Nagesa's intentions. Vaidyanatha considers (2) an extreme
case of (3), which accords well with our interpretation {Gada 102.28-2911;
see above p. 7).
If the above partial reconstruction of Vaidyanatha's thctughts is correct,
something can be said, on the basis of this, about what aspects of the
Paribhasa are established in what way. Point (3b) and part of point (1), as
we saw, were created to make sense of the Jnapaka iith in P. 6.4.132. One
would therefore expect that these points were considered established by
this Jnapaka. This is indeed in accordance with Vaidyanatha's statements.
This state of affairs was hinted at in the passage which we quoted in the
beginning of this chapter, and is again confirmed in Gada 102.26-27.12
Regarding the way the other points are justified, nothing need be said
except that Vaidyanatha considers ah in P. 6.1.95 a second Jnapaka which
establishes (4a) {Gada 102.29-3013).
16. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the preceding pages we have seen Nagesa's conception of the BP and its
workings. This conception may well be unique in the history of Sanskrit
grammar in its simplicity. No longer do we find unspecified, highly
intuitive concepts, no longer a haphazard list of conditions which make an
operation bahirahga or antarahga. Here, everything is brought together
under two heads: An operation is antarahga (\) when its causes lie within
the causes of the bahirahga operation and (2) when its cause lies before the
cause of the bahirahga operation. What may be counted as cause is
precisely specified. And fitting to the twofold division of the meaning of
antarahga, a twofold division of the meaning of the Paribhasais given. A
more neatly designed interpretation could hardly be imagined.
It is true that this neat interpretation of the BP does not account for all
the facts that it should cover. Nagesa himself has to admit that the BP is not
universally valid. But then his predecessors had not fared better. The BP
always had to be qualified by auxiliary Paribhasas, at the very least.1
Nagesa's advance over his predecessors, as far as the BP is concerned, may
or may not lie in his ability to account better for derivations. I do not know.
He certainly excelled them in beauty of design.
It is the tragedy of Nagesa that this beautiful construction remained
unknown to almost all but himself. Some change which had inexplicably
found its way into the text prevented Nagesa's direct student, Vaidyanatha
Payagunda, from grasping his master's intentions. The only other person
who may have been Nagesa's pupil,2 and commented upon the P$, Bhairava
Misra, does not deviate much from Vaidyanatha's interpretation.
If there is a moral to be drawn from all this, it clearly is that the much
cherished guru-sisya-parampara is not always such an infallible guide in
interpreting a text as is often supposed. Vaidyanatha, though Nagesa's
direct pupil, interprets the latter's PS as if he had never known its author.3
Given that much, it must be admitted that he did as much as we could
possibly expect of him. But the interpretation he arrrived at was not the one
which had been intended by his teacher.
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APPENDICES

I. THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE PARIBHASENDUSEKHARA
ON PAR. L
In this appendix the text of the PS on Par. L is reproduced, incorporating
such modifications as were shown to be necessary in Chapters 7 and 8
above. Apart from these modifications, this appendix does not in any way
deviate from the text as edited by K. V. Abhyankar. Indeed, the variant
readings given in that edition are also reproduced here in the notes.
- nityad apy antarangam baliyo'ntarahge bahirarigasyasiddhatvat / tad
aha / - ASIDDHAM BAHIRANGAM ANTARANGE [Par. L]
- antar madhye bahirarigasastriyanimittasamudayamadhye'ntarbhutany
angani nimittani yasya tad antarangam / evam tadlyanimittasamudayad
bahirbhutahgakam bahirahgam / etac ca kharavasanayoh [P. 8.3.15] iti 5
sutre'siddhavatsutre ca bhasyakaiyatayoh spastam / / atrahgasabdena
sabdarupam nimittam evax grhyate sabdasastre tasya pradhanatvat /
tenarthanimittakasya2 na bahirarigatvam / ata eva na tisrcatasr [P. 6.4.4.]
iti nisedhas caritarthah / anyatha stritvaruparthanimittakatisrapek-
sayantarahgatvat3 trayadese tadasamgatih spasfaiva / ata eva trayadese 10
srantasya pratisedha iti sthanivatsutrasthabhasyavarttikadi4 samgac-
chate / / etena gaudherah paced ityadav5 eyadlnam ahgasamjnapeksat-
vena6 bahirarigatayasiddhatvad vali lopo na syad iti parastam /
eyadesader aparanimittakatvenantarahgatvac ca / / nanu yena vidhis
tadantasya [P. 1.1.72] iti sutre bhasya ikoyannaci7[P. 6.1.77] ityadav api 15
tadantavidhau syona ity atrantarahgatvad yano gunabadhakatvam isyate
tan na sidhyed unasabdam asritya yanadeso nasabdam asritya jguna ity
antararigatvad guna eva syad ity uktam / atra kaiyatah / siver bahulakad
aunadike napratyaye gunavalopotham prasahge ud apavadatvad valopam
badhate gunam tv antarahgatvad badhate / guno hy ahgasambandhinlm 20
iglaksanam laghvlm upadham ardhadhatukam casrayati / uth tu vakaran-
tam ahgam anunasikadim ca pratyayam ity alpapek§atvad antarahgah
/ tatra krte yangunau prapnuta iti / evam ca samjnapeksasyapi
bahirahgatvam spastam evoktam iti cet / na / tadantavidhav api bahupa-
darthapeksatvarupabahirahgatvasya gune sattvena tatra dosakathanapa- 25
rabhasyasamgateh / bahirahgantarahgasabdabhyam bahvapeksatvalpa-
peksatvayoh sabdamaryadayalabhac ca / tatha saty asiddham
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bahvapeksam alpapeksa ity eva vadet / / ata eva vipratisedhasutre bhasye
gunad yanadeso'ntarangatvad ity asya syona ity udaharanam na tu gunad
30 ud antarangatvad ity uktam / tvadntya tad api vaktum ucitam / pratha-
myat tad eva va vaktum ucitam / mama tv antarahgaparibhasaya tadvara-
nasambhavat tan noktam / kim ca siddhante nityatvat8 purvam ud gunas
tuthi yana badhitatvad anityah / unasabdam asrityetyadibhasyena9 ca
paribhasayam ahgasabdena saptamyadyantopattamI0 sabdarupam nimit-
35 tarn eva grhyata iti spastam evoktam / / yat tu kaiyatena tadantavidhi-
pakse paratvad gunah prapnotity uktam tat tunasabdam
asrityetyadibhasyasamgatya cintyam / / vali lope'ntarahgaparibhasa na
pravartata iti tu na yuktam / tatsutre bhasya11 eva vrascadisu lopatipra-
sahgam asahkyopadesasamarthyan na na ca vrscafltyadau caritarthyam
40 bahirahgataya samprasaranasyasiddhatvena purvam eva tatprapter iti
bhasyokteh / / yat tu nalopasya satsamjnayam asiddhatvat pancety atra
na sat [P. 4.1.10]iti nisedha iti tac cintyam / nalopasya hi12 padasamjnasa-
peksatvena bahirangatvam vacyam / tac ca na samjnakrtabahirahgatva-
syanasrayanat13 / pancety atra nisedhas tu striyam yat prapnoti tan neti
45 vyakhyanasamarthyena bhutapurvasattvam adayeti bodhyam / / ata eva
krti tuggrahanam caritartham / vrtrahabhyam ityadau padatvanimitta-
katve'pi nalopasya bahirahgatvabhavat / bhyamah padasamjnanimittat-
ve'pi nalopasya tannimittakatvabhavat / paramparaya nimittatvam adaya
bahirahgatvasrayane tu na manam / dhvanitam cedam nalopah sup- [P.
50 8.2.2] iti sutre bhasya iti tatraiva14 bhasyapradlpoddyote nirupitam / /
- antarahge kartavye jatam tatkalapraptikam ca bahirahgam asiddham ity
arthah / vrscatyadisu15 padasamskarapakse samanakalatvam eva
dvayor16 iti bodhyam / / etenantarahgam bahirangad ballya iti paribha-
santaram17 ity apastam / enam asritya vipratisedhasutre bhasye18 tasyah
55 pratyakhyanac ca19 / / antarangasastratvam asya20 lihgam / /
- iyam ca tripadyam na pravartate tripadya asiddhatvat / asyam ca vaha
uthsutrastham udgrahanam jnapakam ity esa sapadasaptadhyayistha /
anyatha samprasaranamatravidhanena laghupadhagune vrddhir eci [P.
6.1.88] iti vrddhau visvauha ityadisiddhes tadvaiyarthyam spastam eva
60 / satyam hy etasyam21 bahirarigasamprasaranasyasiddhatval laghu pad-
haguno na syat / / na ca puganta [P. 7.3.867] iti sutre nimittam iko
visesanam ata eva bhinatfityadau na gunk evam ca najanantarye [Par. LI]
iti nisedhat katham paribhasapravrttir iti vacyam / pratyayasyahgamsa
utthitSkahksatvena tatraivanvayat / pugantetyadau karmadharayasraya-
65 nena pratyayaparahgavayavalaghupadharupeko guna itiko gunavrddh!
[P. 1.1.3] iti22 sutrabhasyasammate'rthe bhinattityadav adosac
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ca / / akarantopasarge'nakarante copapade vaher vaher va nvivicav
anabhidhanan na sta eva / varyuhetyadi23 tuhateh kvipi bodhyam / dhat-
unam anekarthatvan narthasamgatih / prauha ityady asadhv eva vrddher
aprapteh / asyohasya narthakyan na prad uhodho -fV. 6.1.89.3] ity 70
asyapi pravrttih / / na ca karyakalapakse tripadyam24 etatpravrttir dur-
varetivacyam / purvam prati parasyasiddhatvad antarangabhavena pur-
vasya tannirupitabahirangatvabhavat taya23 tasyasiddhatvapratipada-
nasambhavat / na canaya purvasyasiddhatvat tadabhavena26 tarn prati
parasiddhatvam purvatra [P. 8,2.1] ity anena vaktum asakyam iti 75
vacyam / evam hi vinigamanavirahad ubhayor apy apravrttyapatteh
/ kim ca purvatrety asya pratyaksatvena tenanumanikya asya badha evc-
citah / atah karyakalapakse'pi tripadyam asya27 arnipasthitir eva / / ata
eva karyakalapaksam evopakramyoktayuktir uktvatoVtikto'yam pariharo
na va bahirahgalaksanatvad itlty uktam visarjanlyasutre bhasye28 sid- so
dhantina / tripadlsthe'ntarahge kartavye'yam pariharo na yukta iti tadar-
thah / kim tu vacanam evarabdhavyam iti tadas^yah / ata eva nigalyata
ityadau latvartham tasya dosa iti29 vacanam evarabdham / anyathanta-
rahgatvan nilopat purvam vaikalpikalatve tadvaiyarthyam spastam
eva / / ye'pi laksyanurodhad anumanikyapy antararigaparibhasaya pra- 85
tyaksasiddhasya purvatrety asya bad harp vadanti te'pi laksanaikacaksurb-
hir nadartavya30 iti dik / /
- yat31 tu visesapeksat samanyapeksam antarahgam visesapekse visesad-
harmasyadhikasya nimittatvat / yatha rudadibhyah sarvadhatuke [P.
7.2.76] ity atra rudaditvam sarvadhatukatvam ca / tatra sarvadhatukat- 90
vajnanaya prakrter dhatutvajnanam pratyayasya pratyayatvajnanam
cavasyakam iti yasud antarahgah iti tan na / visesasya32 vyapyatvena
vyapakasyanumanenopasthitav api tasya nimittatve manabhavenadhi-
kadharmanimittakatvanupapadanat / bhas.ya evamvidhantarahgabahi-
rahgabhavasya kvapy anullekhac ca33 / etena yad anudattahitah iti sutre 95
kaiyatenoktam lamatrapeksayantarangas tibadayo lakaravisesapeksatvad
bahirarigah syadaya34 iti tat parastam35 / visesapeksatve'pi tasya sama-
nyadharmanimittakatvabhavena tattvasya durupapadatvat / paranimit-
takatvena syadinam bahirahgatvac ca / / yat tu matupsutre bhasye panca
gavo yasya santi sa pancagur ity atra matuppraptim36 asahkya pratyekam ioo
asamarthyat samudayad apratipadikatvat samasat samasenoktatvad iti
siddhantinokte37 naitat saram ukte'pi hi pratyayartha utpadygtte dvigos
taddhito yatha pancanapitir iti purvapaksyuktih38 / dvigor luganapatye
[P. 4.1.88] iti lugvidhanat taddhitarthadvigos taddhito bhavati pancagu-
sabdas ca dvigur iti tadasayam kaiyatah / tato dvaimaturah pancanapitilj 105
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pancasu kapalesu samskrta ityadau savakasadvigor bahuvrihina prakrte
paratvad39 badha ityasayena40 naisa dviguh kas tarhi bahuvrihir iti sid-
dhantinokte tarn avakasam41 ajanano'pavadatvad dviguh prapnotiti pur-
vapaksl / anyapadarthe subantamatrasya vidhlyamanabahuvriheh
110 samkhyayas taddhitarthe42 vidhlyamano dvigur visesavihitatvad bad-
hakah prapnotiti kaiyatah43 / tatah siddhantyekadesy aha / antarahgat-
vad bahuvrihih / kantarahgata / anyapadarthe bahuvrihir visiste'nyapa-
darthedvigus tasminiscasya taddhite'stigrahanarn kriyata iti / adhikastya-
rthapeksamatvarthanimitto dvigur bahirahga iti kaiyata iti / naisa
siddhantyuktir etavatapy apavadatvahaneh / acsamanyapeksayano visis-
tasavarnajapeksadlrghena badhadarsanat / kim coktaritya paratvenaiva
badhasiddheh / kim catradhikapeksatvenaiva bahirahgatvam na44 keva-
lavisesapeksatveneti n^itad bhasyarudham visesapeksasya bahirahgatva-
m / ata eva subantasamanyapekso bahuvrihis tadvisesapekso45 dvigur iti
120 noktam bhasye / na carthakrtabahirahgatvasyanasrayanad46 idam ayuk-
tam / ekadesyuktitvenadosat / ata evastigrahanam nopadhyartham kim
tv astisabdan matubartham iti tvadabhimatam bahirahgatvam api dvigor
nastlti pratipadya siddhantina matvarthe dvigoh pratisedho vaktavya47 iti
vacanenaitat siddham ity uktam / / ata eva tadoh sah sau [P. 7.2.106].iti
125 sutre'nantyayor iti caritartham / anyatha pratyayasamanyapeksatvenan-
tarahgatvad antyasyatve'nantyasyaiya48 satve siddhe tadvaiyarthyam spas-
tam eva / / padah pat [P. 6.4.130] iti sutre bhasyakaiyatayor apy
etadantarangatvabhava eva sucita iti sudhiyo vibhavayantu / /
- nanv evam asusruvad ity atra laghupadhagunad uvaho'l panimittatvab-
130 havad uvah na syad iti cet / na / tatrantahkaryatvarupantarahgatvasat-
tvat / antahkaryatvam ca purvopasthitanimittakatvam ahgasabdasya
nimittaparatvat / idam antarahgatvam lokanyayasiddham iti manu-
syo'yam pratar utthaya sarirakaryani karoti tatah suhrdam tatah sam-
bandhinam / arthanam api jativyaktilihgasamkhyakarakanam
135 bodhakramah sastrakrtkalpitas tatkramenaiva49 ca tadbodhakasabdapra-
durbhavah kalpita iti tatkramenaiva tatkaryanlti patvyetyadav antarah-
gatvat purvam purvayanadesah parayanadesasya bahirahgatayasiddhat-
vad ity anenacah50 parasmin [P. 1.1.57] iti sutre bhasye spastam / / tad api
yugapatpraptau purvapravrttiniyamakam eva yatha patvyety atra padasya
140 vibhajydnvakhyane na tu jatasya bahirahgasya tadrse'ntarange'siddhata-
niyamakam praguktalokanyayena tathaiva labhad iti vaha uth [P. 6.4.132]
sutre kaiyate spastam / ata eva vayvor ityadau vali lopo yanah sthanivat-
tvena varito51 bhas.yakrta / /
- kramenanvakhyane tuktodaharane pQrvapravrttikatvam52 antarahgat-
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vam bahirarigasyasiddhatvam api nimittabhavad53 apraptirupam bod- 145
hyam / / ata5 4 evomarios55 ca [P. 6.1.95] ity arigrahanam
caritartham / taddhi khatva-a-udhety atra param api savarnadlrgham
badhitvantarangatvad gune56 krte vrddhipraptau pararupartham / sadha-
nabodhakapratyayotpattyanantararn57 purvam dhator upasargayoge pas-
cat khatvasabdasya samudayena yogad gunasyantarahgatvam iti 150
samprasaranac ca [P. 6.1.108] iti sutre bhasye spastam / ehlty anukarana-
sya sivadisabdasambandhe tu nasya pravrttir jnapakaparasamprasara-
naccetisutrasthabhasyapramanyenanityam prakrtivad anukaranam ity
atidesam adaya labdharitva etadapravrtteh / / yat tu purvam dhatur
upasargena yujyate pascat sadhanena / upasargena tatsamjnakasabden- 155
a / sadhanena karakena tatprayuktakaryena / ata evanubhuyata ityadau
sakarmakatvat karmani lakarasiddhir iti tan na / kriyayah sadhyatvena
bodhat sadhyasya ca sadhanakahksataya58 tatsambandhottaram eva nisci-
takriyabodhena sadhanakaryapravrttyuttaram eva kriyayoganimittopa-
sargasamjnakasya sambandhaucityat / ata eva sut kat purvah [P. 6.1.135] 160
iti sutre purvam dhatur upasargenety uktva naitatsaram purvam59dhatuh
sadhanena yujyate pascad upasargenety uktvoktayuktyasyaivayuktatvam
uktam sadhanam hi60 kriyam nirvartayatltyadina61 / upasargadyotyar-
thantarbhavena dhatunaivarthabhidhanad uktesu karmani lakaradisid-
dhih / pascacchrotur bodhaya62 dyotakopasargasambandhah / / evam 165
cantarahgatararthakopasarganimittah sut sam-kr-tity avasthayam dvitva-
ditah purvam pravartate tato dvitvadi / / ata eva pranidapayatltyadau
natvam yadagamah [Par. XI] iti nyayena samahitam bhasye / / ata eva
pratyeti pratyaya ityadisiddhih / anyathantarahgatvat savarnadlrghe
rupasiddhih63 / / yad upasarganimittakam64 karyatn upasargarthasritam no
visistopasarganimittatvat tad65 antarahgam / yat tu na tatha tatra purva-
gatasadhananimittakam evantaraiigam / ata eva na dhatu- [P. 1.1.4] iti
sutre preddha ity atra guno bahirahga iti bhasya uktam / / kim ca purvam
upasargayoge dhatupasargayoh samasa aikasvaryadyapattir ity upapa-
dam atih [P. 2.2.19] iti sutre bhasye spastam / / bhavarthapratyayasyapi 175
purvam evotpattih / ataevaneradhyayanefP. 7.2.26]iti nirdesah samgac-
chate / idam ca samanyapeksam66 jnapakam bhavatiho'pi purvam utpat-
teh67 / anyatha tatra samasapattih / tihi tv atinniti nisedhan na doso yadi
bhavatihy upasargayogo'stlty alam / /
- yat68 tv evamrltya purvasthanikam apy antarahgam iti tac cintyam / sra- 180
jistha ityadau vinmator luki69 tilopasyapavadavinmatorlukpravrttya70
jatipaksasrayanena varanaprayasasya prakrtyaikac [P. 6.4.163] iti sutra-
prayojanakhandanavasare bhasyakrtkrtasya naisphalyapatteh / tvaduk-
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tarltya vinmator luko bahirangasiddhatvenanayasatas71
185 tadvaranat / bhasya Idrsantya bahirahgasiddhatvasya kvapy anasrayanac
ca / paribhasayam angasabdasya nimittaparatvac ca / /
- iyam cottarapadadhikarasthabahirarigasya72 nasiddhatvabodhiketTca
ekacom [P. 6.3.68] iti sutre bhasye purvapaksyuktir iti sa73 nadartavya /
paramtapa ityadav anusvare nasiddhatvarn mumas tripadyam tadapravrtteh / /
190 navyamate'pi yathoddesapaksasrayanenanyathasiddhodaharanadanena
tasya taduktitvam avasyakam ity ahuh / abhiye'ntarahga abhlyasya
bahiraiigasya samanasrayasya74 nanenasiddhatvam asiddhatvad ity
asiddhavatsutre bhasye spastam / / evam sici vrddher75
yenanapraptinyayenantarahgabadhakatvamulakam na sicy antarahgam
195 astltlko guna [P. 1.1.3] iti sutre bhasye spastam / /
II. A CONTRADICTION IN THE P$
Early in his discussion of the BP Nagesa states that neither dependence on
technical terms nor an indirect cause can make an operation bahirahga.
The passage concerned reads as follows:
P$ 82.5-83.3, App. I 11. 43-49
tac ca na samjnakrtabahirahgatvasydndsrayandt / . . . ata eva krti
tuggrahanam caritartham / vrtrahabhyam ityadau padatvanimittakatve'pi
nalopasya bahirahgatvdbhdvdt / bhyamah padasamjndnimittatvepi
nalopasya tannimittakatvdbhdvdt / paramparayd nimittatvam addya
bahirahgatvdsrayane tu na mdnam /
"And (to assume) this (i.e., that the elision of n oipancan is bahirahga
on account of its dependence on the circumstance that the technical
denomination 'Pada' attaches to pahcan,) is impossible because
(dependence on) technical terms cannot be admitted to make (an
operation) bahirahga.... (Because then dependence on technical
terms does not make an operation bahirahga), therefore the
statement (in P. 8.2.2, 'that the elision of n shall be as if it had not
taken effect) so far as regards the addition (taught in P. 6.1.71) of the
augment TuK before a Krt-affix (distinguished by the indicatory letter
pY serves a purpose. For the elision (by P. 8.2.7) of the n (e.g., of
vftrahan) in vrtrahabhyam etc. is not bahirahga although it is
caused by the fact that (yrtrahan) is a Pada. (Nor is it possible to say
that the termination bhyam makes the elision of n bahirahga),
because, although bhyam (according to P. 1.4.17) is the cause why the
technical denomination 'Pada' (attaches to vrtrahan), still the elision
of Nvis not caused (directly) by bhyam\ on the other hand, there is no
authority for the assumption that (the elision of n) is bahirahga
because it is indirectly caused (by bhyam)." (Cf. K. p. 232-233.).
As said earlier, two things are stated in this passage. The first is that
"technical terms cannot be admitted to make an operation bahirahga"; the
second, that there is no authority for the assumption that an operation is
bahirahga due to its indirect cause.
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The first of these two opinions has to be taken at its face value. I know of
no passages in the P$ that contradict it. What is more, the same opinion
had already been expressed, somewhat less clearly, by Nagesa in a passage
which we studied earlier (above, p. 6). What we read there amounted to
this: The contention that, in the derivation of gaudhera fromgodha-4hrak,
the substitution of ey for dh by P. 7.1.2 is bahirahga because it is dependent
upon the technical term4Ariga' is mistaken. In other words, technical terms
do riot make an operation bahirahga.
It is the second of the two opinions set forth in the passage now under
consideration which comes into conflict with other parts of the P$. In order
to understand this clearly, we must look somewhat more closely at the
derivation of vrtrahabhyam.
At the stage vrtrahan-bhydm, P. 8.2.7 {nalopahipratipadikantasya)
causes elision of the final n of vrtrahan. The SK explains this sutra (no.
236): pra'tipadikasamjhakam yatpadam tadantasya nakarasya lopah syat,
"let there be elision of n which is final in such a Pada as is also called
Tratipadika'." As a result of this, one of the conditions imposed upon
vrtrahan, so that P. 8.2.7 may apply to it, is that it be a Pada. In other
words, the elision of n is dependent upon the technical term 'Pada'. That
vrtrahan is worthy of this name it owes - through the agency of P. 1.4.17 -
to the affix bhyam. But the operation which consists in dropping N depends
only indirectly on this same affix bhyam.
Once the final n of vrtrahan has been elided, another rule presents itself
to us for consideration. It is P. 6.1.71 (hrasvasyapiti krti tuk), which, after
N has been removed, recognizes that all conditions for its application are
fulfilled, because the remaining form vrtraha ends in a short vowel and is
followed by a Krt-affix which has p as indicatory letter. It should not be
forgotten that between vrtraha and bhyam we still have to imagine (by P.
1.1.62) kvip to be present, which was dropped earlier by force of the rules P.
1.3.9 and and P. 6.1.67. That is to say, for all practical purposes the
situation is vrtraha-kvip-bhyam. What can be done to prevent P. 6.1.71
from taking effect?
If, in one way or another, the elision of n could be shown to be bahirahga
with regard to the addition of tuk - in such a way that BPi would have a say
in the derivation - then this Paribhasa would stop the antarahga rule P.
6.1.71. But how could the earlier operation be shown to be bahirahga! On
the basis of the technical term 'Pada\ which attaches to vrtrahan and is
operative in bringing about elision of N? This is categorically rejected in the
above passage. Then perhaps on the basis of the indirect cause bhyam! We
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must remember that kvip, which disappears in the course of the formation
of vrtrahabhydm, in spite of being the cause of P. 6.1.71, counts in the
context of the BP as "no following cause"; this has been shown above, p.
32f. As a result of this, once bhydm is accepted as the cause of P. 8.2.7, all
conditions are fulfilled for BPi to come into play and then block P. 6.1.71.
But our present passage informs us that there is no authority for assuming
that dropping of n is bahirahga on the basis of its indirect cause bhydm.
This leaves us no other possibility than to accept that there is no scope here
for the BP.. Some other device is required to prevent P. 6.1.71 from taking
effect. It exists in the form of the words tuk and krti in P. 8.2.2.
The previous passage has been given much attention because the next
passage from the P$ is going to say the exact opposite. It occurs among the
comments on Par. LXXXV.
P$ 164.2-4
kirn ca $atvatukor asiddhah ityetadbaldt krti tuggrahandc ca tugvidhau
bahirangaparibhd$dyd apra vrtteh
"Moreover, in consequence of the {tuk in the) rule P. 6.1.86, and
because (Panini) has employed the words krti tuk (in P. 8.2.2), Par. L
has no concern (with an operation which would by it be asiddha) in
regard to the addition of (the augment) TuK." (K. p. 412.)
So, according to this last passage, in a derivation like that of vrtrahabhydm,
the BP does not fail to apply because its conditions are not fulfilled. On the
contrary, even though its conditions are fulfilled, that Paribhasadoes not
apply, because the words krti and tuk in P. 8.2.2 indicate that in derivations
of this type it should not apply. And whereas the earlier passage made clear
that, in the absence of the words krti and tuk in P. 8.2.2, the correct
formation of vrtrahabhydm could not be accounted for, the present
passage tells us that these two words really do nothing but make known
what could also be known by means of the BP; and it is the threat of
superfluity of the same two words (and not their absolute necessity, as the
earlier passage has it), which leads to the conclusion that the BP apparently
does not apply in instances like this.
We conclude that, but lor the presence of krti and tuk in P. 8.2.2, the BP
would have applied unhindered in the derivation of vrtrahabhydm.
But how can this be explained? If the derivation of vrtrahabhydm offers
scope to the BP, we must accept that the elision of n is bahirahga. And it can
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be bahirahga on the basis of the technical term 'Pada' or on the basis of the
indirect cause bhyam. The former alternative is ruled out. Not only is a
technical term not in any way a formal (sabdarupa) cause; we have seen that
Nagesa, twice over, rejected the acceptability of technical terms as causes.
This leaves us with the second alternative: the elision of n is bahirahga on
the basis of the indrect cause bhyam. We already know that, as soon as
bhyam is accepted as cause of elision of N, BPI bars the taking effect of P.
6.1.71.
We cannot but admit, on the strength of the above exposition, that
Nagesa in one place rejects an indirect cause in the context of Par. L, and in
another makes use of it. The question remains which of the two opinions is
to be regarded as a mistake on the part of Nagesa (whose presence in the
text may be ascribed to an oversight, made in the heat of an argument), and
which represents Nagesa's considered opinion. Or do we perhaps have to
assume that, in matters like these, Nagesa adjusted his opinion to the
circumstances? Only the text of the PS can give us a clue.1 One of the
relevant passages is part of the introductory remarks to Par. LVI.
PS 123.1-2
nanv evam sedusa ityddau kvasor antarahgatvdd iti tat ah samprasdrane'pltah2
sravandpattih . . .
"Now one might say that (if) then (Par. L were valid in all but the
particular cases mentioned in Par. LII-LV, the augment) it ought in
(the formation of) sedusah etc. (from sed-vas-as etc. in accordance
with that Paribhasa) to be prefixed to vas because it is antarahga, and
that (having been prefixed to vas) it would also subsequently, after
the substitution of Samprasarana (for v) remain audible." (Cf. K. p.
307.)
At the stage sed-vas-as, two operations apply. P. 7.2.35 (or its restriction
P. 7.2.67) prescribes addition of the augment it to vas; it has no cause. P.
6.4.131 prescribes substitution of Samprasarana u for v of vas. The former
of these two rules is, on the authority of the present passage, antarahga.
This is quite possible, as it has no cause. But it can be antarahga thus only
on condition that the other rule of this pair - i.e. P. 6.4.131 - has some
cause. So let us look more closely at the second rule.
P. 6.4.131 (vasoh samprasdranam) is thus explained in the SK (no. 435):
vasvantasya bhasya samprasdranam sydt, "let there be Samprasarana of
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the semivowel of what ends in vas and is called 4Bha\" Clearly, no cause -
i.e., a cause as required in the context of the BP - is indicated in this rule or
its explanation. But to make sense of the above passage, some cause of P.
6.4.131 is needed.
A solution to this problem is, of course, easy to find. For one of the
conditions of the application of P. 6.4.131 is the technical term 4Bha\ which
must belong to what ends in vas. But this technical term, in its turn, has
been assigned to the form sed-vas, because as follows; this on the strength
of P. 1.4.18. And the cause of P. 6.4.131 must be as, even though it is only
indirectly responsible for that rule taking effect.
One more passage will be adduced to show that Nagesa's assignment of
Bahirahgatva on the basis of an indirect cause is not exceptional in the PS.
Once again, the factor that stands between the operation and its cause is the
technical term kBha\ The passage occurs in the discussion of Par. LVI.
PS 132.5-133.1
. . . cau pratyahgasya pratisedha iti vacanam varttikakrtarabdham
bhasyakrta ca na pratyakhyatam / pratyahgam antarahgam /
" . . . the author of the Varttikas (on P. 6.3.138) has stated 'that a
pratyahga, i.e. antarahga, (operation) is forbidden (to take effect)
before cu (i.e. aficuy and this statement has not been refuted by the
author of the Bhasya." (Cf. K. pp. 317-8.)
Here Nagesa cites with approval what he thinks to be a statement of the
author of the Varttikas (or of an author of Varttikas).3 The import of this
statement is explained by Kielhorn in a footnote (K. p. 318, fn. 1):
In the formation of praiicah from prati-ac-as two rules are
applicable, P. 6.1.77 which teaches the substitution of y for the I of
prati, and P. 6.4.138 which teaches the elision of the a of ac\
the former of these two rules is antarahga, and the latter
bahirahga. Now we are taught by the Varttika on P. 6.3.138 that the
antarahga substitution of y for I shall not take place before ac\ we
accordingly formpRaTi-c-as, and subsequently by P. 6.3.138praiicah.
What interests us at this moment in particular is why, in the formation of
praiicah from prati-ac-as, P. 6.1.77 is antarahga and P. 6.4.138 bahirahga.
For this we have to look at the causes of both these rules. The cause of P.
6.1.77 is the a of as. Since this rule is here supposed to be antarahga, the
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causes of the corresponding bahiranga rule must either encompass this a (in
which case the latter rule will be b\) or follow it (the rule will then be B2).
But determining the cause of P. 6.4.138 is not so easy. The rule reads:
acah, which the SK explains (no. 416): luptanakarasydncater
bhasyakdrasya lopah sydt, "let there be elision of the a of anc, when this
form bears the technical name 4Bha\ and its n has been elided." So there is
no trace here of a locative case ending, which might indicate which is the
cause of P. 6.4.138.
There is no point in detaining the reader, who by now - in cases where
there is no locative case ending to do the job - has become sensitive 10
technical terms as possible indicators, albeit indirectly, of the cause of a
rule. And indeed, it is not hard to see that in the case of P. 6.4.138 the
technical term 'Bha' is a condition of its application. Needless to add, the
cause (in the sense of the BP) of the application of the last mentioned sutra,
at the stage prati-ac-as, is as.
This suffices, I trust, to show that in the context of the BP indirect causes
are a common feature of the PS.
Before leaving this topic, we shall study one more passage, which may
throw some light on the question of how such indirect causes are to be
justified, and perhaps also on the question of why Nagesa let the mututally
contradictory passages discussed above exist side by side in his PS. This
passage occurs in the PS on Par. LXXXV and requires some introduction.
Par. LXXXV states that "that which is taught in a rule the application of
which is occasioned by the combination of two things, does not become the
cause of the destruction of that combination" (K. p. 410). As a result of the
existence of this Paribhasa, the part kumbhakdre- of kumbhakdrebhyah, as
well as the part adhe- in the derivation oiadhaye, are not termed avyaya, as
we might have expected on the basis of P. 1.1.39. The reason is that if these
forms were indeed called avyaya, the case terminations following them
(bhyah and e) would be elided by P. 2.4.82. Here then the combinations
that were responsible for the final e of kumbhakare- and adhe- would be
destroyed as the result of a consequence of that e. In the case of
kumbhakarebhyah, the combination of an Ahga ending in a and a plural
case ending beginning with any one of the sounds contained in the
Pratyahara jhal brings about the substitution of e for the final a oikara in
kumbhakdra-bhyas, by P. 7.3.103. By eliding bhyah, the combination
would obviously be destroyed. In the case of ad ha ye, from ddhi-(n)e, the
combination of something called ghi (see P. 1.4.7) and a case ending which
has N as Anubandha causes the substitution of e for I, by P. 7.3.111. This
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combination also would meet with its end if (h)e were to be elided. It is
due to Par. LXXXV that the correct forms kumbhakarebhyah and ddhaye
are obtained.
Here an objection could be raised. Granted that Par. LXXXV is needed
to secure the correct forms kumbhakarebhyah and adhaye, there is no need
to refuse ithe name avyaya to kumbhakdre and adhe. This term does no
harm by itself. What does do harm, and what must therefore be prevented
by this Paribhasa, is the elision of bhyah and (h)e by P. 2.4.82. This
particular result of being termed avyaya is prevented by our Paribhasa,
because it destroys the combination on which the term avyaya ultimately
depends. But other results of being termed avyaya are not necessarily to be
prevented. One such result is the insertion of ak(ac) before e by P. 5.3.71.
This clearly does not destroy the combination on which the term avyaya
ultimately depends, so that there seems to be no reason to prevent it.
Nagesa does not accept the above argument and rejects it by further
specifying the meaning of Par. LXXXV in such a way that in the above two
instances the term avyaya cannot be used. The exact way he specifies the
meaning of the Paribhasa does not concern us here. But we find something
to our liking in the passage immediately following.
PS 169.2-5
na ca karyakdlapakse lugekavdkyatdpannasamjndbddhe'py akajeka-
\\dkyatdpannd sydd iti vac yam / antarangdydm tadekavdkyatdpanna-
samjndydm bahirahgagundder asiddhatvat / lugekavdkyatdpannd tu
na gunddito 'ntarangobhayor4 api sabdatah subdsrayatvdt / /
"Nor can one say that (when) on the Karyakalapaksa (the
Avyayasamjna- rule P. 1.1.39 has united itself both with the rule P.
2.4.82 which teaches the substitution of luk for bhyah etc., and with
P. 5.3.71 which teaches the insertion of akac,) the term avyaya, so far
as it would be united with (the rule P. 5.3.71 which teaches the
insertion of) akac, might be (assigned to kumbhakare, adhe etc.),
although it could (in consequence of this Paribhasa) not be (assigned
to them) so far as it would be united with (the rule P. 2.4.82 which
teaches the substitution of) luk\ for the Guna (e) etc. (of adhe etc.),
being bahirahga in regard to the antarahga term {avyaya) united with
akac, would be asiddha in regard (to the latter); on the other hand
(the term avyaya) united with luk is not antarahga in regard to the
Guna (e) etc. (of adhe etc.) because both are dependent on the same
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formal cause viz. the case-terminations (E, bhyah etc.)." (K. pp.
419-420.)
In this passage an ingenious suggestion is made. Formerly we were
concerned with two steps in the derivations of kumbhakarebhyah and
ddhaye. The first step consisted of assigning the term avyaya to the forms
kumbhakare- and adhe-, and the second step was the taking effect of an
operation which was the result of the new name given to those forms. These
two steps combined would lead to undesired forms. The question was
whether both the steps were to be prevented by Par. LXXXV, or only the
second one. It is now proposed to telescope the two steps into one, by
uniting the rules concerned into a single sentence. This way, so it is argued,
the term avyaya as united with the objectionable operation (elision of case
endings) will not be assigned to the forms concerned, but the same term,
now united with the other operation (the insertion of akac), will be given to
those forms.
What is remarkable about our passage is that the proposal to telescope
rules is not rejected. Rather, the proposal seems to be accepted as
legitimate, for arguments are adduced that in this way the term avyaya does
not come to be assigned to the forms kumbhakare- and adhe- either. Let us
study these arguments more closely. For the purposes of discussion we
shall confine ourselves to the example kumbhakarebhyah.
At the stage kumbhakara-bhyas, e is substituted for the a of kara by P.
7.3.103 (bahuvacane jhaly et). The following cause of this operation is
bhyas. The above passage informs us that this operation is bahiranga and
asiddha with respect to the antaranga term avyaya united with akac. Since
the bahiranga operation here takes effect before there is scope for the
antaranga assignment-cum-insertion, we are here dealing with BPi. A
result of this is that the following cause of the antaranga assignment-cum-
insertion must either be included in bhyas or be nonexistent. Let us see how
far this is borne out by the facts.
The form kumbhakare- is termed avyaya by P. 1.1.39 (km mejantah).
This rule contains no word in the locative case, either directly or by
anuvrtti, so that no following cause is indicated by it. Insertion of akac is
prescribed by P. 5.3.71 (avyayasarvanamnam akacprak teh). Again there is
no trace of a following cause. We conclude that the assignment-cum-
insertion prescribed by the combination of these two rules has no following
cause either. This result is in perfect agreement with our expectations.
No such perfect agreement is found when we turn to the last sentence of
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the above passage. The term avyaya united with luk, so we are told, is not
antarahga in regard to the substitution of e for the final a of kumbhakara-.
The reason is, so we further learn, that both are dependent on bhyas.
That the substitution of e for a has bhyas as following cause we know
already. We also know that the assignment of the tefm avyaya to the form
kumbhakare- has no following cause. Therefore the question that remains
is whether bhyas is the following cause of the lu- elision of bhyas.
We do not have to study the exact wording of the rule which prescribes
this elision, i.e., of P. 2.4.82 (avyayad apsupah), to see that the answer to
this question must be in the negative. The affix bhyas cannot be the
following cause of its own elision. We are forced to conclude that what is
not the following cause of either of the rules separately is the following
cause of those two rules when combined. Vaidyanatha Payagunda
combines the two rules P. 1.1.39 and 2.4.82 into the followmg: supi pare
krd ya ejantas tadantam avyayasamjnam tastnat tasya ca luk (Gada
182.16). 1 do not know if we have to follow Vaidyanatha to the extent of
rewriting the two rules in such a way that their combination actually
contains a word in the locative case (here supi). In effect, it makes no
difference. The general principle that seems to have been applied here is
that where two rules are united into one - one of these two rules assigning a
name, the other prescribing an operation - all that figures in the two rules
which lies beyond what is covered by the name concerned is to be
considered to be following cause. This way the case ending bhyas, which is
referred to in P. 2.4.82 by means of the word sup, becomes the following
cause of the combined two rules P. 1.1.39 and 2.4.82, even though this word
sup does not appear in the locative case.
If we have interpreted the above passage correctly, we may have come
somewhat closer to a solution of the contradiction described in this
appendix. It is conceivable that Nagesa looked upon the combination of
two rules - one assigning a technical term to a certain form, the other
prescribing an operation which depends upon this technical term - as
permissible, but not compulsory. Where such a combination is not made,
no following cause may be forthcoming, whereas such a following cause
does present itself where the combination is made. If this is correct, it can
quite generally be said that no indirect causes are allowed in the context of
the BP. A following cause which makes its appearance as a result of
combining two rules is not an indirect cause, precisely because the two rules
concerned have been combined into one.
This explanation has the advantage of throwing some light upon the
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riddle that surrounds the presence of a contradiction in the PS. It further
saves the passage discussed last from the darkness of complete
unintelligibility. Unfortunately, it provides us with no clue as to when two
rules of the types mentioned are to be combined, and when not. Indeed, it
seems to leave this decision to the whims of the grammarian. This
arbitrariness deprives the explanation of most of its value.5 We cannot but
conclude that the contradiction in the PS pointed out earlier remains
largely unsolved.
III. ON THE RELATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF NAGESA'S
GRAMMATICAL WORKS
In his Samskrta Vyakarana-Sastra ka Itihasa (part I, p. 247) Yudhisthira
MImamsaka mentions the following eight grammatical works written by
Nagesa:
(1) Laghusabdendusekhara (LSS)
(2) Brhacchabdendusekhara (BSS)
(3) Paribhdsendusekhara (PS)
(4) iMghumanjiisa (LM)
(5) Paramalaghumanjusd (PLM)
(6) Sphotavdda (SV)
(7) Mahdbhdsyapratydkhydnasamgraha (MPS)
(8) Mahdbhdsyapradipoddyota (MPU)
To this list must be added, as was shown by Kapil Deva Shastri in the
introduction to his edition of the PLM:
(9) Vaiydkaranasiddhdntamanjusa (VSM)
In Appendix V it will be argued that another work must be added:
(10) Laghusabdaratna (LSR)
In this appendix an attempt will be made to establish as far as possible
the relative chronology of these works.1
Of the above-mentioned works2 the BSS and the LS$ together form a
group of their own, as do the VSM, the LA/and the PLM. The reason is
that the LSS is an abridgement of the BSS and succeeds the latter.
Similarly, the LM is an abridgement of the VSM, and the PLMm its turn
is an abridgement of the LM. That the abridgements may at certain points
deviate from their originals is not denied.
If we use an arrow to indicate that the book named before the arrow was
composed earlier than the book named after the arrow, we can write:
BSS - LSS
VSM - LM- PLM"
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Several of Nagesa's works refer to each other. Many references of this
kind have been collected by P. K. Gode in an article called "The Relative
Chronology of Some Works of Nagojibhatta - Between c. A.D. 1670 and
1750." Let it here merely be restated that the PS refers by name to the
Sabdendusekhara, to the MPU and to the Manjusa (Gode, op. cit., p. 217);
the LSS mentions the MPU (ibid.); the MPU mentions the Manjusa (ibid.);
the LM mentions the Sabdendusekhara (ibid.),4 the LSS refers to the BSS
(ibid., p. 214).
Gode further claims that he has gone through a manuscript of the VSM
kept at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. This manuscript mentions
the MPU. Unfortunately, Gode was mistaken in thinking that he had read a
manuscript of the VSM. The manuscript concerned (No. 33 of 1907-1915)
contains not the VSM, but the LM, as I was able to ascertain at the above-
mentioned institute. Probably Gode was led astray by the colophon, which
calls the book vaiydkaranasiddhdmtamamjusdkhyah sphotavadah. As
Kapil Deva Shastri pointed out in the introduction to his edition of the
PLM(p. 19), this colophon has been given to the LM, perhaps by mistake.
The difference between VSM and LM is indicated in the introductory
stanzas. The introductory stanza of the manuscript consulted by Gode
clearly uses the name laghuh vaiydkaranasiddhdntamamjusd. We may
preserve Gode's remark in this form, that the LM refers to the MPU.
Mfmamsaka adds to our knowledge by pointing out that the MPU and
the B&S refer to each other. He proposes to conclude from this that the two
works were written simultaneously (Itihdsa, part I, p. 426). Before
discussing this proposal, I should like to draw attention to two passages of
the LSS which mention the PS. They are: vastuta idam bahirangatvam
bhdsye kvdpi ndsritam iti paribhdsdvrttau nirupitam (VaranasI ed., II, p.
572); and ndjdnantaryaparibhdsd tu nasty eveti na ayaje indram ityddau
dosa iti paribhdsendusekhare vistarah (Kumbakonam ed. I, p. 267). It may
further be worthwhile to point out that the BSS mentions the Manjusa at
several places, e.g., at BSS 73.20 and 76.8.5 Sitaram Shastri has adduced
arguments (in the introduction to the BSS, p. 42) to show that in each of
these places the BSS refers to the VSM. He concludes that the LMand the
PLM were composed after the BSS.
But let us direct our attention to Mimamsaka's proposal to look upon the
MPU and the B$$ as written at the same time. It cannot be denied that the
B$$ bristles with references to the MPU. They are found at B$$ 34.14,
53.1, 131.1, 154.1, 182.6, and 198.11, to name but a few. But a study of the
positions taken with regard to the BP in Nagesa's grammatical works will
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show (in Appendix IV) that the BSS must have been composed before the
MPU, And in Appendix V we shall see that it is very difficult indeed to
avoid the conclusion that the LSR was composed after the BSS, but before
the MPU. How then can we make sense of the references to the MPUin the
BSS?
I think a rather obvious answer can solve this problem. Nagesa was
already working on his MPU when he wrote the BSS, but for some reason
or other did not complete it till much later. Perhaps, indeed, a first draft of
the MPU was already written when he studied the Mahabhasya with his
teacher, "eighteen times over" (see Mlmamsaka, Itihasa, I, p. 426).
A few words must be said here concerning the manuscripts used by
Sitaram Shastri for his edition of the BSS. As the editor points out in the
introduction to that work (especially pp. 28-37), these manuscripts are six
in number and show considerable differences among themselves. These
differences are of a kind that can most satisfactorily be explained by
assuming that the BSS went through a rather lengthy process of growth.
Earlier passages were dropped, new ones were added, and so on. These
changes were made, so Sitaram Shastri maintains, by Nagesa himself. The
final version of the BSS is the one found in manuscript ka., with the
exception of certain passages which in manuscript ka. are encircled
(kundalita) and at the same time are also found in mansucript kha.
The question that is provoked by this description is: Is it perhaps not the
case that all the references to the MPU belong to the latest stratum of the
BSS, whereas the passages that show that the BSS preceded the MPU
belong to earlier strata? If this is true, we do not have to assume that
references were made in the BSS to an as yet nonexistent, or only partially
completed, book.
The answer to this question must be negative: Almost all the passages
from the B$$ reproduced in Appendix IV in order to show that the B$$ is
earlier than the MPU belong to the latest stratum of that text. A glance at
the notes will confirm this. The references to the MPU, on the other hand,
have not all been introduced in the latest stratum of the B$$. This also
appears from the footnotes, or absence of them, in the edition of the B$$.6
Appendix IV further gives us some reason to assume that the MPU
preceded the P$ in time. This gives us the following chronological order for
Nagesa's technical grammatical works:
BSS - LSR - MPU - P$ - LSS.
In Chapter 11 above I argued that the SVis an early work which belongs
to the same time as the VSM.1 I also tried to show there that the PLM
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belongs to the period when Nagesa's ideas regarding the BP had reached
their final form, i.e., the time of the PS and the LSS. It seems reasonable to
assign the LM to the period in which these ideas were taking shape, i.e., the
period in which the LSR and the MPU were written.
This leaves us with the MPS. This work neither makes detailed
statements about the BP, nor does it occupy itself with the expressiveness
of words and sentences. Since it also does not refer to other works, nor - as
far as I know - has it been mentioned in any of Nagesa's other works, it is
hard to say anything definite about its date. However, we may derive a clue
from the colophon, which reads: iti snmatkalopakhyanagojibhattavira-
citah pratyakhyanasamgrahah sampiirnah. Here the surname kala is used.
In most of his other works (BSS, SV, PS, LSS, LM in certain manuscripts)
the surname upadhyaya employed. Only at the end of the first half
(purvarddha) of the BSS do we find the surname kala again (BSS 1574.14).
Indeed, K. V. Abhyankar (Prastavana Khanda, p. 21) and Sitaram Shastri
(introduction to BSS, p. 51) tell us that kala was Nagesa's surname, while
upadhyaya became his surname later. If this is correct, the MPS must be
considered a very early work.
The outcome of the above discussion can be summarized in the
following, tentative, scheme. For ease of classification. Nagesa's life has
been divided into three periods.
Period Philosophy of grammar Technical grammar
1st period VSM B$S
SV MPS
2nd period LM LSR
MPU
3rd period PLM PS
LSS
IV. CHANGES IN NAGESA'S OPINIONS REGARDING
THE BP AND THE NP
In this appendix an attempt will be made to show that the ideas which
Nagesa held regarding the BP while writing the PS were, in many respects,
not identical with his ideas at the time he wrote his BSS, and, in at least one
respect, were different from those which he held while writing the MPU.
On the other hand, no important changes can be found between the PS and
the LSS as far as the interpretation of the BP is concerned.
Comparing the four works mentioned above is not always as easy as it
may seem to be at first sight. It is true that all of them give expression to
Nagesa's opinions as they were when he wrote these books, but
unfortunately they do not always do so in as clear a manner as one might
wish. To begin with, three of the above works are commentaries: the MPU
on Kaiyata's PradTpa, itself a commentary on the Mahabha$ya, and the
BSS and the LSS on the SK. And as commentaries, they primarily explain
the opinions of the authors of the works that are being commented upon,
which do not in all cases coincide with the opinions of Nagesa. Fortunately,
Nagesa is not too shy to confess where and in what respects he differs from
those authors, but often he does so after explaining the "wrong" views in
considerable detail. This means in practice that while reading an exposition
we are not sure that it represents Nagesa's ideas until we have come to the
end of it and have seen that it is not subsequently rejected.
The second difficulty connected with reading Nagesa's books consists in
the fact that he often gives a number of opinions regarding a particular
subject. His own opinion he usually keeps for the end. Here again we must
be careful not to consider as Nagesa's an opinion that does not really belong
to him.
Nagesa's own opinion is often introduced with the words vastutas tu,
"but in reality", and pare tu (ahuh), "but others (say)". That in Nagesa's
writings pare tu is to be interpreted thus has been repeatedly observed.
Thieme, for example, in his article "The Interpretation of the Learned",
writes: "His [i.e., Nagojibhatta's] final view, his siddhanta, he would
introduce by pare tu 'others (who are correct)', which amounts, with him,
to bhasyatattvavidas tu: 'those who know the true meaning of the Bhasya'"
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(Kleine Schriften II, p. 599). Sitaram Shastri also puts forward this view on
p. 14 of the introduction of his edition of the BSS.
What no one seems to have observed is that Nagesa's writings contain at
least one passage where the words pare tu have clearly not been used in the
sense described above. This passage is BSS 426.22-421.9. The skeleton of it
reads as follows:pare tu ... iti vadanti / tac cintyam / . . . vastutas tu
The lesson to be learned from this last observation is that in order to
arrive at Nagesa's opinion each statement has to be studied with great care
in its context. It is left to the reader to decide if I have succeeded in
presenting only Nagesa's own views in the passages that follow.
Just as great care must be taken even where Nagesa uses such words as
pare tu, similarly (but now the other way round) we must be careful where
Nagesa uses such words as IT! bhavah, "this is the meaning". Although as a
rule Nagesa here merely explicates the meaning of the main text, without
approving or rejecting that meaning, sometimes he may use this device in
order to ascribe his own ideas to the main text. However, not to get onto
slippery ground, I have in what follows not included such statements as are
accompanied by words like iti bhavah, ity arthah, and ayam bhavah.
In this appendix the text of the PS as reconstituted in Appendix I is taken
as point of departure as far as Par. L is concerned. Following the order of
that text, passages from the BSS are reproduced where these disagree with
the PS. At the same time, passages from the L&Sare reproduced in order to
show that their contents do not differ from what we find in the PS. Also, the
position of the MPU is taken notice of wherever possible. The passages
represent no more than a selection from what is available in the books
concerned.
1. Early in the discussion of Par. L (App. 1,11.8-10), we read in the /\Sthat
meanings cannot make an operation bahirahga. Because such is the case, so
we further learn, P. 6.4.4 (rxa tisrcatasr) serves a purpose. This rule forbids
the lengthening of r before nam in the formation of tisrndm. If meanings
could make an operation bahirahga, the substitution of tisr for tri by P.
7.2.99 at an earlier stage of the derivation would have been superseded by
the substitution of traya for that same tri in accordance with P. 7.1.53. For
P. 7.2.99 has as a cause, in addition to the causes which it shares with P.
7.1.53, the circiynstance that the resulting form must be expressive of the
feminine gender. The situation is saved by the stipulation that meanings
cannot make an operation bahirahga.
The LSS agrees with the PS, saying: tasyam [bahirahgaparibhdsaydm]
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angasabdena sabdarupasya saptamyddyantopdttasya nimittasyaiva
grahanam na tu samjhdyd arthasyd vd . . . (on SK 2212; VaranasI ed. II, p.
453). That the BSS is not of the same opinion as the PS follows from the
following passage which justifies the presence of tisr- in P. 6.4.4 in a way
which is diametrically opposed to what we saw to be the case in the PS. It
reads: na tisrcatasr iti sutre tisrgrahanenaitatsutravisaye bahirahga-
paribhasandsravanat / anyathdntarangatvdt trayddese tadasangatih spastaiva /
(BSS 542.12-14).
The MPU on P. 1.1.56 rejects the opinion that the substitution of tray a
would be antarahga, saying: arthasamjndkrtabahirahgatvasya
sdstre'ndsrayandt (MPU vol. I, p. 419). As in almost all the cases that
follow, the MPU here takes the side of the PS and the LSS.
2. That a technical denomination (samjnd) cannot make an operation
bahirahga either is very clearly stated in Appendix 1,11. 43-44. That the LSS
agrees follows from the sentence quoted above. The PS further informs us
that the derivations of gaudhera and pacet run smoothly, precisely because
technical denominations do not make an operation bahirahga (App. 1,11.
12-14). If it had been otherwise, the substitution of eY for dh in godhd-
dhrak by P. 7.1.2 would have been bahirahga, because it depends on the
circumstance that dhrak is preceded by an Aiiga. Being bahirahga, it would
be nonexistent with respect to the subsequently applying P. 6.1.66, which
would effect the elision of y before R. On account of the nonexistence of ey,
elision of y would not take place, and the desired form gaudhera would not
be obtained.
The BSS follows a different stratagem to obtain the correct form, one
which is directly opposed to what we found in the PS. We read:2 na ca lopo
vyor ityetadvisaye bahirahgdsiddhatve gaudherah pacerannitydddv
dhgatvena bahirahgatayd eyddindm asiddhatvena yalopdpattir iti \dcyamj
tadvisaye nirnitalaksyataydnityatvena tadapravrttau... (BSS 135.19-21).
This passage not only differs from the PS where the latter states that a
technical denomination does not make an operation bahirahga, it also
disagrees with another passage of the PS, viz. Appendix 1,11. 37-41. There
the idea that the BP cannot be applied where P. 6.1.66 is used is rejected on
the ground that in the Mahabhasya this Paribhasahas been made use of in
the context of that rule. But the present passage from the BSS adheres
exactly to that idea, at least as far as the derivations of gaudhera and
pacer an are concerned.
Something more must be said regarding this passage from the BSS.
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There seems to be no reason to doubt that here in, say, the derivation of
gaudhera from godha-dhra(k), the substitution of EY f° r dh by P. 7.1.2 is
considered bahirahga because it depends on the technical denomination
"Ariga". But in order to remove all traces of doubt, I shall reproduce
another passage from that same commentary, in which dependence upon a
technical denomination is given as the reason for considering an operation
bahirahga. The passage comments on the varttika anvddese napumsake
enad vaktavyah, which is to account for the forms enat, ene, endni, etc. It
reads:3 evam camy evayam / ausasadisv enenaiva siddheh / na tatrapi
paratvat tyadadyatve, tata enadddese, laksye laksanasyeti nydyena punar
atvdpravrttau viseso'sty eveti vdcyam4 / atvasydhgasahjndsdpeksatvena
bahirahgatayd ntarahgatvdd enadddesasyaiva purvam pravrtteh / {BSS
678.11-14)
In the MPU we find that the point of view repeatedly defended is also the
one which is adopted in the /\S(and the LSS). A few instances must suffice.
On the Mahdbhdsya on P. 8.2.2 we read: bhdsyakrtd tu samjhdnimittasya
na bahirahgatvam {MPU vol. V, p. 360), and again idam cintyam,
samjfidkrtabahirahgatvasydndsrayandt (ibid.). And on P. 1.1.72: tasmdt
samjndpeksam na bahirahgam {MPU vol. I, p. 543).
3. Let us return to the PS. Related to our previous topic of discussion is the
contention that bahirahga can never mean "depending on many", nor can
antarahga mean "depending on few". This we learn from Appendix 1,11.
26-28, where it is further stated that if such were the case, the BP would
read asiddham bahvapeksam alpdpekse, instead of asiddham bahirahgam
antarahge, as it actually does.
Again the B$$ is of a different opinion, as is shown in the follow-
ing remark: bahirbhutasupnimittakapadasamjndpeksatvena bahva-
peksataydsyapi bahirahgatvdt {B$$ 666.1-2). I have not been able to find
corresponding passages in the MPU and the L$$.
4. Appendix 1,1. 56 tells us that the BP does not apply in the Tripadl. This
is not only true on the Yathoddesapaksa. A special section (11. 71-87) is
inserted to show that in that part of the Astddhydyl the BP cannot be used
on the Kdryakdlapak$a either.
In the BSS the BP does apply in the Tripadl, provided that the
Kdryakdlapak$a is adopted. This is shown by the following two
quotations: Jcakry atreti / iha skor iti lopo yanah kdryakdlapak$e
bahirahgdsiddhatvdn na / {BSS 216.3-4). And again: 6kdryakdlapakse
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bahirangaparibhdsopasthitisdmarthyena purvatrdsiddhatvasya
bddhdt / aTa eva ndrku\a ityddau na visargah / (BSS 191.10-11). There is
no need to remind the reader that in the PS Nagesa referred with approval
to a passage of the Mahdbhdsya according to which, so Nagesa tells us, a
special statement is required in order to obtain correct forms like ndrku(a,
precisely because the BP cannot in any way be used (App. 111.78-82). It is
therefore all the more interesting here to quote what immediately follows
the second of the two passages from the BSS cited above. What we read
here is closely similar to Appendix I, 11. 71-78, but reaches the opposite
conclusion: na caivam apikim kdryakdlapaksam dsritya purvatrdsiddham
ity asya bddhah kdryah, uta yathoddesam dsritydntarahgaparibhdsdyd bd-
dha ity atra vinigamakdbhdvdd anayd purvatrdsiddham ity asya pravrtti-
bandhena, tena ca parasydsiddhatve, tannirupitabahirangatvabhdvendsydh
pratibandhena, parasparavirodhe,1 dvayor apy apravrttydpattau6 visargo
durvdrah / spastam cedaryi kharavasdnayor iti sutre bhdsye hi vdcyam /
laksydnurodhendtra kdryakdlapaksasyaiva, bahirangaparibhdsdyd eva
cdngikdrdt / {B$$ 191.12-18). Nagesa probably had the last sentence of this
passage still in his memory when he wrote in his P&. ye'pilaksydnurodhdd
anumanikyapy antarahgaparibhdsdyd pratyaksasiddhasya purvatrety asya
bddham vadanti te'pi laksanaikacaksurbhir nddartavyd ... (App. I. 11.
85-87).'
The L$S, of course, supports the PS, saying: bahirahgaparibhdsd tu
traipddikeiitarange nety asakrd dveditam (Varanasi ed. II, p. 587). As this
passage indicates, statements to the same effect occur repeatedly in the LSS.
The MPU sides with the PS and the LSS against the BSS, most clearly
on the Bhasya on P. 83.15: evam ca kdryakdle yathoddese ca tripddydm
bahirahgdsiddhatvdpravrttir iti bhdsydl labhyate / vastutah pratyaksa-
tvena balavatd purvatrdsiddham ity anendnumdnikyd asiddhaparibhdsdyd
bddha evocitah / (MPU vol. V, p. 439). Again we seem forced to conclude
that the MPU was written after the BSS.
5. The next passage of the PS to be considered is Appendix I, 11. 88-99.
Here the question of whether that which depends on something general is
antaranga and that which depends on somethingspecial bahirahga is dealt
with and answered in the negative. The passage has been studied in much
detail in Chapter 8 above, and its contents do not need to be recounted here
further. The first passage to be reproduced here brings the rejected position
back to mind. It is needless to add that this position is here, in the BSS,
presented as the correct one. The passage comments on the following line
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of the SK (on no. 2476): prakrtipratyayavisesdpcksdbhydm adldbhydm
antarahgatvdd ydsut, rudydt. It reads: prakrtTti / pratyayavisesapeksa-
ydsudapeksaydntararigatvdt Has ceti lope,ydsuditoh prdptayor antarahgat-
vdd ydsud ity arthah j idrsam antarahgatvam ca matupvidhdyake bhasye
uktam I 9sdmdnyadharmdpeksasdstrdpeksayd kas cid visesadharmo'dhiko
nimittakotauyasminvisesdpeksasdstresti, tat tato bahirahgam Hi tadarthah /
yathdtra ruddditvam, sdrvadhdtukatvam ceti bodhyam j sdrvadhdtukat-
vajndndya prakrter dhdtutvajndnam, pratyayasya tattvajndnam
cdvasyakam Hi sdmdnyadharmanimittakatvam atrdpy asiiti bodhyam /
(BSS 1759.12-19).
This time, it is extremely simple to find out that the LSS represents a
point of view different from that which we find in this last passage. The reason
is that the L&£, where it comments on this same rule (SK 2476), repeats
this passage virtually unchanged, but then continues: vastuta idaip
bahirahgatvam bhasye kvdpi nasritam Hi paribhdsavrttau nirupitam
(Varanasi ed. II, p. 572).
The most important difference between the passage in the BSS (which is
there accepted) and the one in the LSS (where it is rejected, as we have seen)
is that the LSS leaves out the sentence according to which this kind of
Antarangatva is found in the Bhasya on the sutra which teaches matup.
Apparently Nagesa's views regarding the correct interpretation of that
section of the Mahabhdsya had undergone a change during the time that
had elapsed between the BSS and the LSS. That this was indeed the case is
also clear from the PS, which dedicates a long and difficult passage to the
correct interpretation of that section of the Mahabhdsya (App. I 11.
99-124). The conclusion here reached is that where the Mahabhasya
seems to assign Antarangatva to an operation on the basis of the fact that it
depends on something general, it is not the siddhdntin who is speaking, but
the siddhdntyekadesin. That same passage of the Bha§ya had been
considered to represent the opinion of the siddhdntin at the time that
Nagesa wrote his BSS. Let us see how the passage is interpreted in the
MPU.
That commentary does not leave us in suspense for long. We read:
siddhdntyekadesy aha antarangatvdd ityddi astigrahanam kriyata Hyantam
(MPU vol. IV, p. 155). And the following passage is almost identical with
Appendix I, 11. 114-120, and indeed deals with the same subject: naisd
siddhdntyuktih, tdvatdpy apavddatvdhdneh / acsdmdnydpeksayano visist-
asavarndjapek^adlrghena bddhadarsandt / yat tu sdmdnydpeksam
visesdpeksdd antarangam Hi etadbhdsyena sucitam itif tan
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na I adhikapeksatvena bahirahgatva evaitadbhdsyatdtparydt / ata eva
subantasdmdnydpekso bahuvrihis tadvisesdpekso dviguh iti bhdsye
noktam / {ibid.). The close similarity between the A/P^/and the /'Sand its
difference from the BSS do not surprise us any longer.
6. We now come to the portion of the PS which introduces BP2, i.e.,
Appendix I, 11. 129 et seq. As we remember, the derivation of vdyvofi
illustrated one of the peculiarities of BP2. In vdyu-os the substitution of v
for u has as following cause o; in vdyvos P. 6.1.66 would cause elision of y,
the cause of which would be y. Clearly, v lies before o, and elision of y is
therefore antarahga with respect to the substitution of v for u.ihit BP2 does
not make a bahirahga rule asiddha with respect to a subsequently applying
antarahga rule. Therefore, in order to prevent the elision of y in vayvos, the
Bhasya has resorted to the sthanivat principle.
All this we know. But the BSS has different ideas. There we read: l0ata
eva vayvor itydder bahirahgaparibhdsayd siddhir akare uktd (BSS
135.22-136.1).
As usual, the MPU takes the side of the PS. The following passage not
only takes the same stand as the PS with respect to the derivation of
vdyvoh, it further contains much that is also found in Appendix I, 11.
138-146: tatra padasyaiva vibhajydnvdkhydne sarvesdm yugapatprdptdv
anaydu vyavasthd / kramendnvdkhydne tu purvapravrttikatvarupam
antarahgatvam purvayanddesasya [i.e., in patvyd, mrdvya]
bodhyam / asiddhatvam parayanddesasya nimittdbhdvdd
aprdptatvarupam bodhyam / ata eva vayvor ity atra ndsiddhatvam /
evamvidhdntarahgatvasya drstdntddibalena yugapatprdptivisayatvdt /
(MPU vol. I, p. 434).
7. The next point that deserves our attention here is the question of
whether a verbal root is first joined with the suffix or with the preposition.
The PS states that the first of the two alternatives is correct, the second
false. It says so at Appendix 1,11.148-149 and takes the matter up again at 11.
154-179. In this latter passage we further read that the verbal root alone
conveys the meaning that is indicated (dyotyd) by the preposition. The
result is that operations which depend on the meaning of the preposition take
place even before the root is joined with the suffix. An example is* the
derivation of samcaskdra. At the stage sam-kr-ti, first s(ut) is added by P.
6.1.135, because it depends on the meaning indicated by the preposition
(viz. bhusar\a\ see P. 6.1.137), and after that, reduplication takes place by
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P. 6.1.8, because it depends on the suffix. Last of all, the preposition is
actually joined to the verbal form. This way of looking at derivations also
allows us to explain forms like pratyeti and pratyaya. If here the verbal root
(I) had been joined to the preposition (prati) first, the outcome of the
derivations would have been different.
I shall first reproduce the comments of the BSS and the LSS on the
following line from the SK (on no. 2399): purvam dhatur upasargena
yujyate tatah sadhanena iti bhasyam / purvam sadhanena iti matantare
tu ... The BSS (1736.4-5) comments: purvam sadhaneneti / tundrucir
bodhitd / . In other words, according to the BSS, the root is joined to
the preposition first. The LSS comments on this same line as follows:
matantare tv iti / idam eva sdram iti vaksyate / (Varanasi ed. II, p. 547).
That is to say, according to the LSS the root is joined to the suffix first.
The comments in the/?££ and the L$$ evoked by some remarks of the SK
on P. 6.1.135 (no. 2553) are also worth quoting. The SK reads: tathd hi purvam
dhatur upasargena yujyate. The BSS (1794.1-5) comments: purvam dhatur
iti / ata eva anubhuyate ity atra karmani lakarah / purvam dhdtuh
sadhaneneti tarkaviruddham iti bhavah / pratyaya ityddinirdesena
upasargakdrydt purvam api kvacit sddhanakdryapravrttir jndpyate iti
pratyeti tyddau na dosah / anyathd dlrghe, tatah krtaikddesasya gune,
rupdsiddhih spastaiveti dik / . So the BSS has its own way of accounting
for pratyaya and pratyeti. The LSS is not in need of such a special device,
since it sides, as ever, with the PS. In the present context (where the
derivation of samcaskaratuh is under discussion) it says, purvam
dhatur iti / upasargenety asya tadarthenety arthah / ata eva anubhuyate
iti karmani lakarah / evan cdntarahgdrthakopasarganimittakatvdd
dvitvddyapeksaydsudantaranga itydsayah / (Varanasi ed. II, pp. 594-595).
To show that the MPU agrees with the PS and the LSS, first a portion of
the Mahdbhdsya on P. 6.1.135 will be given. It reads: Purvam dhdtuh
sadhanena yujyate pascad upasargena / sadhanam hi kriyam nirvartayati
tarn upasargo visinasty abhinirvrttasya cdrthasyopasargena visesah
sakyo vaktum / satyam evam etat / yas tv asau dhdtupasargayor
abhisambandhas tarn abhyantaram krtva dhdtuh sadhanena yujyate j
(Mbh. vol. Ill, p. 93,11. 22-26). Excerpts from the MPU on this passage:
purvam dhdtuh sadhanena ity asya yuktatvam darsayati sadhanam hiti II...
satyam evam etat / yas tv asdv iti / upasargasamjnakasabdayogdtpurvam
sddhanayoga iti satyam eva / paran tu tvadabhimatam dhdtupasarga-
sambandhakrtam artham abhyantaram krtva svabodhyam krtva dhatoh
purvam niyamendkdnksitdrthatvdt sddhanasambandhah / iatkdrya-
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pratyayayoge krte kriyatvdvagatav upasargasamjnakasabdayogah / (MPU
vol. IV, pp. 477-478).
8. The PS now proceeds to refute the view that an operation can be
antaranga on account of the fact that it affects an earlier part of the word
than what is affected by the corresponding bahirahga operation (App. 111.
180-186).
I have not been able to find a passage from the BSS which clearly shows
its position in this respect, but the following seems to indicate that it
disagrees with the P$\ nparasthdnikam iva paranimittakam api
bahirahgam ity dsayena tatsattvdd iti ydvadbddham sddhu (BS$ 197.3-4).
The MPU shows its preference for the position taken in the PS in the
following words: yat tv anayd rityd purvasthdnikam apy antarahgam
iti I tad ayuktam / antarahgasabddrthdbhdvdt j ahgasabdasya tatra
nimittaparatvat / (MPU vol. I, p. 434).
9. Appendix I, 11. 187 f. rejects the opinion that the BP does not cause a
bahirahga operation which is taught in the third Pada of the sixth Adhyaya
of Panini's grammar, where the word uttarapade is understood, to be
regarded as asiddha. The BSS repeatedly shows its allegiance to the
rejected opinion, e.g., in the following statement: niyam
cottar apadddhikdre na pravartate iti ica ekdca iti sutre bhdsye spas tarn
(BSS 130.12-3). The LSS parrots the PS thus: uttarapadddhikdre esd
paribhdsd nety uktis tu bhdsye uktapratyuktikramena purvapaksina iti
spastam tadviddm / parantapahity asya tripddydm bahirahgaparibhdsdyd
apravrttyd susddhatvena phaldbhdvena cottarapadddhikdre tatpravrtteh
sattvdt j (Varanasi ed. II, p. 780).
To get the opinion of the MPU, we turn to the passage of the
Mahdbhdsya referred to by the BSS. It is the last part of the Bhasya on P.
6.3.68, and it reads: naisd paribhdsd [i.e., the BP] ihottarapadddhikdre
sakyd vijndtum / iha hi dosah sydt / dvisamtapah
paramtapah j samyogdntalopo na sydi j tasmdcsrimanyxim iti bhavit-
avyam / / (AfBH. vol. Ill, p. 167, 11. 12-14). This passage cannot fail to
make the impression that the Bhasya supports, or even proclaims, the view
rejected in the PS and accepted in the BSS. And indeed, initially the MPU
says that this Bhasya passage represents the correct view. But then Nagesa
revises his opinion in a passage that is flanked by the words pare tu . . .
dhuh, words which commonly indicate, as we know, that here Nagesa's
considered opinion is being given. The portion of this passage that is
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relevant for us is: purvapaksy aha naisd iti ity eva bhavitavyam
ityantam / karyakdlapakse 'pi traipddike 'ntarahge bahirahgaparibhdsdpra-
vrtter visarjaniyasutre bhdsye vdrtikakhandakasiddhdntinoktatvdt yat-
hoddesapaksena sddhayitum sakyatvdc cedam prayojanam sithilam . . .
(MPU vol. IV, p. 640).
10. One line of the PS on Par. L remains to be compared with Nagesa's
other grammatical works. It is Appendix I, 11. 192 f., which reads:
dbhiye'ntarahga dbhiyasya bahirahgasya samdndsrayasya ndnendsiddhat-
vam asiddhatvdd ity asiddhavatsiitre bhdsye spastam / /
This line was studied in great detail in Chapter 4 above, and a
satisfactory interpretation of it was reached. It recurs in a virtually identical
form in the BSS: l4dbhlye'ntarahge dbhiyasya bahirahgasya samdndsray-
asya ndnendsiddhatvam ity asiddhavatsiitre bhdsye spastam (BSS
130.13-14).
However, it is not our task here to find where Nagesa's earlier and later
works agree. More interesting is that in our study of the above passage we
came across a sentence in the MPU which did not agree with what we found
to be Nagesa's position in the PS (above, p. 44). For details the reader may
refer back to Chapter 4. Here it may be remarked that this is the first point
of disagreement between MPU and PS that we have come across.
11. There remains something to say about the NP. As a matter of fact,
most of it has been said already in Chapter 13 above. Let us recapitulate the
most important points: The PS rejects the NP. The BSS, on the other hand,
accepts the existence of this Paribhasa, and considers the word satva in P.
6.1.86 Jnapaka of it, rejecting the word tuk in that same rule as
Jnapaka. The passage in which all this can be read is BSS
192.3-18: nanu ndjdnantarye iti nisedhah / atra ca satvatukor iti siitras-
thasatvagrahanam jndpakam / anyatha ko sicad ityadau paddntarasdpe-
ksabahirahgaikddesasydsiddhatvena satvdpravrttau kin tena / l5tri-
pddisthe'pi satvekdryakdlapaksdsrayendsydsiddhatvam iti cen na / pascat
pravartamdne vidhdv ajdnantarye tatpravrtteh / ata eva pacdvedam
ityddisiddhih / na ca satvavidhdv ingrahanam, tac ca parenaiveti na
tatrdjdnantaryam / tanmadhyecdm apy antarbhdvasattvenddosdt / ata
eva acor dnantaryam iti vadantah pardstdh / dharmigrdhakamdndd eva
easy ah svabodhakottaravibhaktibodhitdjnisthdnantarya eva
pravrttih / . . . etena tUggrahanam api jndpakam iti
parastam / pretyetyadau (ltdhdtupasargakdryatvenaikddesasydntarahgat'
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vac ca I him ca) samasottaram lyappravrttyd purvam
purvapadasambandhena samase jdte, tatra samhitdyd nityatvdt,
lyabutpattiparyantam apy asamhitayavasthanasambhavena purvam
ekddese, 11bahirbhutalyabapeksatugapeksayd dhdtupasargakdryatvena
tasydntarahgatvena bahirahgdsiddhatvasya durupapddatvdc ca /
The beginning of this passage may cause confusion, since it could
erroneously be thought that there the Jfiapaka saTva of the NP is rejected.
In reality it is the applicability of this Paribhasa in the example under
consideration (i.e., sukhdrtta) that is rejected. The Paribhasa itself, as well
as its Jnapaka satva, is very much accepted, as becomes clear from the
remainder of the passage.
That the LSS rejects the NP we have also seen in Chapter 13 (p. 120,
above). So the only question that remains here is what position the MPU
takes with regard to this Paribhasa And in answer it must be said that the
MPU again fully backs the LSS and the PS. Witness the following
comment on Kaiyata: yady api ndjdnantaryeti j vastuta iyam
siddhdntyasammatety asakrd dveditam / (MPU vol. IV, p. 698).
V. THE LAGHUSABDARATNA
The Laghusabdaratna (LSR) is a commentary on the Praudhamanorama
(PrM) of Bhattoji DIksita, which is itself a commentary on Bhattoji's
Siddhantakaumudi (SAT). If the colophons are to be believed, the LS7? was
written by Hari Diksita, the author of the Brhacchabdaratna (BSR) and
grandson of Bhattoji DIksita. However, a tradition exists that the real
author of the L$R was Nagesa Bhatta, who honoured his teacher Hari
DIksita by writing this book in the latter's name. This last opinion has been
defended in particular by the two editors of the BSR, i.e., by Sitaram
Shastri in the introduction to his partial edition of the BSR (pp. 23-39) and
by Venkatesh Laxman Joshi in three appendices to his partial edition of the
same text (pp. 276-328). Their arguments seem to me strong enough to
warrant acceptance of Nagesa's authorship of the LSR, at least tentatively.
Let me repeat their main points.
Sitaram Shastri begins by showing that the LSR cannot have been
written by Hari DIksita. He gives three reasons:
(1) In many places the explanations of the LSR contradict the
explanations of the BSR.
(2) Sometimes the LSR disagrees with the PrM; the BSR, on the other
hand, does not show such rebellious features.
(3) The LSR at times explains the sentences of the PrM in such a clever
way* that they come to mean something different from what they were
intended to mean; the BSR uses no such devices.
Each of these three points is extensively illustrated by the author. The
same can be said of the last two of his next three points, which aim more
directly at establishing Nagesa's authorship of the LSR:
(1) The style of the LSR is the same as that of the B$S, LSS, the
Manjusa, and the PS, as well as other works written by Nagesa.
(2) Certain passages of the LSR recur in virtually identical form in other
books of Nagesa. Examples from the BSS are given.
(3) Opinions accepted by Nagesa in his B$S' and other works are
implicitly or explicitly stated in he L$R, even where they are opposed to the
opinions of Hari DIksita.
Finally, Sitaram Shastri shows that Nagesa, consciously or
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unconsciously, left some features in the LSR which betray that he himself,
not Hari Diksita, had written this book:
(1) Never does the LSR refer to Bhattoji Diksita as "grandfather" or to
Kaunda Bhatta as "uncle", as the BSR does.
(2) Two manuscripts advise the reader to consult "the Sabdendusekhara
etc. of my student".
(3) One manuscript at one place calls the LSR a "commentary on the
Manorama written by Nagoji Bhatta".
Venkatesh Laxman Joshi does in his third appendix what Sitaram
Shastri also had done: he shows that the L&R at certain places rejects what
had been said in the BSR. In his first appendix Joshi shows that
Vaidyanatha Payagunda. in his commentary Bhdvaprakdsa on the LSR
repeatedly refers to someone by the name mdnya. This person can be
identified as Hari Diksita, the author of the BSR.1 Joshi shows that
virtually all opinions ascribed to this mdnya can be found in the BSR, and
further that these opinions as a rule deviate from the ones represented in the
LSR. Although Joshi does not explicitly say so, one might conclude from
this that in Vaidyanatha's opinion the author of the BSR and the author of
the L$R are different persons.
In his second appendix Joshi shows that, where the LSR uses some such
words as ity anyatra vistarah, ity anyatra prapancitam etc., Payagunda
specifies the work referred to as one of Nagesa's books. This behaviour of
Payagunda as well as certain other remarks made by him, are looked upon
by Joshi as strong evidence that Nagesa is the author of the LSR.2
As I said earlier, I think that the arguments brought forward by Sitaram
Shastri and Venkatesh Laxman Joshi are strong, strong enough to warrant
our accepting Nagesa's authorship of the LSR at least as a working
hypothesis. It is therefore worthwhile seeing what position the L$R takes
with regard to the BP.
Unfortunately, the L$R is somewhat parsimonious in the information it
gives regarding its standpoint in this respect. In spite of that, I shall here
reproduce what I have been able to find in the L$R up to and including the
yahanta section of the SK. For ease of comparison I shall give comparable
subsections the same numbers as have been employed in Appendix IV.
1. Regarding the question of whether meanings can make an operation
bahirariga, the L$R sides with the B§$ against the MPU, the PS and the
L§§. The SK on P. 5.4.31 (no. 2099) reads: lohitdl lingabddhanam vd /
lohitikd, lohinikd kopena / . Here the L$R remarks (Chaukhambha
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ed. II, p. 280): antarahgatvdd bddhakatvam ity api bodhyam / strltva-
nirapeksatvendsydntarahgatvam /
2. Regarding the role that technical denominations can play in making an
operation bahirahga, the LSR seems to be in a stage of transition. This may
explain the fact that the LSR contains two passages, one accepting a
technical denomination as a cause for calling an operation bahirahga, the
other rejecting this. The first passage states: na ca tadd lavasthaydm ad hi
pakse akdrsid ityddau dosah / clisicor api syatdsival lavasthaydm eva
pravrttydhgasamjhdnirapeksatvendntarahgatvddvikaranottaram evddddi-
pravrtteh / spastam cedam ekdco dve ity atrabhdsye j (Chaukhambha ed.
II, p. 345-6): We find the opposite point of view here: pare tu
samjhdkrtabahirahgatvasydndsrayanena nityatvdd asuhi rupdsi-
ddhih /'... ity dhuh / (BHU ed., p. 419).
4. It is repeatedly stated in the LSR that the BP does not apply in the Tripadi
even on the kdryakdlapaksa. Two instances: visarjariiyasutrabhdsydt tu
kdryakdlapakse'pi tripddydm tadapravrttir iti labhyate j mulan tu
kaiyatdnusdreneti pare / (BHU ed., p. 138); and again, kdryakdlapakse'pi
tripddydm bhdsyamate bahirahgaparibhdsdyd apravrtteh (Chaukhambha
ed. II, p. 156). Here the LSR has adopted Nagesa's later point of view.
5. An equally modern approach is displayed by the LSR where the
question of whether or not something special can make an operation
bahirahga is at stake. The LSR thinks that it cannot. See the following: na
ca pratyayavisesdpeksasatvdpeksaydntarahgatvdd atve rupasiddhyedam
vyartham / tddrsdntarahgasya sastre'nasrayanajnapanarthatvdt / ata eva
bhdsye Idrsam antarahgatvam na kvdpy dsritam j (BHU ed., p. 504).
7. Roots are first joined with suffixes, then with prepositions. This point of
view of Nagesa's later works is already accepted in the LSR: purvam
dhdtuh sddhaneneti paksasya mukhyatvdd iti bodhyam (Chaukhambha
ed. II, p. 359).
11. We know already (see above, pp. 122 ff.)that regarding the NP the
LSR has a different opinion from both the BSS and PS. It accepts the
Paribhasa but not satva in P. 6.1.86 as its Jfiapaka. On the contrary, the
Jfiapaka is here TuK in that same sutra. The discussion of Par. LI in the PS
suggests that the LSR represents a later phase in the development of
THE IA G HUSA BOA RA ISA 191
Nagesa's ideas regarding the BP than the BSS.
It is clear from the above that the LSR fits beautifully between the BSS, on
the one hand, and the MPU and what follows it, on the other.3 It is
therefore no more than natural to accept that the LSR was written after the
BSS and before the MPU. The circumstance that the LSR fits here so well
is also additional evidence that it was written by Nagesa.

NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1
 This answers the objection that could be raised against my interpretation and that would
run as follows: "Your interpretation forces you to consider the received text of the P$not to be
original in two places. The other interpretations did not lead to such complications and were
therefore closer to the text. This shows that your interpretation is unacceptable." In reality it is
not so much my interpretation, but rather the methodological principle to be described below,
which forces me to consider the present text of the P$ not to be original in two places. The
same difficulties exist in the other interpretations. That they have been passed over in silence
there does not plead for, but rather against, those interpretations.
2Thieme is the only author I know of who has explicitly stated this principle. Some
limitations on an unrestrained use of it will be mentioned below.
3
 This is how P. K^Gode described the VSM and the MPU (Studies in Indian Literary
History, Vol. Ill, p. 218).
4
 Much of what follows is inspired by the philosophy of Karl R. Popper. Perhaps it is more
correct to say that it is an application of that philosophy to a new field. For although Popper
writes mainly about the methodology of science, he nevertheless thinks that the "method of
learning by trial and error - of learning from our mistakes - seems to be fundamentally the
same whether it is practised by lower or by higher animals, by chimpanzees or by men of
science. My interest is not merely in the theory of scientific knowledge, but rather in the theory
of knowledge in general" (Conjectures and Refutations, p. 216). Knowledge in general
includes, no doubt, knowledge regarding the meaning of a text.
5
 Both these restrictions have been transgressed, in differing degrees, in the following pages.
See note 3 to Chapter 10, and note 5 to Appendix II.
6
 A possible exception is mentioned at p. 20 below.
CHAPTER 1
'Strictly speaking, Nagesa does not say "in a rule'1. The presence of this phrase in the
translation does no harm as long as it does not exclude what is to be read in a rule either by
anuvrtti or through the working of a Paribhasa.
2
 The question could legitimately be raised whether the v../. paceran is the original reading,
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and not pacet. A number of reasons could be adduced to support this supposition. First of all,
the two words gaudherah and paceran (not pacet) occur together in the Mahdbhdsya on
Sivasutra 5 (Kielhorn's edition, vol. I, p. 28, 1. 8), and at #55135.19-20. The co-occurrence of
the word gaudherah here in the /IS therefore favours the read ing paceran. Secondly, the fact
that Vaidyanatha in his Gadd (86.20-21) rejects paceran on grammatical grounds suggests
that he may have altered the text. A third ground is that Bhairava Misra, the second
commentator in chronological order, upholds the reading paceran and counters the
arguments used by Vaidyanatha (BhairavT 106.20-24). However, abandoning the reading
pacet would remove the foundation from a line of reasoning that will be employed in Chapter
2 below (see p. 18); or so it might be argued. In reality the situation is not all that serious. In the
LS$ - a work which represents the same views regarding the BP as the P$ (see Appendix
IV) - Nagesa repeats what we find in our present passage of the PS, with respect to bhavet, the
derivation of which is in all essentials identical with the derivation of pacet. The passage
concerned (LS$ on SK 2212; VaranasT edition, vol. II, p. 453) comments on the phrase
yalopah j bhavet / of the Siddhdntakaumudi and reads: yalopa iti / na ca tatra
kartavye'ngasanjndsdpeksasyeyo bahirahgataydsiddhatvam iti vdcyam / tasydm
ahgasabdena sabdarupasya saptamyddyantopdttasya nimittasyaiva grahanam na tu sanjndyd
arthasya vety adosdt / evan ceyo'paranimittakatvendntarahgatvam iti hodhyam / . So
whatever the original reading in the PS was, paceran or pacet, we can rest assured that in
accepting pacet there is no danger that we might come to ascribe opinions to Nagesa which
were not his.
3
 Vaidyanatha Payagunda makes a remark from which we may conclude that he considered
the two conditions as belonging together, the one being an extreme case of the other. See
below, Chapter 15, p. 152 and fn. 11.
CHAPTER 2
1
 Fn. 1: B.C.H. -tyartham ca sd. G. tyartham caisd /.
2Where in the LS$ Nagesa invokes the help of Par. LXXXVIII, in his B$$(which was
written before the PS) he makes use, in the same context (1758.9), of the Paribhasa dhdtoh
svarupagrahane tatpratyaye karyavijndnanu which is, however, rejected in the PS; see PS
171.5-7 and K. pp. 429 430. We have here an instance of Nagesa changing his opinions. For
other such instances see Appendix IV.
Fn. 4: A.C. sasthitvdt.
4
 antarangdn api iti nydyas tu jndpakasiddhamna sarvatra iti nydyendnityatvdn na (LSS,
VaranasT ed. II, pp. 447-448). The passage testifies that Par. LI1 has the general effect of
making the substitution of luk supersede any other operation (except an Apavada), not
merely such an operation as is antaranga with respect to the substitution of luk.
5
 On the question of whether we are permitted to make use of the example pacet, see note 2
to Chapter 1.
6Fn. 4: B.H. om. kdrvam.
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Fn. 1 (p. 194): C. ityddau samscahor ityddir visaya~\ B. ityddivisaya-.
8The Bdlamanoramd on this passage of the SK says: nanv antarangatvdt samprasdrandt
purvam vrddhydyddesayoh krtayoh pascal samprasdrane purvarupe asisavad iti sydt,
asusavad iti na sydt. .. (part IV, p. 293). That is to say, according to this commentary, asisavat
would result if substitution of Vrddhi by P. 7.2.115 were to take place first and subsequently
substitution of ay for di by P. 6.1.78. This is incorrect. Once ay has been substituted for ai,
asisavat can no longer be obtained. For there is no rule that causes the elision of v once it has
arisen in this derivation.
9
 An instance from Nagesa's writings where the word ddi is used apparently without serving a
purpose is found at SV 29.2, in the following context: . . . yasya yathdsaktigrahah^-grdhahi
must be a misprint], tasya tata eva bodhah / avyavahitottaratvddinivesena ca
kdryakdranabhdve vyabhicdraparihdrah / (SV29A 2). The commentary Subodhini(29.12-15)
explains: yatra padasaktigrahdvyavahitottaram vdkydrthabodha utpadyate tatra
padasaktigrahah kdranam / yatra tu vdkyasaktigrahdvyavahitottaram sa utpadyate tatra
vdkyasaktigrahah kdranam iti kdryakdranabhdvaparikalpandn na vyabhicdra ity art hah / .
Another way of accounting for ddi in our passage of the PS would be to follow the
suggestion made in Appendix II and accept as following cause of two rules united into one
(one rule assigning a name, the other prescribing an operation) all that figures in the two rules
and lies beyond what is covered by the name considered, irrespective of the case ending"
attached to the term which refers to that following cause (see p. 171-72, below).
10
 Fn. 2 (p. 14): C. anubhavan kdryi.
11
 Fn. 2: B. bddhakabija.
12
 Fn. 3: B, om. api.
13
 Fn. 4: C.G.H. -ntarahgavisaya.
14
 In spite of this I tend to think that our passage refers to BP21, not to BP22. One reason is
that Par. LXV seems to be used exclusively in cases closely i^milar to ayaja-i-indram. Here the
two rules concerned operate on the three sounds a-i-i. It seems only natural to assume that it
is that aspect of the BP which finds its causes among these three sounds and which is invoked
here, i.e., BP21 and not BP22, which would draw the complete wQrdsaya/e and indram into the
picture. A second reason is that Nagesa may have had a preference for using the expression
purvopasthitanimittakatva in connection with BP21, employing purvapravrttikatva with BP22.
See PS 96.2-3 and 97.2 (App. I 11. 131 and 144).
CHAPTER 3
'The fact that Nagesa does not accept Par. CX1X does not in any way jeopardise this
statement, for the reason he does not accept it is that it is superfluous, i.e., that all its supposed
results can be accounted for without it. See P$ 193.10-194.2; K. pp. 513-514.
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2Cf. PS 418.21-22: yannimittaghatitanimittakam yad [the edition reads yon na, which
seems to make no sense] bhavati, tat tadapeksaya bahirafigam Hi tdvan narthah,
dharmigrdhakamdnavirodhdt. That this sentence describes, and rejects, Nagesa's opinion is
clear from the preceding sentence, which quotes the P$ verbatim.
3
 See the previous note.
4
 This restriction, unavoidable as long as we stick to the assumption that the P$ is consistent
with itself, must be used with extreme caution. In the derivation of asusavat from svi-(n)i(c)-
(c)a(h)-t, which we studied on pp. 19f., the substitution of Vrddhi for the radical /is bahirafiga
because its cause is nic, whereas the antarahga substitution of Samprasarana for v was shown to
have no cause. But nic does not survive to the end: it is elided by P. 6.4.51 and does not appear
in asusavat. Here then, apparently, nic has to be accepted as a cause even though it is
dropped in the course of the derivation.
51 know of no examples besides (the incorrect form) *dtitat and atisthipat, and some forms
whose derivation is in all respects parallel to these, such as adidipat. See Chapter 6, pp. 55f.
and notes 1 and 3.
CHAPTER 4
1
 Not only Kielhorn. Jayadeva Misra says in his commentary Vijayd (p. 212,11. 7-9): dbhlye
antarahge dbhiyasya bahirangasya samdndsrayasyeti / iyam pahktir na samiclnatayd
yojayitum sakyate /.
CHAPTER 5
*Fn. 1: B. -peksasyaikddesasya bahi-. P. reads -peksaikddesasya bahi-.
2
 This is so because Par. X does not apply in the context of the BP. See pp. 24f.
3
 It might be argued that the passage which follows makes use of BP22, not of the two-word
principle. However, the words used in that passage make such an assumption not very likely to
be true.
4Fn. 2: C.G.H.P. -ntarangatvdddhal-\ B. -ntarahgatvena haU.
5Fn. 3: -perta numddayah.
CHAPTER 6
'The fact that atitat, rather than dtitat, is the correct form, does not affect the argument. A
Jnapaka is required to let us know that atitat is correct; see Mbh. HI.345.3-7. Application of
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rules would by itself lead to atitat. In the words of Nagesa: atitad iti prayoge drsyate, nyayena
tv atitad iti prdpnoti... {MPU V, p. 245).
2Fn. 3: A.C.E.G.H.K.M. -dvitvasya; B. -dvivacanasya.
3
 We find a closelysimilar situation in the derivation of adidipat, as pointed out by Vasudev
Shastri Abhyankar in his Tattvddarsa (76.15). here di-p-(n)i(c)-(c)a(h)-t becomes dip-i-a-t by
P. 7.4.1; the causes are (n)i(c)din<\ (c)a(h). Subsequently P. 7.3.86 applies; its cause is (n)i(c). P.
7.4.1 is bahirahga and therefore asiddha with respect to P. 7.3.86.
CHAPTER 7
'The two-word principle is of no help either. The two operations -joiningd-d into a and
joining d-u into o - are on a par in that both connect two different words. The independent
position of prepositions in Panini's grammar may in this connection be recalled.
2Cf. PS 76.13: arthanimittakasya na bahirahgatvam / ata eva . . . and P$ 77.1, where ata
eva again refers back to this same statement. At PS 80.8 ata eva refers back to the immediately
preceding denial that bahirahga can mean "depending on many" etc. Similarly at PS 82.7 ata
eva introduces a corollary of the fact that a rule cannot be bahirahga on account of its
depending on a samjnd, stated two lines earlier. Further occurrences of these words at PS 87.6,
9; 90.1, 6, 7; 91.3; 94.6, 8; 95.2 etc.
CHAPTER 8
1
 Most commentators pass over the contradiction in silence. Vijayadeva Mishra tries to save
the passage in a far-fetched way, saying: sdmdnyadharmanimittakatvdbhdveneti / na hi
sdstrapramanasiddhasya sarvadhdtukatvasya pratyayatvadhdtutvajndnam antarajfidtatvam
iva pratyaksapramdnasiddhasya Irttvasya latvajndnam vindjndtatvam yena Irttvajndne
latvajndnam dvasyakam sydd iti bhdvah / Irttvajndndya katham til latvajfidndpeksdydm api
syddikdrye ghate kuldlpitur ivdnyathdsiddhatvena latvasydnimittatvdd adhikanimittaka-
tvaprayuktasya bahirahgatvasya durupapddatvdt / {Vijayd 207.12-17).
2
 This same passage, together with what precedes it, is again reproduced in Appendix IV, p.
182.
3
 Again reproduced in Appendix IV, p. 182.
4
 It is interesting to note that Nagesa already had misgivings about the correctness of
Kaiyata's statement when he wrote his Uddyota. While commenting on this statement (i.e., in
the Uddyota on P. 1.3.12) he says: aparanimittakatvena ladesdndm antarangatvam vaktum
yogyam, idrs'dntarahgatvasya bhdsye kvdpy andsrayandd iti kecit {MPU vol. II, p. 236).
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CHAPTER 9
1
 See Gadd 93.15, where the passage beginning with ata evomanos ca is introduced with the
words: nanuktajndpakenddydrthaldbhe'pi ndntydrthaldbho'tah sa ninnulo'ta aha: ata
evometi /. Later he refers back to this feature as "the second Jfiapaka": dvitiyajndpakena
prakriydkramena purvopasthitanimittakatvasya labha iti bodhyam / (Gadd 102.29-30).
Besides two Jnapakas and the maxim from ordinary life, Vaidyanatha invokes the authority of
the Bhasya to justify that aspect of the BP according to which that operation is antarahga
whose causes lie within the causes of the corresponding bahiranga operation. Cf. Gadd
102.27-28: yena vidhir iti sutrasthoktabhdsyaprdmdriydd ghatakatvenety asydpi Idbhah. For
a further discussion of Vaidyanatha's views, see Chapter 15 below. Vaidyanatha s idea that ah in
P. 6.1.95 is a Jnapaka of the BP was not new. The same idea had been expressed in a varttika (no.
9) an P. 6.1.108: drii pararupavacanam tujndpakam antarangaballyastvasya (Mahdbhdsya,
Kielhorn's edition III, 83.25).
2Fn. 1: C.H. sye visaye.
3
 In Chapter 10 below.
4
 For example, Vaidyanatha's commentary to Par. LXXXV mentions variant readings at
Gadd 178.12-13; 180.28; 181.13-14, 16-19; 182.10, 15.
5
 For example, the reading paceran instead of pacet in P$ 78.1 (App. I 1. 12), which
Payaguncla rejects (see note 2 to Chapter 1), has survived in seven (or six?) out of ten
manuscripts (see P$l% fn. 1 and App. I note 5; manuscript A is mentioned twice, which must
be a mistake). See further P$ 26 fn. 3; 31 fn. 6; 32 fn. 2 (?); 36 fn. 4; 42 fn. 2 and 5; 46 fn. 2 etc.
6
 Fn. 5: ka. idam tv avadheyam.
7
 /tf 76.9-12 is attacked in PS 418.4-6; PS 76.13-77.2 in PS 420.2-5; ^ 7 8 . 1 - 3 and PS
81.4-82.3 in PS420.5-8; /tf 78.3-80.10 in PS418.8-21;/>580.12-81.2 in PS4\S.25^193; PS
82.3-7 in PS 419.12-16; PS 82.7-83.2 in PS 419.25^20.1; P$ 85.2-6 in PS 418.22-25; PS
86.4-7 in PS 421.6-12; /tf 86.8-87.12 in PS 422.5-17.
8
 See p. 83 above.
CHAPTER 10
'The temptation becomes even greater when we see that Nagesa uses the same argument
once in his LSS in a passage which also occurs in the BSSand which at the same time contains
a remark that is clearly incompatible with the point of view which he had adopted in the PS.
The passage comments on the Varttika satisistasvarabaliyastvam anyatra vikaranebhya iti
vdcyam (cf. V . 6 . 1 . 1 5 8 . 9 a n d 11) a n d r e a d s ( L $ $ o n S K 3 6 5 0 , V a r a n a s l e d . II , p . 9 1 7 = B $ $
2208.13-17): anyatreti / atra cajndpakam tdseh parasya lasdrvadhdtukasya nighdtavidhdnam
I anyathd vikarandnam lakdravikesdpek$atayd tibddindtp lamdtrdpeksatvdd antarahgatvena
tibddindm api kartrddyarthapeksatvena bahirangatve tu paratvena - tibddi$u krtesu
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kriyamanasya tasisvarasya satisistaivacchesanighatena siddhe tadvaiyarthyam spastam eva /.
The remark that substitution of ti(p) etc. for / is bahirariga because it requires the meanings
kartr etc. contradicts P§ 76.13 (tenanhanimittakasva na bahirangatvam = App. 1 \. 8) and
suggests that the whole of this passage was thoughtlessly transferred to the LSS.
2See Jayashree A. Gune, The Meaning of Tenses and Moods, p. 3.
3
 Cf. Thieme's remark: "With all his criticism of Kaiyata, Nagojl remains a most generous
opponent. Wherever it is possible, he tries to save Kaiyata*s formulation by showing it to be
capable of being interpreted in a way that would yield an unimpeachable view." (Kleine
Schriften II, p.' 608, fn. 10.)
Of course, it cannot but be admitted that the fact of some effort being required to make the
interpretation fit Nagesa's actual words can be used as an objection against this interpretation.
The interpretation is, therefore, presented with no more than a moderate amount of
confidence. It must, however, be emphasized that the correctness or otherwise of this
interpretation has no repercussions elsewhere in this book, not even on the discussion
immediately following.
'Above, p. 97.
5
 Above, p. 100.
CHAPTER 11
'See note 3 to Appendix III.
2
 No manuscript of the VSMexists in Poona, as far as I know. (See also Appendix III, p.
174 below.) I have therefore not been able to acquaint myself directly with this book.
3
 It seems likely that the SV is nothing more than a repetition of certain parts
of the VSM, most probably of the chapters called Varnasphotasamanyaniriipana,
Sakhandapadavakyasphotaniriipana, Akhandapadavakyasphotanirupana and
Jatisphotanirupana (see the table on pp. 23-24 of Kapil Deva Shastri's introduction to the
PLM). The reason is that on two occasions the SV refers forward to what seem to be chapters
of the VSM: to the Tinarthanirupana at SV 8.4^5 (tatha akhyatarthaniritpanavasare
prapaneayisyamah), perhaps to the Samasasaktinirupana at SV 55.12-13 (sakyasambandha
eva laksana na bodhyasambandhe ity ekarthwhavavade prapancayisyate). It is disturbing
that this second sentence must, in the VSM, have belonged, not to the Varna-
sphofasamdnyanirupana, but to one of the other three chapters enumerated above,
most probably to the Sakhandapadavakyasphotanirupana. But these three chapters come at
the end of the VSM, and therefore do not precede the chapter Samasasaktinirupana, nor any
other chapter to which our sentence could be understood to refer. We may thus have to
assume that the SV was the beginning of a complete reorganization of the VSM, which was
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never completed. The identity of names (the VSM also calls itself Sphotavdda; see the
introduction to the PLM, pp. 21-22) further support this.
That the SV was written after the VSM, not before it, is testified to by the circumstance that
in the LM and in the PLM we find one single chapter a bout the sphota, as we assume theSF
was intended to be for the VSM. Moreover, that chapter of the LM is often identical with the
SV. And Vaidyanatha Payagunda's commentary Kald on the LM often takes whole passages
from the SV, especially of course while commenting on the chapter on sphota. Close
similarities exist between SV 29.2-30.3 and LM 429.13-25,5^31.2-4 and LA/429.14-15, SV
32.1-2 and LM 430.5-7, SV 34.4-35.1 and LM 430.7-9, SF35.3-6and LM 430.10-13, SV
37.1-2and LM 13.8-10, SV 38.1-39.2 and LM 17.1-9, SF51.6-8 and LM 430.14-16, SV
52.4-6 and LM430.17-20, etc. Further similarities exist between SV5.1 and Afa/d 495.17-18,
5F30.3-4andA:fl/fl432.17,5'F30.6-31.2and^a/a432.11 14,5 F31.4-35.7 and Kald 15.7-30,
SF52.6-9 and Kald 433.3-6,5^60.1 and Kald 442.24-25, 5F61.4-62.2 and Kald4433-l,SV
96.8-9 and Kald 495.20, 5^99.4-5 and Kald 495.16-17, SV 100.2-3 and Kald 495.18-19,5^
100.3 andKald 497.6. Inspection of a manuscript of the unpublished VSM (unfortunately not
accessible to me) may solve the problem of the exact relation between the 5^and the VSM.
4
 Regarding Sitaram Shastri's contention that the LM was written after the L$$ (a
consequence of which would be that the LM postdated the P$\ see Appendix III), see note 4 to
Appendix III.
CHAPTER 13
1
 Fn. 4: B. ata eva ca nalopah.
2
 Fn. 5: P. nalopasydsiddhatvena\ B.H.nalopdsiddhatvena siddhes ta-\ C.G. nalopdsiddhes
ta-.
3
 Fn. 6: C. om. sati.
4The other passage discussed in Appendix II tells us that the words krtiand tuk in P. 8.2.2
indicate that the BP cannot be used when tuk is added. This also conflicts with the statement
according to which these words serve a function on account of the NP.
5Fn. 1 (p. 164): 'aca dnantaryam' iti gha. na. pdthah /.
6Fn. 2 (p. 164): 'nisedhdprdpteh' iti mudritesu pathah /.
Fn.3: 'sw trasthatuggrahanam' iti gha. pdthah /.
8Fn. 4 (p. 102): C.G.H -ntaryanimittake; B. -ntaryanimitte.
9Fn. 1 (p. 103): P. mentions the reading tasya bhdvo bahistvam bahirahgatvam.
10Fn. 4: C.G.H. ity dhgrahanam\ B. ity atrdngrahanam.
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11
 Fn. 1 (p. 102): C.G. parddivattvenau-; B.H. pardditvenau-.
12
 Fn. 2 (p. 102): P. reads padatvena sasya padddi-.
13
 Fn. 3 (p. 102): C.G.H. nisedhah; B. satvanisedhah.
14
 Below, p. 186.
CHAPTER 14
1
 Fn. 6: G.P. na satvam ddye\ A.B.C.H.M. nettvasatve ddye\ the latter reading is also
mentioned by P.
2Fn. 7: C. aprasiddhatvdt; B. aprasiddhatvdc ca.
3Fn. 1: G.H.P. saumendre; B.C. somendre.
4Fn. 2: C.G.H. -dgune pit rva-; B. -dgune krte purva-.
5
 It must be admitted that here BP22 is used not because the meanings involved arise in a
certain order. Rather, the substitution of ant seems to be antarahga here quite simply because
it presents itself earlier in the derivation than the substitution of at. It is to cover cases like this
that I like to paraphrase BP22 as "first come, first served". It is also possible to assume that in
the passage under consideration the word antarahga is used in a nontechnical sense. On this
alternative, however, the theoretical difficulty remains of whether BPi or BP2 is to be applied.
6Fn. 2 (p. 149): B.H. iyam ca pardntarangddibadhdndm a-.
7Fn. 5: B.H. syantsyantyddau sakdrddivise$dpeksatvdd atmamepda-; P. rejects this
reading.
CHAPTER 15
1
 Fn. 1 (p. 84): ga. -rvavihitatvdt tadabhd-.
2Fn. 2 (p. 85): gha. -na tattvdta-.
3
 The edition readsparatvdjand gives no variant readings. All the same, paratvaj cannot be
correct. The emendation purastdj is tentative, but gives, no doubt, the intended meaning.
41 understand tattvam here to mean antarbhutatvam, since the word antarbhuta is used in
the immediately preceding sentence.
5
 Here I take tattvam to mean antarahgatvam. My reason is as follows: The P$ contains a
line which is almost identical with this line from the Gadd. It reads: tad api yugapatprdptau
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purvapravrttiniydmakam eva ...na tu jdtasya bahirangasya tadrse'ntarahge'siddhatani-
ydmakam. . .(/>.$ 96.9-10; App. 111. 138-141). The word tad in the /^corresponds to tattvam
in our passage of the Gadd. The word tad is explained by Vaidyanatha as follows: tadapi ti /
lair a bhdsye spastam uktam idam antararigatvam ity art hah / (Gadd 103.17).
6At />£ 96.2-3 (App. I 1. 131) and at P$ 148.11.
7
 See pp. 30f., above.
8The edition reads kapratyaya-. This seems to be a misprint.
9This we observed in the beginning of this chapter, p. 146-147.
10The term purvopasthita is used at PS 96.2 -3, the derivation of patvyd (vibhajydn-
vdkhydne) appears at /^96 9. This same derivation (k ra me nd nvakh yd ne) does not come in till
later, at P$ 97.2.
11
 alpanimittasya tatrve paranimittasyaivdbhdvenanaimittikasya tattvam kaimuti-
kanydyena siddham....
12
 tatrddyajndpakena jdtasyety asyeva purvavihitatvddyalpanimittatvayor Idbhah / alpa-
nimittatvam api samkhyayd labdham /
13
 dvitiyajnapakena prakriydkramena purvopasthitanimittakatvasya Idbha iti bodhyam.
CHAPTER 16
1
 Siradeva considers the Paribhasa anitya (PS234. \2). So do Purusottamadeva (PS 129.19
ff.), NFlakantha Dfksita (PS 304.21-22), and Sesadrisudrn (PS 423.9-10). Of the authors
belonging to the Paninian school whose treatises are included in the PS, only Vyadi and
Haribhaskara do not seem to accept that the BP is anitya. Haribhaskara, however, refers to the
opinion of those who think it is (PS 354.9-10).
2
 It is far from certain that Bhairava Misra was Nagesa's direct pupil. See K.V. Abhyankar,
Prastdvand Khanda, pp. 24-25.
3This would agree with the opinion of Govind Das, according to which the author of the
Gadd and other grammatical works was the same Balam Bhatta who was in his old age known
to Colebrooke in the early years of the 19th century. Says Das: "Another question namely,
whether Balam Bhatta was merely a pet name of the author, his real name being Vaidyanatha as
is generally believed, is solved by the opening Shlokas of the Digest he was compiling for
Colebrooke. It is clearly stated there that his father's name was Vaidyanatha, his mother's
Lakshml Devi. It seems that all his works on grammar were composed in his father's name and
all his law works in his mother's name. There is a Benares tradition that his father took the
child to Nagesh, for whom he had great respect and asked him to bless the youngster. Nagesh
did it and said that he would grow up to write commentaries on his works. If all this is true, it
would prove that Balam Bhatta became a pupil of the famous Nagesh only towards the close of
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his life."(J. R- Gharpure (ed.), Bdlambhattu Book I, Introduction^. 32; my italics.) That this
Balam Bhatta had been a pupil of Nagesa we learn from one of the slokas referred to by Das:
nagesapadanirato vaidyandthdtmajah sudhihi (ibid. p. 33).
APPENDIX I
'Fn. 5 (p. 76): H.P. nimittam eva\ A.B.C.D.E.G.M. om. eva.
Fn. 6 (p. 76): C. tendrthanimittasya.
3Fn. 7 (p. 76): B.D.E.M. stritvanimittaka-.
4Fn. 1 (p. 77): A.D.E.G.K.C.H.M. -tsutrasthabhdsya-; B. tsutra eva bhdsya-.
5Fn. i (p. 78): A.E.B.P. paced itydddv e-\ A D . K.C.G. H. M. pacerannitydddv e-.
Fn. 2 (p. 78): P. reads samjndsdpeksatvena.
7In. 3 (p. 78): A.B.D.E.K.M.H.G. yanaci-.
Fn. i (p. 80): C. nityatvdt purva-\ A.D.E.B.G.H.M. nityatvdd gundt purva-.
F n
- 1 (p- 81): A.B.D.E.G.K. -bhdsyena pari-;C. -bhasye capari-. P. bhasyena capah-.
10 r- _
**n. 2 (p. 81): A.P. saptamyddyantopdttam\ B.C.D.E.K.G.H.M. saptam-
yadyantatayopdttam.
"Fn. 3 (p. 81): A.D.E.M.H.G- tatsutrabhdsye eva.
Fn. 1 (p. 82): A.D.E.K.C.M. nalopasya hi padasamjndsdpeksa-\ B. nalopasya
padasamjndsdpeksa-; G.H.P. nalope hi pada-.
Fn. 2 (p. 82): A.D.E.K.C.G.H.M. samjndkrtabahira-\ B. samjndkrtasya bahira-.
Fn. 1 (p. 83): B. tatraiva pradipo-.
Fn. 1 (p. 84): E.P. vrscatyddisu\ B.C.G.vrascddisu. M. vrascatyddisu. H. vrscatityddisu.
I6Fn. 2 (p. 84): A.D.E.K.C.G.M. dvayor iti\ B. Jvayor api.
Fn. 3 (p. 84): B. paribhdsdntaram apdstam.
Fn. 4 (p. 84): G.E. sutrabhdsye.
19Fn. 5 (p. 84): B.M. tatpratydkhydndc ca / /.
204 NOTES
20
 Fn. 6 (p. 84): B. antarahgas'dstram asyd [?]
21
 Fn. 1 (p. 85): P. satydm hy etasydm; A.B.C.D.G.H.M. satydm hi tasydm.
22Fn. 1 (p. 86): A.D.C.G.M. gunavrddhiti-\ B. om. ///.
23Fn. 2 (p. 86): vdryuhetyddy uhateh. A.D. vdryuha ityddi tu uhateh.
24
 Fn. 3 (p. 86): M.P. tripddydm etatpra-; A.D.E.B.G.G. [?] H. tripddydm tatpra-.
25Fn. 1 (p. 87): A.B.C.G.M. -bhdvdt tayd tasyd-; B.om. tayd. U.bhdvddanayd tasyd-.
26Fn. 2 (p. 87):C.H. -siddhatvdt tadabhdvena;B.G.om. tad. A.M. antarahgatvdbhdvena.
27Fn. 3 (p. 87): B. tripddydm asydnupa-.
28
 Fn. 4 (p. 87): B. -sutrabhdsye.
29Fn. 5 (p. 87): B. om. tasya dosa iti.
30Fn. 6 (p. 87): C. laksanaikacaksurbhir nddartavya iti; B.G.H.M. laksanacaksurbhir
nddaraniyd iti.
31
 In agreement with the results of Chapter 7 above, we skip here P$ 87.13-92.3 and
continue at P$92A. Moreover, P$ 92.4-13 has been modified as indicated in Chapter 8; the
result is 11. 88-99.
32Fn. 5 (p. 92): B. visesyasya.
33Fn. 6 (p. 92): C.G.H. kvdpy anullekhdc ca\ B. kvdpy anullekhandc ca.
34Fn. 3 (p. 92): B. bahirahgdh sydyddaya.
35
 Fn. 4 (p. 92): C.G. iti parastam.
36
 Fn. 1 (p. 93): C.G. matupprdptim dsahkya\ B.H. matup prdpnotfty dsarikya.
37
 Fn. 2 (p. 93): C.G.H. siddhdntinokte; B. siddhdntinoktam.
38
 Fn. 3 (p. 93): P. purvapaksyuktih; B.C.G.H. purvapaksyuktir bhdsye.
39
 Fn. 4 (p. 93): P. paratvdd bddhah\ B.C.G.H. om. paratvdt.
40Fn. 5 (p. 93): C.H. itydsayena; B.G. itydsayakena.
41
 Fn. 6 (p. 93): C.G.H. tarn avakdsam a-; B. tarn evdvakdsam a-.
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42Fn. 7 (p. 93): B.H. and Kaiyata samkhyayas taddhitdrthei, C.G. samkhyayas taddhitart-
heti.
43Fn. 8 (p. 93): P. kaiyata iti; B.C.G.H. om. Hi.
44The word na is not found in Abhyankar's edition (/>£94.5), probably due to oversight. It
is needed in order to make sense of the sentence. It is present in other editions, e.g., in the one
that contains Vaidyanatha's Gadd (101.6).
Fn. 1 (p. 94): B. -dvisesdpeksdrthadvigu-.
Fn. 2 (p. 94): C. -tvasydndsraya-; B.G.H. -tvdnrisraya-.
47Fn. 1 (p. 95): B.H. and Bhasya vaktavya; C.G. vdcya.
Fn. 2 (p. 95): B. "nantyasya satve.
Fn. 1 (p. 96): P. tatkramenaiva ca\ B.C.G.H. om. ca; G. kramenaiva tattadbodhaka.
Fn. 2 (p. 96): H. d ity acah. P. -d ity anendcah; B.C.G. d ityddindcah.
51
 Fn. 1 (p. 97): P. reads vdritocah parasminnity atra bhdsyakrtd /.
Fn. 2 (p. 97): C. G. H. purvapravrttikatvam apy antarahga; B. pu rvapravrttinimittakatvam
api antara--
53
 Fn. 3 (p. 97): B. nimittatvdbhd-.
54
 Here the passage P$ 87.13-92.3 is inserted, for reasons described in Chapter 7. The
passage here covers 11. 146-179.
55Fn. 7 (p. 87): [?] ata evaumdrios ca- M. ata eva omd-.
56
 Fn. 8 (p. 87): B.P.G. -ngatvdd gune krte; C. om. km. M.H. -ngatvdd dd gune.
57
 Fn. i (p. 88): B.P. sddhanabodhana-\ C.G.H. sddhakabodhaka-.
58Fn. 1 (p. 89): P. mentions the reading sddhandkdriksatvdt.
59Fn. 1 (p. 90): P. purvam hi; B.C.G.H. and Bhasya om. hi.
60Fn. 2 (p. 90): C.G.H.P. and Bhasya sddhanam hi; B. om. hi.
61
 Fn. 3 (p. 90): P. tyddind bhdsye /.
62
 Fn. 4 (p. 90): G.H. srotrbodhdya.
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63
 Fn. 1 (p. 91): C.G. rupdsiddhih\ B.H. rupdsiddheh.
64
 Fn. 2 (p . 91): C . G . . H . -rganimittaka; B. -rganimittam.
65
 Fn. 3 (p. 91): C.G.H. -nimittatvdt tad antarahgam; B. om. tad.
66
 Fn. 1 (p. 92): C.G..H. sdmdnydpeksakam.
67Fn. 2 (p. 92): B.P. purvam utpatteh; C.G.H. purvam utpattify.
68
 Here we turn back to P$ 97.3.
69
 Fn. 4 (p. 97): C. om. luki... vinmatoh.
70Fn. 5 (p. 97): B. -pravrttyartham jdti-.
71
 Fn. 1 (p. 98): C.G.H.P. bahirahgdsiddha-\ B. bahirahgatvdsiddha-.
72
 Fn. 2 (p. 98): C.G.H. padddhikdrasthabahi-\ B. -padddhikdrasya bahi-.
73
 Fn. 3 (p. 98): G. [?] G.H. -r iti nddartavyd; B. om. sd.
74Fn. 1 (p. 99): C. om. samdndsrayasya.
75Fn. 1 (p. 100): B. sici vrddhau yena-.
APPENDIX II ""
'The two passages that are going to be studied now, and that are intended to show that
indirect causes can make an operation bahirahga, lose some of their force owing to the fact
that the examples they contain can also satisfactorily be accounted for with the help of BP22.
Those readers who wish to press this point and conclude that after all as far as Nagesa is
concerned indirect causes cannot make an operation bahirahga will have to find another way
to save the Jnapaka of the BP (see above, p. 29f.), failing which they have to consider Nagesa's
remarks concerning that Jnapaka nonsensical thus sinning against the methodology adopted
in this book. Moreover, the previous passage discussed in this appendix cannot be accounted
for with the help of BP22.
2Fn. 1: B. om. api.
3The Mahdbhdsya (Kielhorns's edition, vol. Ill, p. 177, 1. 2) reads: ihdnya dcdryds cau
pratyarigasya pratisedham dhus ..., ascribing this statement to **other Acaryas". The
statement is not a Varttika in the ordinary sense of the word, and indeed Kielhorn's edition
does not print it as one.
4Fn. 3: B.C.G. bahirahgobha-. H. antarahgdd ubhayo-.
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5
 The explanation does not fit very well with the rest of the interpretation of Par. L. either,
being rather ad hoc.
APPENDIX III
1
 Sitaram Shastri is of the opinion (which he expresses in the introduction to the B$$, p. 45,
and repeats in the introduction to the B$R, p. 39) that Nagesa constantly made changes and
improvements in his books. This would explain the fact that "almost all his grammatical
books are mentioned in almost all those books." However, the mutual references lead us into
difficulties in only one or two cases (viz. in the case of the MPUand perhaps that of the L&£;
see below, p. 174f. and note 4). These difficulties, moreover, can much more satisfactorily be
accounted for by assuming, not that those works were first completed and afterwards
modified, but rather that Nagesa took much time in completing them; that is to say, he kept
them as unfinished drafts for a long time. Sitaram Shastri's idea seems probable only in the
case of the B$$, where the evidence of the manuscripts appears to support it (see p. 175
below). As long as it has not been shown that manuscripts of Nagesa's other grammatical
works display the same peculiarities as those of the B$$, Sitaram's suggestions must be
discarded.
2
 P. K. Gode {Studies in Indian Literary History, Vol. Ill, pp. 212-213) gives a list of titles of
works ascribed to Nagesa, found in Aufrecht's Catalogus Catalogorum. Sitaram Shastri
(introduction to the BSS, pp. 59-60) gives a number of titles which is mainly based on that list.
Among these titles there are some which cannot but belong to grammatical works, but which
are not contained in the list of ten titles given above. Since I have not been able to find printed
editions of any of those works, they are not discussed in this appendix.
3
 That the B$$ preceded the L$$ is already clear from the fact that the former refers to itself
in the colophons as Sabdendusekhara, the latter as Laghusabdendusekhara. A similar line of
reasoning applies to the VSM and the LM, this time with reference to the opening stanzas (see
Kapil Deva Shastri's introduction to the PLM, p. 19). The PLM presents itself under this
name both in its initial stanza and in its colophon, i.e., it presents itself as an abbreviation of
the LM. Further arguments to show the temporal priority of the B$$ over the L^^have been
given by Sitaram Shastri in the introduction to the B$$ (pp. 40-41).
4
 Sitaram Shastri is of the opinion that the Sabdendusekhara referred to in the LM is the
L$$. If this were true, the chronological scheme proposed'in this appendix, as well as certain
(tentative) conclusions arrived at in Chapter 11, would be jeopardized. However, the two
arguments which he brings forward on pp. 42-44 of the introduction to the B$$ are both
weak. The first merely shows that Vaidyanatha Payagunda, in his commentary on the LM,
explains a reference to the Sabdendusekhara by quoting the L$$. This may or may not show
that according to Vaidyanatha the LM was written after the L$S. And even if we assume that
it does show this, we are still far from attaining on this account any certainty regarding the
relative chronology of these two works. Much of the present book is intended to show that
Vaidyanatha is not such an infallible guide regarding Nagesa's work as has often been
supposed. Moreover, the B$$ contains a passage (also quoted by Sitaram Shastri, p. 43)
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which has the same meaning as the passage from the L$$quoted by Vaidyanatha; only the
form differs somewhat.
The second argument shows that at one place where the LM contains the phrase etac ca
nirupitam ... sabdendusekhare the L$$ contains a more detailed discussion of the topic
concerned than the B$$. Indeed, the Z?££contains here no more than what is also found in the
LM. However, the term nirupita, as far as I know, does «o/ promise a lengthy discussion. That
role is reserved for words like vistara and prapancita. I do not see what objection could be
raised against the assumption that the LMhere simply refers to a passage from the B$$ where
the same topic has been discussed in a similar manner.
Finally, even if it were certain that the LM refers to the L&$, one could still, on very
reasonable grounds, maintain that the L$$ was completed after the LM. Sitaram Shastri
himself has attempted to show that the B$$ underwent many revisions in the hands of Nagesa
after its first appearance (see p. 175 below). Indeed, the L££is supposed to be the final result
of all these revisions (introduction to B$$, p. 35). But the final version of the /?&£used in the
edition was completed before the L$R(below, pp. 175 and 191). The L £ £ on the other hand,
refers to the /\£and was completed after that work (below, p. 174). Sitaram's own theory
therefore suggests that the L££ was worked upon by Nagesa during the whole period from the
completion of the B$$ until after the completion of the P$. We are forced to accept something
similar regarding the MPU (below, p, 175). It follows that if the LM does indeed refer to the
L££ (which is doubtful), all we can conclude from this is that the LM was written after the
5
 Some of the passages in which the Manjusd is mentioned do not belong tothe latest layer of
the text: i.e., they do not belong only to manuscripts ka. and ga. (see below). This applies, for
instance, to B$$ 73.20 and 365.12.
6
 For example, the refernce to the MPU at B$$ 198.11 occurs in a sentence that belongs to
the relatively early manuscript kha, but not to the late manuscripts ka and ga. See B$$ 198 fn.
4.
7
 And in note 3 to that chapter some reasons were given to assume that the SKwas
composed after the VSM.
APPENDIX IV
*Fn. 3: 'nq tisr'ity drabhya 'spastaiva'ityantah ka. pdthah.
2Fn. 4: ka. ga. pdthah / kha. ndsti /.
3Fn. 3: 'evan ca'ity drabhya 'vidhanapadarthatvdt' ityantah ka. kundalitah kha. pdthah /
ga ndsti / (yidhdnapadarthatvdt occurs at p. 679, 1. 2).
4Fn. 4: 'iti vdcyam / apavddatvdd enadddesasyaiva purvam pravrtteh' iti kha. pdthah.
5Fn. 3: ita drabhya 'sthdnivadbhdvdc ca'ityantah ka. kundalitah kha.pdthah / ga.ndsti /
(sthdnivadbhdvdc ca occurs at B$$ 216.5).
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6Fn. 4: 'sdmarthyena' ityantah kha. ndsti.
7Fn. 5: 'parasparavirodhe' ity atogre 'vinigamjakdbhdvdc ca' ity ay am amsahka. pustake
sthitopi tatraiva masilepena durikrtah / 'dvayoh parasparavirodhe' iti tu kha. pdthah / (I
cannot find the words vinigamakdbhdvdc ca).
8Fn. 6: 'pravrttydpanes ca paratvdd visargo' kha. pdthah.
9Fn. 3: 'yatra sdmdnyadharmdpeksasdstrdpeksayd' iti ga. pdthah.
10
 Fn. 4: ka. ga. pdthah / kha. ndsti /.
11
 Sc. dnuptirvyd.
12
 Fn. 4 (p. 196): kha. pdthah. In the later Mss. Arc. and ga. this position has been definitely
abandoned, witness, B$$ 129.23-130.2, which, as fn. 5 to p. 129 indicates, occurs only in Mss.
ka. and ga.\ the passage reads: antahkdryatvam cdntarbhutanimittakatvam / purvopa-
sthitanimitiakatvam iti ydvat / antarangasabde'hgasabdasya nimittaparatvat / na tu purvo-
pasthitasthdnikatvam api / ahgasabdat tadalabhdt /.
13Fn. 5 (p. 129): 'krti tuggrahandd iti dik' (pr. 131)ityanto'yam ka. ga. pdihah . . .
14
 This passage also falls within the jurisdiction of fn. 5 to p. 129, partially reproduced in
note 13 above.
15Fn. 1: 'asydsiddhatvam' ityanto'yam ka. ga. pdthah kha. ndsti I.
16
 Fn. 2: ka. ga. ndsti / kha. pdthah /
17Fn. 3: 'bahirbhutalyabapeksayd'kha. pdthah
APPENDIX V
!The same point is made by Sitaram Shastri in the introduction to the B$R, pp. 21-22.
2
 George Cardona, in his Pdnini: A Survey of Research, p. 287, refers to Joshi's arguments,
and further points out that K. V. Abhyankar defended the view that the L$R was written by
Hari Diksita, whereas M. S. Bhat joined the camp of those who see Nagesa as its author.
Neither Cardona, nor any of the authors he mentions, seem to have taken notice of Sitaram
Shastri's introduction to the B$R, which, in my opinion, contains the best arguments.
3
 Sitaram Shastri also maintains on pp. 46-47 of the introduction to the B$$ that the
antedates the L$R However, the opinion which this same author records on p. 41 of the
introduction to the B$R and according to which the L$R is Nagesa's last grammatical work
cannot be accepted because of the evidence contained in this appendix.
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